Defining What to Regulate: Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization by Morriss, Andrew P. & Dudley, Susan E.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2006
Defining What to Regulate: Silica and the Problem
of Regulatory Categorization
Andrew P. Morriss
Texas A&M University School of Law, amorriss@law.tamu.edu
Susan E. Dudley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate: Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 Admin. L. Rev.
269 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/425
ARTICLES
DEFINING WHAT TO REGULATE: SILICA
AND THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
CATEGORIZATION
ANDREW P. MORRISS* & SUSAN E. DUDLEY**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................... 2 70
I. The Problem of Categorization ....................................................... 272
A . C haracterization ....................................................................... 274
B. Silica Categorization and Health Effects .................................. 277
C. Incentives for Developing Knowledge ..................................... 280
1. Market Incentives and Market Failures .............................. 281
2. Incentives for Categorization and Knowledge ................... 282
3. Government Failures and the Role of Interest Groups ....... 284
II. An Interest Group-Based Account of Silica Regulation ................. 288
A. The Early Awareness of the Health Risks of Silica ................. 288
B. From the Industrial Revolution to the New Deal ..................... 290
1. Industrialization's Im pacts ................................................. 290
2. The Reaction of Interest Groups ......................................... 295
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law & Regulation, Case School of Law,
Cleveland, Ohio & Senior Fellow, Property & Environment Research Center, Bozeman,
Montana. A.B. 1981, Princeton University; J.D., M.Pub.Aff. 1984, The University of Texas
at Austin; Ph.D. (Economics) 1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The authors
thank Chaya Compton and Olivia Odell for research assistance; the attendees at the Sorptive
Minerals Institute Spring Forum 2005, the University of Texas Law and Economics
Workshop, and Harrison Coulter for comments on various versions of this Article; and Case
School of Law Dean Gerald Komgold for research funding.
Director, Regulatory Studies Program, Mercatus Center at George Mason
University and Adjunct Professor, George Mason University School of Law. B.S. 1977,
University of Massachusetts; S.M.M. 1981, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
270 ADMINIS TRATIVE LA WREVIEW [58:2
3. W orkers' Com pensation ..................................................... 299
4. The Silicosis Crisis of the 1930s ........................................ 302
5. T he N ew D eal ..................................................................... 305
6. Explaining the 'Moderate' Outcome .................................. 309
C. W orld W ar II to O SHA ............................................................. 314
D. Regulation Under OSHA .......................................................... 322
1. O SHA and Incentives ......................................................... 322
2. OSHA and Interest Groups ................................................. 325
3. The Silica Standards ........................................................... 328
4. Institutional Biases in Regulation ....................................... 331
E. Explaining Regulations ............................................................. 334
III. Regulation by Litigation ................................................................. 342
IV . W hat to D o? .................................................................................... 354
INTRODUCTION
Firms and doctors involved in silicosis suits are facing grand jury
investigations in New York, and a federal judge in Texas has suggested
fraud may be involved in some of the tens of thousands of silicosis claims
pending in her court, charging that one firm had attempted "to inflate the
number of Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the Defendants and
the judicial system."' Doctors involved in diagnosing silicosis claimants
are pleading the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination rather
than electing to testify before Congress about their roles in the lawsuits.2
At the same time, silica dust regulation is on the agenda of regulatory
agencies around the world. The United States Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and regulators in other countries3 are
considering issuing new standards for silica dust, spurred on by the
International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization's
Global Campaign for the Elimination of Silicosis and the International
Agency for Research on Cancer's (IARC) 1997 classification of silica as a
1. Editorial, The Silicosis Sheriff, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005, at A10; In re Silica
Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2005); see also Editorial,
Case of the Vanishing X-Rays, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2005, at A8; Lester Brickman, What
Did Those Asbestos X-Rays Really Show?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2005, at A9.
2. See Press Release, Energy and Commerce Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, Doctors Refuse to Testify at Silicosis Hearing; Others Recount Diagnoses
'Manufactured for Money' (Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
108/News/03092006 1810.htm (announcing the refusal of three physicians to testify at
length about the circumstances behind their silicosis diagnoses despite a subpoena ordering
them to do so).
3. See Tee Lamont Guidotti, A Small Committee with a Big Agenda: The ILO/WHO
Global Campaign for the Elimination of Silicosis and the ICOH Scientific Committee on
Respiratory Disorders, ICOH Q. NEWSL. (Aug. 1999), http://envepi.med.uoeh-u.ac.jp/icoh/
ICOH%20QuarterlyNesletter.htm (describing the elimination campaign and attempts to
involve the worldwide community).
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human carcinogen.4 In addition to cancer, the regulators continue to have
their traditional concerns with respiratory problems from dust inhalation,
silicosis in the case of silica dusts.5 Some action by OSHA on silica in the
near future is virtually certain because the current standard, derived from a
1962 consensus standard originally created by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), "is based on particle
counting technology, which is considered obsolete ' 6 and because the IARC
conclusion has made clear that the existing standard, which did not
consider the cancer risk, is no longer adequate. As a result, silica
regulation is a "high priority" initiative at OSHA, one of only four such
listed in OSHA's December 2004 unified agenda.
7
Occupational health and environmental regulators face challenges in
developing regulations that adequately address the complexity of
biological, mineralogical, chemical, physical, and other characteristics of
substances like silica. Too much detail induces paralysis; too little
produces regulations that fail to focus on the actual harmful substances and
so imposes costs without corresponding benefits. As the In re Silica
Products Liability Litigation opinion demonstrates, 8 crucial questions also
arise as to the role of the tort system in regulating hazardous products.
In this Article we examine the current and future regulation of silica and
the issues involved in developing new standards. In Section I, we describe
the problem of categorizing the subject of regulation. In Section II, we use
the experience with silica and public choice theory to focus on both the
pressures agencies face and the roles interest groups play in shaping
4. International Agency for Research on Cancer, Silica, 68 IARC MONOGRAPH 41
(1997), available at http://monographs.iarc.frihtdocs/monographs/vol68/silica.htm
[hereinafter IARC, Silica] (concluding that there is sufficient evidence that silica is
carcinogenic to humans when inhaled).
5. See William G.B. Graham, Quartz and Silicosis, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 191, 191 (Daniel E. Banks & John E. Parker eds., 1998)("Silicosis is the term used to designate the occupational lung disease caused by inhaling
crystalline silica (alpha-quartz or SiO 2) or its polymorphs, tridymite or cristobalite."); see
also William Jones et al., Dust Particles: Occupational Considerations, in HANDBOOK OF
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 213, 213 (Morton Corn ed., 1993) ("Pneumoconiosis is the reaction
of the lungs to inspired dust."). The authors added that "[s]ilicosis is a fibrotic disease
produced by inhalation of silica-containing dusts. High exposures to crystalline silica can
result in acute silicosis. Acute silicosis develops rapidly (1-3 yr) and is characterized by
labored breathing (dyspnea), fatigue, cough, and weight loss." Id. at 215; see also Paul
Stark et al., Standard Imaging in Silicosis and Coal Worker's Pneumoconiosis, in 30 THE
RADIOLOGICAL CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA: OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 1147, 1147-48(Theresa C. McCloud, MD ed., 1992) (describing acute, chronic, and accelerated forms of
silica dust exposure).
6. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (OSHA), U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNIFIED
AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS (2005), available at
http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/ua/Spring2005/agenda/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR_(DOL).html.
7. See Department of Labor 2004 Regulatory Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,781 (Dec. 13,
2004) (listing and describing worker exposure to crystalline silica among the four high-
priority initiatives).
8. See infra notes 469-81 and accompanying text.
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occupational safety and health regulations. This regulatory history makes
silica regulation an ideal case study for examining the general problem of
categorizing regulated substances. In Section III, the history of asbestos
litigation illustrates the undesirable consequences of relying on the tort
system to drive regulation. In Section IV, we recap the problems
associated with the regulation of silica and other compounds that are
difficult to characterize, and we discuss possible options for developing
sound policy.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORIZATION
Silica is the common name for minerals containing a combination of
silicon and oxygen such as silicon dioxide (NO2). As silica is one of the
most common substances in the Earth, 9 it might appear that defining silica
for regulatory purposes would be trivial. And, of course, regulators could
define silica for regulatory purposes as the mineral Si0 2. Yet such a
definition would be grossly over-inclusive, potentially subjecting virtually
every human activity to regulation.' 0 Thus, a more sophisticated definition
of silica is necessary for effective regulatory action.
Silica comes in multiple forms that have varying mineralogical
characteristics. First, silica may be "free" (only Si0 2 is present), or it may
be mixed chemically with another atom or molecule." This is important
because only free silica is currently considered to have human health
effects. 1 Further, free silica can be distinguished into amorphous and
9. See BRANCH OF INDUS. MINERALS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CRYSTALLINE
SILICA PRIMER 5 (1992) [hereinafter PRIMER] ("All soils contain at least trace amounts of
crystalline silica in the form of quartz."). The Primer adds that "the average quartz content
of igneous rocks is 12%" and that "[b]ecause of its abundance in the earth, silica, in both its
crystalline and noncrystalline states, is present in nearly all mining operations." Id. at 5, 6.
In addition, "quartz is... the major component of sand and of dust in the air." Id. at 5.
10. See Graham, supra note 5, at 191. Graham notes that people who experience "dusty
non-occupational exposures, as in villages in the high Himalayas or in desert communities,"
also show abnormal chest radiographs and other indications of silica exposure and that even
workers in very low exposure jobs also show abnormalities in cells and proteins:
Whether these findings represent the presence of a disease process (alveolitis) is
almost a subject for philosophical discussion, akin to asking whether tanning of the
skin is a pathologic process or a normal response to an imposed stimulus. This
analogy is not too far-fetched, since exposure to both quartz and sunlight have been
constant companions in the evolution of biologic systems.
Id.; see also Mei-lin Wang & Daniel E. Banks, Airways Obstruction and Occupational
Inorganic Dust Exposure, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE, supra note 5, at 69, 69 (noting
that "Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)" is a "physiologic parameter rather
than an etiologically defined disease" and so "the cause explaining these abnormal
pulmonary parameters in any single individual cannot be made without a clinical
evaluation").
11. INDUS. ACCIDENT PREVENTION ASS'N, SILICA IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (2003)
[hereinafter IAPA, WORKPLACE], available at http://www.iapa.ca/pdf/Silica-in-the-
workplace-FEB03.pdf.
12. See id. (explaining that only dusts with more than 1% free silica by weight pose an
exposure hazard).
[58:2
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crystalline silica.13 The former is "essentially benign," while at least some
forms of the latter are potentially toxic when inhaled or otherwise
ingested. 14 As we will discuss in greater detail below, however, this simple
binary characterization is still too crude to capture the distinctions
necessary to differentiate the risks presented by different forms of silica. 15
The difficulties in adequately characterizing even what appears to be a
comparatively straightforward, common substance like silica, which has a
long history of medical study, are magnified when the issue is a substance
about which little scientific research has been undertaken.' 6  Unless
regulators are willing to employ a version of the precautionary principle
that allows them to prevent all innovation until a substance is proven safe, 17
13. There are two states of silica: amorphous and crystalline, which are "quite different
physically." PRIMER, supra note 9, at 3. Of the two states, "[o]nly the crystalline structures
are highly toxic and fibrogenic." Marlene Absher, Silica and Lung Inflammation, in
HANDBOOK OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, supra note 5, at 661, 662. Although there are seven
forms, or polymorphs, of crystalline silica, four are considered "extremely rare." PRIMER,
supra note 9, at 5. The three major forms are quartz, cristobalite, and tridymite. Id.
14. See Graham, supra note 5, at 191 ("Amorphous silica, which lacks a crystalline
structure, is essentially benign. Crystalline silica in any form is potentially toxic when
absorbed or inhaled in sufficient quantities.").
15. See PRIMER, supra note 9, at 16. There are several difficulties inherent in
determining the content of a sample:
The crystallinity of silica from different deposits, even from slightly different
locations within the same deposits is not necessarily the same. This raises two
problems. First, a single standard (that is, the reference material to which the silica
in the sample is compared) may not be appropriate. Using a standard that matches
the particle size and crystallinity of the silica in the sample is essential for an
accurate analysis. Second, obtaining a representative sample, when the sample size
is so small and the deposit is so large, is nearly impossible.
Id.; see also John E. Craighead, Inorganic Mineral Particulates in the Lung, in HANDBOOK
OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, supra note 5, at 399, 405 ("[T]he Si0 2 cristobalite is far more
toxic and pathogenic than the mineralogically similar alpha quartz.... Since different dusts
cause disease by differing pathogenetic mechanisms, the issues are exceptionally
complex."); Absher, supra note 13, at 663 ("Factors which determine whether an exposed
individual develops pulmonary pathology include the dose and duration of exposure, the
nature of the dust (quartz, cristobalite, or a variety of silicates and silica-bearing minerals)
and the content of crystalline silica in the exposure material.").
16. See Elena Fagotto & Archon Fung, Improving Workplace Hazard Communication,
19 ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH. 63, 64 (Winter 2002-2003), available at http://www.issues.org/
issues/l 9.2/fagotto.htm (noting OSHA estimates that employees are exposed to 650,000
hazardous products in the workplace and describing problems with getting sufficient
information to evaluate those exposures); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), DELAYS IN
SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER-CAUSING AND OTHER DANGEROUS
SUBSTANCES 9 (1977) ("Several sources say that about 2 million chemical compounds exist
today; information on toxicity may be available for 100,000; about 13,000 known toxic
chemicals are commonly used; and about 500 new substances are introduced each year.").
17. The literature on the precautionary principle is vast but generally does not assess the
potential perils of the principle. For notable exceptions to this, see generally INDUR M.
GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK ASSESSMENT (2001), which argues that the precautionary principle has too great a
reach. See also Jonathan H. Adler, The Cartagena Protocol and Biological Diversity:
Biosafe or Biosorry?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 761, 777 (2000) (arguing that
technological advances are important to biodiversity protection); Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 924-25
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thereby cutting off huge areas of economic activity, regulators will have to
operate with a great deal of uncertainty. 18  Regulators thus need a
principled approach to determining how much of a distinction to draw in
characterizing the subject of a regulation.
A. Characterization
The ability to regulate rests on the regulator's ability to define what is
being regulated. Not only must the regulator offer a legal definition of the
regulated substance, but regulators must also create a means of
characterizing the regulated substance such that it can be identified using
test equipment. 19 This implies the ability to define the regulated substance
scientifically. Similar problems also exist with respect to non-physical
definitions: A regulator of a financial product must define the
characteristics of the product (for example, distinguishing a stock from a
bond). 20  Although we concentrate on scientific characterization for the
purposes of workplace health and environmental regulation, our analysis
applies to other forms of regulation as well.
(1996) (suggesting that in many instances countervailing risks from well-intended
regulatory programs produce harms as great or greater than those the regulations are
intended to prevent).
18. Uncertainty is discussed most extensively in connection with environmental issues,
rather than issues connected to workplace health and safety, but the concerns are similar.
For concise summaries of issues caused by scientific uncertainty, see Daniel A. Farber,
Probabilities Behaving Badly. Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 145 (2003), which addresses the problems of uncertainty in environmental
regulations and explores statistical power laws to alleviate the problems. See also J.B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the
Environment By Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997)
(discussing the inherently uncertain nature of the environment and different approaches to
dealing with the environmental issues).
19. Cf. Jones et al., supra note 5, at 218 (explaining that, for silica dust, "'respirable'
samplers are used"). According to Jones,
These are samplers that preferentially sample that fraction of the dust that enters
the alveolar region of the lung. In this country the most common means for making
this measurement is to use a small battery-operated pump to first draw air through a
miniature cyclone to remove the nonrespirable particles and then through a filter to
capture the respirable portion.
Id.
20. See Olufunmilayo Arewa, Breaking Through the Intangibles Haze: Business
Paradigms and Changing Business Discourse 8-9 (Working Paper No. 4-14, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=589205 ("With the rise of
intangibles has thus come a certain level of confusion as to how existing categories, rules
and regulations initially drawn up in the context of a tangible paradigm should apply under
an intangibles paradigm."). The general nature of the problem can be seen by examining the
attempts to define the term "hedge fund," about which one author recently commented, "[tlo
oversimplify slightly, a hedge fund is like a mutual fumd that has been designed to avoid
four federal laws that generally require investment funds and their advisers to identify fund
officers and holdings and to submit to Securities and Exchange Commission oversight."
David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 28, 30, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2005/feature-skeel-novdec05.msp.
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A hypothetical example illustrates the problem. Suppose a substance,
kryptonite, is suspected of having deleterious health effects on humans
exposed to it. Further investigation reveals that kryptonite comes in two
forms: cL-kryptonite and 0-kryptonite. Based on this initial investigation, it
appears that only a-kryptonite causes health effects; there is no evidence
that 0-kryptonite is harmful. But, there is also no evidence that 3-
kryptonite is not harmful. In short, we have reason to believe that Ct-
kryptonite is harmful, although we do not know why it is harmful; we
know only that 0-kryptonite is different from a-kryptonite and that the data
supporting the knowledge that a-kryptonite is harmful come from studies
of ct-kryptonite.
A regulation of "kryptonite" which does not distinguish between a-
kryptonite and P3-kryptonite will either over-regulate or under-regulate the
uses of kryptonite.2 1 If we regulate both forms of kryptonite at the level
appropriate for a-kryptonite and 0-kryptonite is not harmful (or not as
harmful as a-kryptonite), then we will over-regulate. That is, a regulation
that does not distinguish the two forms will impose unnecessary costs on
users of 0-kryptonite.2 As a result, users of P-kryptonite will reduce
output (since their costs have gone up), consumers of 13-kryptonite products
will face higher prices, and employment will decline in 03-kryptonite-using
industries and in industries using products made with P-kryptonite.
If, on the other hand, the kryptonite regulation regulates both forms at a
level appropriate for 13-kryptonite, it will under-regulate the users of a-
kryptonite. That is, the regulation will fail to impose costs, the imposition
of which would yield benefits that exceed those costs. As a result, users of
a-kryptonite will use too much, causing harm to employees and/or
consumers of products produced with the a-kryptonite.
Finally, a uniform standard based on an average of the two forms of
kryptonite will under-regulate users of a-kryptonite and over-regulate users
of j3-kryptonite. The challenge for regulators, therefore, is to properly
define what they are regulating so that they avoid the twin dangers of over-
regulation and under-regulation.
21. If a-kryptonite is uniformly distributed in kryptonite, a regulation that does not
distinguish the two forms may not over-regulate since the amount of a-kryptonite is simply
a fixed percentage of the amount of the total kryptonite. So long as the regulation takes into
account that the exposures should be based on the impact of the proportion that is a-
kryptonite, a regulation that does not distinguish between the two forms will not over-
regulate.
22. Remember, we specified that we do not know if 3-kryptonite is harmful. We
nonetheless call regulation of 0-kryptonite over-regulation because the justification of
regulation rests on the studies linking the harm to a-kryptonite.
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In the hypothetical we assume that both the regulators and the rest of the
community know that kryptonite comes in both a and 13 forms, that the a-
kryptonite form is hazardous, and that there is no evidence concerning the 13
form. It is also possible that the distinction between the a and 3 forms is
unknown and that discovering the distinction will require substantial
investment in research. Without knowledge of how a substance causes
harm, it is difficult to determine which types of distinctions matter. We
thus may face questions not only about a-kryptonite and 13-kryptonite but
also about a-kryptonite and a'-kryptonite. Resolving whether there is an
a'-kryptonite'and whether it is the distinction between a and a' forms, a
and 13 forms, both, or neither that matters-and doing so on the basis of
ambiguous epidemiological evidence 23 and animal studies 24 -requires a
substantial investment of both time and money in research.25
Now suppose the regulator has available only a study that shows a health
impact from an unspecified form of kryptonite. The regulator proposes a
kryptonite standard based on the available evidence and resolving the
uncertainties caused by the necessarily incomplete evidence before it.
During the comment period, an entity potentially subject to the new
standard provides evidence that kryptonite exists in both a and 13 forms and
that the studies on which the regulator relied measured only the impact of
a-kryptonite. Because the regulator does not know the precise mechanism
through which kryptonite causes harm, he cannot know with certainty
whether the a / 13 distinction is relevant. Because the a / 13 distinction was
previously unknown, the regulator also cannot draw on a scientific
consensus about its relevance.
23. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 120-21 (1995) (noting the potential for methodological defects in
epidemiological studies); PETER S. BARTH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED
ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 28-29 (1980) (citing further inadequacies in epidemiological
studies).
24. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 406-09 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 2d ed.
2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc-catalog.nsf (search by title for "Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence," select "Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Second
Edition," follow "Link or download" hyperlink, then select appropriate author hyperlink)
(describing the assumptions in extrapolating data from animal studies to assess human
health risks); Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra, at 333, 346 (discussing the disadvantages of
animal toxicity studies for assessing human health risks). For a somewhat dated evaluation
of similar issues, see generally Bert P. Krages 1I, Rats in the Courtroom: The Admissibility
ofAnimal Studies in Toxic Tort Cases, 2 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 229 (1987), which provides a
thorough analysis of potential reliability problems with animal studies used in toxic tort
litigation.
25. The costs of animal studies, for example, are measured in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars. See Krages II, supra note 24, at 234 n.25 (providing several examples of costly
animal studies).
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How should the regulator respond to the new knowledge that the a / 3
distinction exists? Should he proceed to regulate only a-kryptonite? Or
does some precautionary principle shift the burden to the regulated parties
to show that the a / 3 distinction is relevant to the harm caused by
kryptonite? If so, how can he do so without understanding the harm
mechanism? Should the regulation be delayed entirely? With respect to
the P-kryptonite only? How should a court treat evidence in a tort suit
seeking to impose liability based on kryptonite exposure when such a
distinction is demonstrated?
At some level, the burden must rest on the regulator-a showing of harm
from exposure to benzene, for example, does not justify imposing
regulations on cotton dust because benzene and cotton dust are easily
distinguishable. But just as obviously, a showing of harm from one
substance may justify regulatory action with respect to a close analogue in
the absence of evidence that the distinctions between the two are relevant.26
We do not require individual regulations for each firm to be based on the
precise chemical, physical, mineralogical, or other form of composition of
its raw materials. We do require different regulations for substances that
are different at a fairly crude level, even closer than the distinction between
benzene and cotton dust. The questions, therefore, are where regulators are
to draw the line initially and what sort of evidence from the regulated
justifies shifting the line during the rulemaking process.
B. Silica Categorization and Health Effects
While silica is defined broadly, silica-related diseases are currently
associated only with free crystalline silica.2 7 Distinguishing between
crystalline and noncrystalline silica is merely the beginning of our
knowledge of potential distinctions, however. For example, the
Mineralogical Society of America classifies crystalline silica into 17
forms. 2 8 Research on health effects focus on only four principal forms,
2 9
but the wider set of Mineralogical Society classifications suggests that
these categories may not capture the impact of all of the potentially
relevant distinctions among the types. Changes in scientific knowledge
26. This principle can also be observed in the regulation of drugs. See Natalie M.
Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme on Orange Book
Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 216-17 (2005)
(discussing the issue of sameness in FDA regulations).
27. See IAPA, WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 2 (describing the problem as existing only
with free silica).
28. See Gilbert Hart, The Nomenclature of Silica, 12 AM. MNERALOGIST 383, 383-95
(1927), available at http://www.minsocam.org/MSA/collectors-corner/arc/silicanom.htm
(illustrating the various classifications of silica).
29. See IARC, Silica, supra note 4, at 41 (identifying the dangerous, crystalline forms
of silica as Cristobalite, Quartz, Tripoli, and Tridymite).
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have already led to new theories about how silica causes health effects.3 °
Future changes may lead to further development of knowledge. In its 2002
review, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
recommended further research to reduce uncertainty regarding
"mechanisms and the influence of particle characteristics on development
of disease."31
Moreover, whether an individual exposed to silica dust develops silicosis
depends on a range of individual factors including personal characteristics
unrelated to the exposure, such as whether the individual smokes. 32 The
American Thoracic Society, for example, found evidence suggesting that
exposure to crystalline silica "'produces increased risk for bronchogenic
carcinoma,"' but "'noted that less information was available for lung
cancer risks among silicotics who had never smoked and for silica-exposed
workers who did not have silicosis.' 33 And not all dust containing free
crystalline silica, currently thought to be the most dangerous, is harmful.
Filtration by the nose, throat, and upper airways remove larger particles
before they reach the innermost depths of the respiratory tract (alveoli or
air sacs) where silicosis damage occurs. 3 4 The size of dust particles is thus
important to determining hazard levels as well. This short summary is
intended to make the point that our understanding of how silica affects
human health is incomplete. Clearly we face a danger of over-regulation
because we do not know whether particular forms of silica are harmful,
even if we are certain that some particular form is harmful.
Most recently, studies have suggested that there may be a crucial
difference between freshly fractured crystalline silica and silica with older
fractures. Fractured silica that has aged for weeks to months poses fewer
30. See, e.g., R. K. Iler, The Surface Chemistry of Amorphous Synthetic Silica-
Interaction with Organic Molecules in an Aqueous Medium, in HEALTH EFFECTS OF
SYNTHETIC SILICA PARTICULATES 3, 3 (D.D. Dunnom ed., 1981). According to Iler,
For many years it was supposed that the [health] effects were due to soluble silica
dissolved from the fine particles by body fluids, but now it is generally conceded
that they are due to the surface of crystalline quartz particles that adsorbs and
interacts with certain molecular compounds of the living cells.
Id.
31. NAT'L INST. OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (NIOSH), U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE
CRYSTALLINE SILICA, at vii (2002) [hereinafter NIOSH HAZARD REVIEW].
32. See IAPA, WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 6 (listing the relevant individual factors,
including "amount and kind of dust inhaled, content of crystalline free silica in the dust,
form of the silica, relative size of the inhaled particles, length of exposure, individual
resistance, smoking habits, disease status, [and] age of worker").
33. NIOSH HAZARD REVIEW, supra note 31, at v-vi (quoting American Thoracic
Society findings).
34. See IAPA, WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasizing the efficiency of the
human body's filtration system).
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health risks than freshly fractured silica. 35 The Sorptive Minerals Institute
(SMI), which represents the absorptive clay industry, is studying the
differences in health risk between exposure to freshly fractured, aged silica
and the "geologically ancient" clays (fractured over eons through natural
geological processes) used in that industry. 36  The initial results of its
experiments suggest that the characteristics of artificially fractured quartz
(pulverized, ground, blasted, or otherwise fractured by man) make it a
greater health threat than respirable quartz generated through natural
geological processes.
We also face the danger of under-regulation. Prolonged exposure to free
crystalline silica is associated with scarring of the lungs (silicosis).
Silicosis is a progressive, incurable disease that impairs respiratory
function.37 It takes years to develop, seldom exhibiting symptoms in under
five years.38 Not controlling exposure to harmful forms of silica thus risks
irreparable damage to exposed individuals' lungs. As described below, the
regulatory history of silica includes frequent, incorrect assertions that the
problems of silica exposure had been solved by regulatory measures that
subsequent knowledge revealed to be less effective than promised. In the
early 1990s, 200 to 300 silicosis deaths per year were reported. 39 Further,
research has recently associated chronic exposure to high levels of certain
forms of free crystalline silica with lung cancer. Delay in addressing silica
exposure thus also has its costs, and there is now reason to believe that
those costs are larger than previously thought.
The problem of categorization is central to regulatory action concerning
silica. The IARC analysis of silica dust, for example, noted that
"carcinogenicity in humans was not detected in all industrial circumstances
studied. Carcinogenicity may be dependent on inherent characteristics of
35. See Email from Vincent Castranova, Ph.D., NIOSH, to Andrew Morriss, Professor
of Business Law & Regulation, Case School of Law (Aug. 3, 2005) (on file with authors)
("Freshly fractured silica has a greater ability to generate radicals, activate reactive species
production from alveolar macrophages, cause in vitro toxicity, and is more inflammatory in
vivo."). Dr. Castranova cited the following studies to support his conclusion: Vincent
Castranova et al., Enhanced Pulmonary Response to the Inhalation of Freshly Fractured
Silica as Compared to Aged Dust Exposure, 11 APPLIED OCCUPATIONAL & ENvTL. HYGIENE
937 (1996); Vincent Castranova et al., Role of Surface Free in the Pathogenicity of Silicosis,
in SILICA AND SILICA-INDUCED LUNG DISEASES 91 (Vincent Castranova, Val Vallyathan
& William E. Wallace eds., 1996); Val Vallyathan et al., Freshly Fractured Quartz
Inhalation Leads to Enhanced Lung Injury and Inflammation, 152 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE
MED. 1003 (1995); Vincent Castranova, Generation of Oxygen Radicals and Mechanisms of
Injury Prevention, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 65 (Supp. 10 1994); Val Vallyathan et
al., Generation of Free Radicals From Freshly Fractured Silica Dust: Potential Role in
Acute Silica-induced Lung Injury, 138 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 1213 (1988).
36. This statement is based on discussions between the authors and members of the
Sorptive Minerals Institute (SMI) at the May 2005 SMI Spring Forum.
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38. IAPA, WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 6.
39. NIOSH HAZARD REVIEW, supra note 31, at 1.
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the crystalline silica or on external factors affecting its biological activity or
distribution of its polymorphs.,, 40 Determining which forms of silica pose
a human health threat, and so are candidates for regulatory action, is thus
key.
In sum, we know that silica can be classified in multiple ways. These
classifications may or may not have a relationship to the health effects
observed in epidemiological studies of silica exposure and other research
on silica's health effects. We do not know, for example, exactly what form
of silica medical researchers included in some early studies because
distinctions now recognized were unknown or thought to be unimportant at
the time the studies were conducted. Yet these distinctions are potentially
as important as the distinction between silica dust and dust that does not
contain silica. OSHA regulates (and is considering tightening regulations
on) silica based on a recognition that silica dust is different from other
dusts. If it turns out that only freshly fractured crystalline silica dust is
hazardous, failing to draw that distinction will have unnecessarily imposed
substantial costs on industries using other forms of silica. We are thus in
the position of the regulator considering ct-kryptonite, ct'-kryptonite, and P-
kryptonite: We have multiple distinctions, but we do not know if they are
relevant. As our ability to draw distinctions based on chemical,
mineralogical, and other bases grows, it increasingly exceeds our ability to
understand the relevance of the distinctions we can draw.
We have thus established the fairly obvious fact that regulators must
draw lines. What may be less obvious is that the ability to draw these
distinctions is endogenous. That is, the characterization of the regulated
substance (and other distinctions) depends on the investment by the
regulator, the regulated, and other interest groups in creating and using
knowledge about the subject of the regulation. Different participants have
different incentives to invest in building and using such knowledge. We
discuss these incentives in the next Section.
C. Incentives for Developing Knowledge
If we had complete knowledge about a workplace hazard, its risks, and
its remedies, we might be able to design a comprehensive regulation that
perfectly aligned protective measures and hazards, striking just the right
balance between the cost and benefit of mitigation. Of course, we do not
have such information about workplace hazards any more than we have it
about anything else.4' Examining attempts to implement regulatory
40. IARC, Silica, supra note 4, at 41.
41. There is generally considerable uncertainty about occupational disease. See, e.g.,
BARTH, supra note 23, at 15-27 (recounting problems obtaining reliable data on
occupational health and deaths).
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solutions in economic policy, Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich A.
von Hayek coined the term "the knowledge problem" to explain why
centralized regulatory solutions are inferior to decentralized market
processes. 42 Hayek's central point was that decentralized markets focus
dispersed information-information that no one individual (not even a
regulator) can obtain-and convey it efficiently to market participants.
1. Market Incentives and Market Failures
To understand Hayek's point, consider the financial incentives an
unregulated workplace provides for protecting health and safety. First,
employees have obvious incentives to protect their own health-faced with
two otherwise equal jobs with different risks, employees will prefer the less
risky job. Thus, informed employees will demand safeguards for health
and safety.
Second, even wholly self-interested employers have incentives to
provide safe and healthy work environments to ensure a productive
workforce.43  Employers often have significant investments in their
employees' firm-specific human capital. 4 Safeguarding that investment
45
requires reducing turnover. Moreover, employees in more risky jobs can
command higher wages than employees with equivalent skills in less risky
environments, which provides financial incentives for employers to protect
the health and safety of employees, even in the absence of government
requirements. 46 Indeed, even critics of market forces concede that market
responses sometimes occur before regulatory action.4 7  For example,
42. See generally Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (discussing problems with economic theory and the refinements
needed to resolve those problems); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (1984-85) ("Such [regulatory]
determinations impose massive information-gathering burdens on administrators .... ").
43. Of course, employers may also have moral reasons to wish to provide a safe work
environment. Curiously, those who readily attribute benevolence to governments and recoil
from public choice theory's assumption that self-interest guides politicians and bureaucrats
rarely concede even an enlightened version of self-interest to those involved in private
enterprise.
44. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 15-44 (2d ed. 1975) (providing an
overview of investment in human capital's potential effects on employer earnings).
45. Professor Christopher Sellers, no apologist for corporate America, noted that
corporate interest in industrial medicine soared during labor shortages after World War I as
a means of reducing turnover. CHRISTOPHER C. SELLERS, HAZARDS OF THE JOB: FROM
INDUSTRIAL DISEASE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE 145 (1997).
46. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 117-18 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776)
(offering a wage comparison of occupations with various levels of risk). See generally Joni
Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in Wage-Risk
Trade-offs, 25 J. Hum. RES. 202 (1990) (using Smith's doctrine to study wage-risk
assessments made by smokers and non-smokers as well as seatbelt users and non-users).
47. See, e.g., Christopher C. Sellers, "A Prejudice Which May Cloud the Mentality:"
An Overview of the Birth of the Modern Science of Occupational Disease, in TOXIC
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systematic medical exams of employees, an important tool in uncovering
workplace diseases, were part of "paternalistic programs to care for the
workers' broader needs, often to wean them away from trade unions."4
8
The market failure analysis of workplace health and safety stresses
obstacles to these incentives' operation. For example, some argue that
because employees are ignorant of the true nature of the risks they face,
they fail to demand sufficient safety.4 9 Similarly, others contend that
employers are able to impose one-sided bargains on employees and are able
to force them to accept dangerous jobs when employees would prefer safer
working conditions.50 As a result of these market failures, critics argue, an
unregulated work environment would be hazardous to employees' health
and safety. Because employers could impose contracts including
dangerous working conditions without fully compensating employees for
the additional risk, employers would choose not to invest in safety, thereby
shifting the cost to employees.
2. Incentives for Categorization and Knowledge
With respect to the problem of categorization, we can use our kryptonite
example to illustrate how the incentives operate. Suppose we begin with
the problem of kryptonite exposure generally, without regard to the various
forms of kryptonite. Employers will have an incentive to invest in
discovering whether there are relevant distinctions among forms of
kryptonite (a, a', and 3) because the discovery of a relevant distinction can
reduce the risk premium they must pay to employees. Note that this benefit
CIRCLES: ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS FROM THE WORKPLACE INTO THE COMMUNITY 233, 235
(Helen E. Sheehan & Richard P. Wedeen eds., 1993) ("[M]ining and railroad companies
recognized particular health hazards associated with their industries many years before the
turn of the [twentieth] century and began hiring their own physicians to treat employees.")
(citation omitted).
48. Id. at 237-38. Unions often resisted physical exams. SELLERS, supra note 45, at
119. Protests over exams were "pronounced" by 1915, and then-President of the American
Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, denounced them as a "menace for the freedom of
workers." Id.
49. See, e.g., BARTH, supra note 23, at 53 (quoting workers in Anaconda, Montana who,
when informed of the risk of arsenic poisoning from copper smelter work, continued to
work there because of the philosophy that "what bothers me is not what happens twenty
years from now, but how I feed my kids tomorrow"); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
LAW 32 (2004) (asserting that "an important obstacle to workplace safety [in the early
twentieth century] was the persistent and usually irrational optimism that workingmen
seemed to bring to estimations of the risks they faced").
50. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 17 (1993)
(describing how in light of employees' attempts to improve their working conditions "the
history of occupational safety and health regulation is as much a story about workers
seeking government help in adjusting the balance of power in the employer-employee
relationship as it is a chronology of scientific discoveries concerning the cause and
prevention of workplace injuries and diseases").
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of increased knowledge to employers is dependent upon convincing
employees that the distinction is relevant. Employers must persuade the
employees to accept a lower risk premium for working with the less
harmful form of kryptonite. Employers will have to make investment
decisions under considerable uncertainty (since they do not even know if
there are multiple forms of kryptonite, let alone whether the harm caused
by the different forms, that may or may not exist, is different). The key is
that the incentive exists to produce knowledge, even if the incentive is not
to produce perfect knowledge.
However, market failures affect incentives to invest in categorization. If
employees misperceive the risks of kryptonite generally, and so fail to
demand an appropriate risk premium, or are unable to bargain for risk
premiums at all, employers will have no incentive to invest in knowledge
about kryptonite's potential forms. Moreover, if employees misperceive
risks because they are incapable of understanding scientific evidence,5 1
they will be unlikely to accurately assess the evidence produced by
employers. Employers may then invest in inaccurate evidence to mislead
employees about the risks of kryptonite. If the market failures dominate
the unregulated market, the incentives for investing in knowledge will be
diluted or destroyed, and a perverse incentive to create junk science may
exist.
The choice in addressing health and safety issues is not, of course,
between OSHA and the completely unregulated marketplace. We must
therefore also consider the impact of intermediate regulatory measures on
workplace health and safety. Since the early twentieth century, workers'
compensation and other forms of insurance financed through premiums
paid by employers have provided incentives for workplace health and
safety.52 Insurance gives employers incentives to promote safety because
employers with poor safety records face higher workers' compensation
insurance premiums.5 3 These incentives appear to have had an impact on
the workplace: The doubling of workers' compensation premiums between
51. See, e.g., Mine Safety and Health Administration, Final Hazard Communication
(HazCom) Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,314 (June 21, 2002) (premising hazard communication
standards on a concern that, in the absence of regulation, "many operators and miners are
not as aware of the presence and nature of hazardous chemicals as they should be").
52. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 794 (3d ed.
2001) (recounting briefly a recent history of those incentives); see also SELLERS, supra note
45, at 114 ("The compensation systems not only helped spur the new round of corporate
medical hiring, they also attuned many more managers and owners to what some of their
number had already realized: that corporate doctors, if properly employed, could have a
measurable effect on the bottom line.").
53. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52, at 794 (discussing the powerful effect of the
incentives on industry safety); BARTH, supra note 23, at 61 (noting that there is widespread
agreement that a key aim of workers' compensation is to encourage "the maintenance of a
safe and healthful workplace").
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1984 ($15 billion per year) and 1991 ($31 billion), for example, led to
significant improvements in worker safety. By the late 1990s, workers'
compensation premiums had fallen to $26 billion.54  Research suggests
that, if not for workers' compensation, occupational fatalities would be one
third higher than they are.55 Workers' compensation insurance thus has
had a demonstrable impact on workplace health and safety.
With respect to the incentives to understand health impacts of potentially
hazardous substances in the workplace, workers' compensation insurance
creates incentives for research by adding a repeat player concerned with
lowering costs. Insurance companies profit from the difference between
the claims they pay and the premiums they collect. 56 Workers'
compensation insurers compete among themselves for employer business
by offering lower premiums.57 If an insurer can discover a basis for
distinguishing among high- and low-risk employers (for example, the a / 3
kryptonite distinction), it can offer low-risk employers lower premiums and
win market share. Moreover, employers who can demonstrate that their
workplaces are less hazardous than the workplaces of other firms by
showing a distinction in exposures will be able to negotiate lower
premiums. Thus, both insurers and employers have incentives to seek to
increase knowledge about the appropriate categorization of workplace
hazards. A complete picture of the incentives to build knowledge of
workplace hazards must include the incentives of repeat players such as
insurance companies.
3. Government Failures and the Role of Interest Groups
Market failure theory proponents sometimes view documenting, or
perhaps even simply asserting, the existence of one or both of the effects
described above (employees' inadequate understanding of potential risks
and inadequate bargaining strength compared to employers) as sufficient
justification for state intervention. A crucial insight of public choice
theory, however, is that we must consider the possibility that state
interventions will make things worse. In other words, there may be a
"government failure" as well as a market failure, and the means of properly
54. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52, at 794.
55. Id. The evidence on the impact of workers' compensation on injuries is weaker and
influenced by "moral hazard" because insurance provides incentives to report, or even
misrepresent, accidents in order to collect insurance benefits. Id.
56. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Products Liability Law and Insurance Profitability, 19 J.
LEG. STruD. 837, 838 (1990) (discussing the significance of loss ratios to insurance profits).
57. This competition exists in all states except North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming, where the state operates a monopoly insurer. ALLISON DEMERITT,
WASHINGTON POLICY CENTER, REFORMING WASHINGTON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEM (2004), available at http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/laborpolicy/
PBDemerittLaborReformingWorkersCompensation2004.htm.
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judging the relative worth of alternative institutions is to compare the
strengths and weaknesses of both rather than the strengths of state action
with the weaknesses of market processes. 58 Understanding the complete
set of institutional strengths and weaknesses requires that we consider the
incentives created by both.
Moreover, we must consider the form of the intervention required to
compensate for any market failures. If the problem is a lack of information
among employees about the magnitude of risks, for example, providing
them with the information is one means of correcting the market failure;
directly specifying the risk reduction measures employers must take is
another. These two solutions have different incentive effects, and the costs
and benefits of each should be considered in contemplating the form of
intervention.
Given the other incentives employers and employees have to protect
worker health and safety, what role should federal regulation have?
Traditional welfare economics argues that the existence of market failures
requires government intervention. 59 It suggests that politicians seeking to
serve the public interest will regulate to correct those "market failures," in
which case we would see regulations enacted to serve the public interest by
addressing perceived or real market failures. 60 This does not appear to be
uniformly the case, however, suggesting that a richer theory of regulation is
needed.61  Many regulations do not correspond to market failures.
Economic regulations, the predominate type of regulation through the
1960s, were not well correlated with identifiable market failures, and
indeed, they often seemed to serve private, not public, interests.6 2 In the
case of OSHA regulation, empirical analysis has not found strong evidence
that OSHA regulations have had a substantial impact on worker health and
safety,63 suggesting that alternative explanations are necessary.
58. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 21 (1997) (positing that the "question
is not whether market performance improves or deteriorates with larger number of parties,
but rather whether the market works better or worse than the courts").
59. See generally ARTHUR C. PiGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
60. VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52, at 314-17 (suggesting the theory that government
interference to correct market failures may be in the public's best interest).
61. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SC. 335 (1974).
62. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52, at 313-17 (explaining that industry often profits
rather than general social welfare). See generally William A. Jordan, Producer Protection,
Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151
(1972) (analyzing empirical studies showing that economic regulation was more likely to
increase costs to the consumer than to protect the consumer).
63. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52, at 789-90 (discussing empirical evidence that the
declining trend in job-related accidents did not accelerate after the creation of OSHA and
noting the implication that the "injury decline may have occurred in the absence of the
agency"). There is evidence of at least a difference in emphasis in enforcing regulations.
Professor Alison Morantz found that federal enforcement actions on construction safety
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The understanding of regulation improved with the insights of George
Stigler and James Buchanan, two Nobel Prize-winning economists. The
works of Stigler and Buchanan developed insights for predicting when
policymakers would promulgate regulations and the form they would be
likely to take. In particular, Stigler's 1971 article, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, helped raise awareness of the incentives created by regulations
and wealth-redistribution consequences of economic regulation. Stigler
started with the premises that (1) the basic resource of the government is
the power to coerce, (2) an interest group that can convince the government
to use its coercive power to its benefit can improve its well-being at the
expense of others, and (3) agents (firms, individuals, government officials,
interest groups) are rational and try to maximize their own utility (well-
being). 64
With this foundation, Stigler set forth the hypothesis that regulation is
supplied in response to the demands of interest groups acting to maximize
their own well-being (income). 65  He observed that the behavior of
legislators is driven by their desire to stay in office (maximize political
support). Regulation is one way to redistribute wealth, and interest groups
compete for that wealth redistribution by offering political support in
exchange for favorable legislation.
The implication of Stigler's theory is that regulation is likely to be biased
toward benefiting interest groups that are better organized and have more to
gain from the wealth redistribution. Regulation is thus likely to benefit
smaller, better-organized interest groups with strongly felt preferences at
the expense of larger interest groups with weakly felt preferences.
Buchanan's work (together with Gordon Tullock) contributed to this
richer understanding of regulation through the creation of public choice
theory.66 Public choice economics begins with the recognition that
(1) individuals in government (politicians, regulators, voters, etc.), just as
individuals in other circumstances, are driven by self interest and (2) these
individuals are not omniscient.6 7  Public choice theory argues that
government officials cannot simply systematically maximize the public
regulations were significantly more aggressive than state enforcement actions in the level of
fines imposed and in impact on firms' behavior. Alison D. Morantz, Has Regulatory
Devolution Injured American Workers? A Comparison of State and Federal Enforcement of
Construction Safety Regulations (Stanford Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 308,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-755026.
64. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 3, 4-7 (1971) (considering the various benefits that a state can provide an industry).
65. See id. (emphasizing the interest groups' intent to use the regulation to restrict entry
into their market).
66. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962) (setting out the basics of the theory).
67. GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 16
(2002).
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interest. For example, to produce favorable outcomes, even a benevolent
politician must be in office. To gain and retain office, the politician must
obtain campaign funds and votes; getting both requires cooperating with
interest groups seeking to maximize their own welfare. Thus, public choice
economics reach conclusions similar to those drawn from Stigler's
economic theory of regulation. Public choice also recognizes that, because
policymakers are not omniscient regarding the consequences of different
policy choices, their interventions, even when designed to correct market
failures, may produce "government failures. 68
The insights of public choice theory and the economic theory of
regulation shed new light on when we are likely to observe regulation and
the forms it will take. Crucially, they tell us that we need not rely on bad
actors in government to explain sub-optimal outcomes. Good people, with
pure motives, will also produce special interest regulations due to the
structure of the political system. Thus, small, organized interest groups can
exercise the political will to gain specialized benefits while spreading costs
to large unorganized citizens. To study regulation, therefore, we must
understand the interest groups that have a stake in regulatory actions and
the political players involved.69
68. Nicholas Bagley and NYU Law School Dean Richard Revesz take issue with both
Stigler's capture theory and public choice theory in a recent paper, arguing instead that the
regulatory process is biased against regulatory action by interest group pressures. See
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized Review of Regulation
(NYU Law and Economics Research, Working Paper No. 05-16, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-786486. Bagley and Revesz contend that the impact of OMB
review is to make agencies choose to regulate in ways to avoid conflict with OMB. Id.
While we disagree with their analysis of the regulatory incentive structure, their arguments
are compatible with ours in some respects. Most importantly, even under Bagley and
Revesz's analysis, it will be important to define the subject of regulation, and agency
decisions on that point will be subject to political pressures.
69. See generally MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50 (providing an example of this
lack of consideration of interest groups in a thorough account of OSHA's development
through 1990). Although Professors McGarity and Shapiro are keenly attuned to the
interests of businesses seeking particular actions from OSHA, they generally do not
consider any motivation beyond disinterested concern for the best interests of the public for
nonprofit actors. Thus, for example, in their account of OSHA's regulation of ethylene
oxide, they accept at face value the participation of the Nader organization, Public Citizen
Health Research Group. See id. at 83-87 (mentioning briefly the organization's petition but
moving quickly to the promulgation of the ethylene oxide rule). Yet the Public Citizen
Health Research Group had interests beyond seeking to implement its vision of the public
good. For example, the group needed to be able to raise money to support its activities.
Similarly, McGarity and Shapiro accept the claims of OSHA employees who resigned
during the Reagan Administration that they resigned because political interference from the
Administration was keeping the agency from sound science. Id. at 92-93. An alternative
hypothesis is that these OSHA employees disagreed with the changes in policy instituted by
the Reagan Administration and sought to use their departures to embarrass the
Administration. For a thorough discussion of the roles of "public interest" groups in various
environmental regulations, see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain,
19 REGULATION 26 (1996), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg 19n4b.html.
See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits, in POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN I (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
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II. AN INTEREST GROUP-BASED ACCOUNT
OF SILICA REGULATION
In Section I, we argued that significant problems must be resolved for
the design of effective regulatory measures. In this Section, we turn to the
regulatory history of silica dust because understanding regulatory outcomes
depends on the examination of the roles interest groups and incentives play
in shaping regulatory policy.
A. The Early Awareness of the Health Risks of Silica
Silica is everywhere-it is the second most common mineral in the
earth's crust.7 ° Silica dust is a highly visible air contaminant, unlike many
other workplace hazards like gases that are potentially carcinogenic at low
concentrations and difficult to identify in the workplace. Dust, after all, is
generally visible to the naked eye even if the specific particles that are most
hazardous are not. Discussions of silica and silicosis often begin with a
quote from De Re Metallica, a sixteenth-century treatise on mining, by the
German scholar, doctor, and founder of modem geology Georg Bauer (also
known as Georgius Agricola), or another source of similar historic vintage
to make the point that the hazards are well-known. 7' Such accounts are at
least partially correct. By as early as the end of the nineteenth century,
occupational health writers had clearly established a relationship between
70. PRIMER, supra note 9, at 4. The most common form of silica (SiO2) in nature is
quartz. Id. at 2-3.
71. For a brief account of Bauer's life, see Georgius Agricola (1494-1555),
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/agricola.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). Bauer
noted, "The critics say further that mining is a perilous occupation to pursue, because the
miners are sometimes killed by the pestilential air which they breathe; sometimes their lungs
rot away." Daniel E. Banks, The World-Wide Problem of Occupational Lung Disease, in
OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting Bauer); see also Marvin R.
Balaan & Daniel E. Banks, Silicosis, in ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 435,
435 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed. 1998) ("[Silicosis is a] man-made disease, it is probably as
old as human history and was known to the ancient Egyptians and Greeks .... Although
the prevalence of silicosis apparently peaked in the late 19th and early 20th century when
mechanized industry was just beginning .... ); Frederick L. Hoffman, The Mortality from
Consumption in Dusty Trades, in FROM CONSUMPTION TO TUBERCULOSIS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 524, 524 (Barbara Gutmann Rosenkrantz ed., 1994) ("The importance of dust as a
factor in occupation mortality has attracted the attention of every authority on occupation
diseases from Ramazzini to Thomas Oliver."); Balaan & Banks, supra, at 435 (noting that
Hippocrates reported on miners suffering from silicosis); GEORGE ROSEN, THE HISTORY OF
MINERS' DISEASES: A MEDICAL AND SOCIAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1943) ("The earliest
evidences of occupational diseases in miners reach far back into prehistoric times.");
Absher, supra note 13, at 661 ("Silicosis is a disease of ancient origin."); Stark, supra note
5, at 1147 ("Silicosis is a chronic fibrosing disease of the lungs produced by prolonged
extensive exposure to free crystalline silica. It was first described in the sixteenth
century."); MARTIN CHERNIACK, THE HAWK'S NEST INCIDENT: AMERICA'S WORST
INDUSTRIAL DISASTER 37 (1986) ("The patriarchs of occupational medicine, Agricola in the
sixteenth century and Ramazzini in the eighteenth, associated the disease [silicosis] with the
dusts created in tool manufacture, as well as in mines and quarries.").
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dusts, including silica dusts, and health.72 Thus, the hazards of silicosis are
not a new discovery, even though the complexities of its cause and effect
are still being explored today. 73
A conclusion one might draw from these venerable sources is that the
market has clearly failed with respect to dust exposures. How, after all,
could hundreds of years of exposure to dangerous dusts occur unless there
was a market failure? The answer lies with the evolving nature of scientific
knowledge and the nature of dust-induced health problems. Despite
widespread general knowledge that dust exposure posed risks, in fact little
specific knowledge existed as to the types of risks with which we are
concerned today. Nineteenth-century and earlier observers could see dust
in the air in mines and other workplaces and observe that some of the
employees working in those locations became sick. They had little
accurate knowledge about why the employees became ill, why some did
and some did not, and how the dust they observed was connected to the
illness. Conditions in these workplaces were generally quite different from
those that prevail today. Exposures in pre-industrial economies, for
example, tended to be limited to a few high-risk occupations (for example,
mining). Even in those occupations, the technology used in pre-Industrial
Revolution mining differed from modern methods, and it produced
different types and volumes of dust. We remember the successful
identification of the association between dust and silicosis, forgetting the
many similar theories that have since been proven wrong (for example, the
connection between "miasmas" and disease).74 We cannot conclude from
Agricola's writings that the public widely understood that the conditions he
observed caused disease. Nor can we conclude that the absence of action
to control the dust hazard until the twentieth century represents indifference
to the health and welfare of the employees by either the employees
themselves or their employers.
72. See Stark, supra note 5, at 1147 (noting that "[t]he specific name silicosis was
introduced in 1870 by Visconti" and thus demonstrating that knowledge of the problem of
silica dusts has existed for over 125 years). General knowledge of dusts as a source of
occupational disease was also prevalent. For example, a 1902 address on "the Dust
Problem" to a Sanitary Congress in Manchester, England by Sir James Crichton-Browne
included the statement that "'[tihe mortality of the principal dust-producing occupations,
compared with that of agriculturalists, who live and work in what is practically dustless
atmosphere, is excessive to a startling degree."' Hoffman, supra note 71, at 525 (quoting
Sir Crichton-Browne's address). Similarly, an 1879 article in "Buck's Hygiene and Public
Health" by Dr. Roger S. Tracy considered dust issues at length, including noting problems
of chronic and progressive disease. See id. at 527-28 (quoting the article and noting its
detailed discussion of the symptoms of the disease).
73. See Graham, supra note 5, at 191 (implying that silicosis was a well-documented
problem in the 1700s, although the term "silicosis" only dates to 1870).
74. See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Social Risk and the Transformation of Public Health Law:
Lessons from the Plague Years, 86 IOWA L. REv. 869, 881-83 (2001) (discussing changes in
theories as to the cause of disease).
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B. From the Industrial Revolution to the New Deal
Although miners and some other occupations had experienced dust
exposures for centuries, the development of power tools and other new
technologies as a result of the industrial revolution dramatically changed
the scope and type of dust exposure for employees in a wide range of
industries.
1. Industrialization 's Impacts
Industrialization in the United States brought a sharp increase in
accidental deaths and injuries.75 Throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Americans grappled with a number of responses to the
problem. Not surprisingly, given the toll from accidents, the problem of
workplace disease was not the first priority. 76 The initial response to the
increased accident rate was an "outpouring" of new tort litigation despite
the restrictive tort doctrines that made suits difficult for plaintiffs to win-
between 1870 and 1910, tort cases in New York City had grown from 4.2%
to 40.9% of the trial court caseload.77  Complaints concerning the
plaintiffs' bar used alarmist terms: "'barratrous speculations,"'
"'communistic tendencies,"' and "'enormous verdicts"' all contributed to
the denigration of "'manly and professional dignity"' at the bar.78
Dust may not have been at the top of the social agenda, but it too was
affected by industrialization. As a result of technological change, the scope
of the dust problem grew dramatically with the Industrial Revolution.
7 9
Exposure to silica dust increased sharply in the early years of the twentieth
century after the invention of the pneumatic hammer drill in 1897 and sand
blasting in 1904.80 The new technologies meant that more dust was made
up of smaller particles. 81 Although no systematic measurements existed,
75. WITT, supra note 49, at 22 ("By virtually all accounts-contemporary accounts as
well as those of historians writing a century later-the United States witnessed an industrial-
accident crisis of world-historical importance.").
76. Id. at 37 ("[A]round the turn of the twentieth century, the industrial accident
emerged in the United States as among the most visible of social ills.").
77. Id. at 59.
78. See id. at 62 (quoting Slap at Roosevelt in Barnes Reply, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1913,
at 5).
79. DAVID ROSNER & GERALD MARKOWITZ, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE tN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 38 (1991) ("In the first two
decades of the twentieth century, steam-driven equipment replaced hand drills and
sledgehammers in granite quarries throughout the nation."); see also id. at 41 (describing the
higher risk from power tools because of the greater amounts of dust they create).
80. PRIMER, supra note 9, at 12; see also ALAN DERICKSON, WORKERS' HEALTH,
WORKERS' DEMOCRACY: THE WESTERN MINERS' STRUGGLE, 1891-1925, at 40 (1988)
(describing the spread of power tools in mining and the resulting increase in silicosis).
81. See DERICKSON, supra note 80, at 41 (explaining that enhanced drilling techniques
resulted in greater amounts of dust particles that were smaller in size and therefore better
capable of penetrating the alveoli of the lungs).
[58:2
2006] SILICA & THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY CA TEGORIZA TION 291
federal studies conducted by the Bureau of Mines found that mines in
Joplin, Missouri and Butte, Montana contained dust levels at more than 100
times the levels later allowed under the OSHA standards imposed in the
1970s. 82  Even in states with laws requiring ventilation of dusty
workplaces, insufficient knowledge resulted in laws that lacked specificity
in defining meaningful exposure or ventilation levels.
8 3
Further, the limits of pre-twentieth-century medical knowledge
significantly hampered medical diagnosis of dust-related injuries. The
absence of X-ray technology severely limited the ability to examine the
lungs of living patients, 84 and the lack of the germ theory left doctors
without a correct causal understanding of much of what we take for granted
in medicine today. 85  For example, scientists had trouble distinguishing
82. Id. at 42.
83. See SELLERS, supra note 45, at 38 (observing that the laws lacked the specificity
necessary to ensure adequate protection for the workers).
84. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 32 (providing anecdotal evidence of
the development of the X-ray machine and its impact on the analysis of particles within the
lungs).
85. Cf SELLERS, supra note 45, at 114-15 (describing the impact of new medical
advances). Elizabeth Fee attributes some of the growth of medical knowledge to the
increased crowding in urban areas that accompanied industrialization:
The [prior] belief that epidemic diseases posed only occasional threats to an
otherwise healthy social order was shaken by the industrial transformation of the
late nineteenth century. The burgeoning social problems of the industrial cities
could not be ignored: the overwhelming influx of immigrants crowded into narrow
alleys and tenement housing, the terrifying death and disease rates of working-class
slums, the total inadequacy of water supplies and sewage systems for the rapidly
growing population, the spread of endemic and epidemic diseases from the slums
to the homes of the wealthy, the escalating squalor and violence of the streets.
ELIZABETH FEE, DISEASE AND DISCOVERY: A HISTORY OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF
HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1916-39, at 12 (1987). Solving these social problems required
understanding them, thus producing a demand for medical knowledge that spilled over into
industrial contexts. This resulted in a transformation in public health agencies, shifting
personnel from those hired due to "patronage or political considerations" to experts, part of
the general Progressive Era trend toward expert agencies. Id. at 16. Public health and
medicine had direct benefits for the military, among others, allowing the construction of the
Panama Canal after the defeat of yellow fever and malaria. See id. at 16-17 (touting the
triumph of improved public health over the high death toll that had previously hindered
completion of the Canal). These lessons were brought home and applied in the public health
and industrial contexts. Id. at 17-18. The resulting agencies and projects demanded trained
personnel, helping to spark professional schools in the field. See id. at 18 (noting the
newfound stress on the need for full-time health professionals). The emphasis remained on
public health rather than industrial health, however. The 1915 Manual for Health Officers,
the first handbook for public health officers, devoted only four pages to industrial concerns,
compared to three hundred on contagious diseases. Id. at 21. Fee suggests that the
profession took a wrong turn by focusing on individual disease-causing agents rather than
larger social contexts. See id. at 21-22 (decrying the lack of majority commitment to study
more than just the immediate physical impact of the various "disease-causing organisms").
However, we believe that the marginal net value from addressing individual diseases was so
large that the profession's direction was more the result of picking "low hanging fruit" than
simply bad intellectual choices.
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tuberculosis from lung scarring caused by dust exposure. 86 Even today,
radiographic techniques cannot distinguish silicosis from many other
respiratory diseases.87 Similarly, variation in individual susceptibility to
various industrial hazards discouraged investment in general mitigation
measures solely because some employees became ill. 88 Medical standards
changed rapidly in the first quarter of the twentieth century, becoming
more science-based and making much greater use of technology. 89 This
included expansion of information technology such as punch cards, which
enabled the tracking of patterns of disease.90
Pre-twentieth-century understanding of dust hazards was primitive by
modern standards, and improving that understanding ultimately required
technological change (the invention of radiography in 1895) 9' and
scientific breakthroughs in medicine (the germ theory's impact on medicine
in the 1870s and 1880s).92 Although the discovery of X-ray technology
prompted a massive reaction almost overnight-machines were for sale in
the United States for $50 within a short time after the discovery of the
technique in Germany, and more than 1,000 articles and 49 books on the
topic appeared in the first year after its discovery93 -it took time for the
86. See generally Am. Lung Ass'n, Interstitial Lung Disease, http://www.cheshire-
med.com/programs/pulrehab/ipf.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006) (discussing the various
causes of the disease and noting the lack of understanding of all of the origins and treatment
of the disease); BARTH, supra note 23, at 87 (noting that "there are no pulmonary function
tests specific to silicosis").
87. See BARTH, supra note 23, at 87 (adding that, despite the inability of the tests to
identify conclusively the cause of the disease, workers' compensation acts still base
decisions on X-ray analysis).
88. See SELLERS, supra note 45, at 28 (describing the reaction of employers who
assumed that workers who became ill despite the existing safety precautions were somehow
more susceptible to the disease, leading to the conclusion that no greater safety efforts were
necessary).
89. See JOEL D. HOWELL, TECHNOLOGY IN THE HOSPITAL: TRANSFORMING PATIENT
CARE IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (1995) ("[T]he entire hospital had become, by
1925, quite actively and self-consciously based on science."); id. at 5 (noting the increased
use of machinery, including X-ray equipment).
90. See id. at 40-42 (tracking the early history of calculating technology). The use of
such methods reflected more than technological change-they also reflected the growth of
the same scientific management techniques for reorganizing factories. See id. at 42, 55
(illustrating the similarities between the recordkeeping of hospitals and general businesses,
including the methods common in factory settings).
91. See id. at 103 (summarizing the findings of Wilhelm Conrad Rontgen, the German
physics professor who invented the first X-ray machine); see also RUTH BRECHER
& EDWARD BRECHER, THE RAYS: A HISTORY OF RADIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 3-9 (1969) (describing the discovery of X-ray technology).
92. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of
AIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1995)
(describing the impact of changes as a result of the discovery of the bacteriological basis for
tuberculosis).
93. HOWELL, supra note 89, at 104. The first duplication of the result in the United
States took place in January 1896. BRECHER & BRECHER, supra note 91, at 11-12. The
American X-Ray Journal, a monthly publication devoted to "practical X-ray work and allied
arts and sciences" began publication in May 1897. Id. at 301.
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practical application of it to spread beyond major urban centers. 94 It also
took time for the new technology to become accepted as a vital part of
diagnosis even for obvious conditions such as broken bones.95 Finally,
although the technology was certainly available by 1900, major innovations
in reducing the cost of its use were not realized until the demands of World
War I prompted innovation.
96
In addition, before the twentieth century, public health was "still largely
the province of amateurs and gentlemen," 97 and the gentlemen did not have
the tools or the political base to demand resources. Only when private
foundations and state governments began funding research in the first years
of the twentieth century did a more systematic analysis of workplace safety
and health begin.98 The demand for more knowledge about dust-related
health hazards also grew because of the changes that the Industrial
Revolution introduced in factories.
Slowing the development of accurate knowledge of the causes of
workplace diseases
was the ambiguous way that occupational ailments often manifested
themselves. Even widely recognized industrial diseases could be
difficult to identify with any certainty in a given worker. Ailments
without characteristic signs of their occupational origins, such as
cardiovascular illnesses, many muscular strains and cramps, or even the
infectious lung diseases that often complicated silicosis, were easily
94. See HOWELL, supra note 89, at 108-09 (noting that it took "decades" for the
technology to spread to geographic locations near "most Americans").
95. See id. at 108 (quoting a medical paper's assertion that "'no one will for a moment
suppose that the vacuum-tube and induction-coil.., will, or ever can, displace the sense of
touch guided by a well-balanced and experienced mind'). This sentiment can also be seen
in the lengthy delays between hospital admission and radiographic examination for patients
in the hospital records studied by Howell until at least the 1920s. See id. at 110-11, 119-20
(confirming the rather infrequent use of X rays throughout the technology's early existence).
As Howell notes, "The mere existence of a diagnostic technology did not dictate how or
where it would be used; both hospital and machine had to change before the x ray or any
other machine could significantly influence hospital care." Id. at 132.
96. See id. at 118-19 (remarking that the war created a shift from glass plates to film,
spurred the creation of portable units, and led to the development of faster film).
97. FEE, supra note 85, at 2. As Fee notes,
Before the twentieth century, there were few formal requirements for public health
positions, no established career structures, no job security for public health
officials, and no formalized ways of producing new knowledge. Public health
positions were usually part-time appointments at nominal salary; those who
devoted much effort to public health typically did so on a voluntary basis.
Id. at 9. Since industrial medicine lagged behind public health, one may fairly attribute
similar characteristics to those few interested in the relationship between work and illness.
98. For example, the Russell Sage Foundation conducted the first systematic
investigations of accidents as a part of its Pittsburgh Survey. JACQUELINE KARNELL CORN,
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF WORKERS: THE AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL
INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS 1938-1988, at 2 (1989). The Illinois Occupational Disease
Commission performed the first survey of industrial disease in the United States in 1910.
Id. at 3.
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attributable to nonoccupational rather than workplace causes. Even for
those diseases more specifically connected with certain occupations, like
lead poisoning, recognition could be difficult.
99
A close look at when knowledge developed supports this account. An
article published in 1900 in the Journal of the American Medical
Association became the first major U.S. medical publication to identify
silica dust as the cause of fibrosis. 10 0 It discussed elevated death rates
following the introduction of mechanical milling equipment in a Nevada
gold milling firm.101 British researchers also documented problems in
South African mines in this same period. 102 Significantly, dust hazards
were first documented in the context of high exposure occupations (mining
and milling) in which new techniques increased the hazard at the same time
as new medical technology and knowledge made diagnosis possible.
The public reacted to the new knowledge by demanding yet more
knowledge. As early as 1911, for example, an insurance company
statistician pushed for a federally funded study into the health of metal
miners. 103  Insurance company interest in the subject is not surprising:
Some estimates today are that "at least thirty thousand" metal miners "at
any time" during this period had silicosis. 10 4 And insurance policies for
factory workers had boomed in the preceding decades--estimates run as
high as 3.5 million policies by 1900.105 New knowledge was produced-
"By the 1920s, silicosis was established as an important industrial
disease." 10 6 The new knowledge was far from complete: "[S]ilicosis was
perceived as a problem affecting rural, relatively isolated populations in
widely scattered communities" rather than as a widespread problem.
10 7
Knowledge about silicosis grew together with more general knowledge
99. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 21.
100. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 31 (explaining the impact of this
article on the recognition in the United States that silicosis was a distinct condition).
101. William Winthrop Betts, Chalicosis Pulmonum or Chronic Interstitial Pneumonia
Induced by Stone Dust, 34 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 70 (1900); see also CHERNIACK, supra note
71, at 38 ("An aggressive, often fatal form of silicosis, caused by milling of the quartz dust,
was identified in Nevada in the 1890s.").
102. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 31-32 (discussing the success of the
studies in bringing the devastating effects of industrial dusts to light).
103. Id. at 33; see also SELLERS, supra note 45, at 60-61 (relating the initiative taken by
Frederick Hoffman to initiate the most comprehensive studies at the time); BARTH, supra
note 23, at 6 (noting the end of sales of insurance to asbestos workers in 1918 as proof of the
insurance industry's knowledge of the hazards).
104. DERICKSON, supra note 80, at 52.
105. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 25.
106. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 48. A Department of Labor report
addressed "The Problem of Dust Phthisis in the Granite-Stone Industry" in May 1922.
CORN, supra note 98, at 7.
107. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 48.
[58:2
2006] SILICA & THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY CATEGORIZATION 295
about work-related disease-Professor Sellers concludes, for example, that
the field of industrial hygiene "coalesced between the 1910s and 1930s."08
Viewed in light of contemporary knowledge and technology, the market
reacted to the unprecedented increases in silica dust exposure caused by the
new technologies around the turn of the twentieth century by demanding
knowledge. Insurance companies, among others, stood to profit from
creating better understanding of the health effects of silica dust exposure,
and as diagnostic technology advanced and medical knowledge improved,
private interests reacted to the increased exposure and resulting increase in
silicosis by investing in knowledge. These investments appear to us to
have been made faster than would have been expected given the long
latency periods for silicosis. Far from a market failure, this initial response
appears to have been quite rapid in light of the uncertainties in medicine,
primitive understanding of the disease, long latency period, and rapid
technological change.
2. The Reaction of Interest Groups
The same industrial innovations that produced finer and more dangerous
dust also led to major increases in labor productivity and, as a result,
produced significant dislocations in a number of industries.' 09 For
example, in the nineteenth-century foundry industry, mould-making was a
skilled occupation" 0 supported by a great deal of semi-skilled and
unskilled labor."' Starting in the twentieth century, much of the support
work was mechanized and output soared: "By the early years of the
[twentieth] century, one worker running a machine mixer for two hours
could mix as much sand [for moulds] as two workers mixing by hand for
an entire day."'" 2 Craft workers generally resisted employer control over
their work," 3 which limited employer knowledge about hazards. For
example, Sellers reported that:
108. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 2.
109. See SELLERS, supra note 45, at 109 ("The early 1910s were a time of intense change
and upheaval in the workplace. Restructuring attempts by scientific managers helped
provoke an unprecedented strike wave as expert approaches to the threatened worker body
continued to proliferate."). But not all technological change increases hazards. See BARTH,
supra note 23, at 51-52 (listing technological changes that have reduced hazards); id. at 54
(discussing some improvements in occupational health from technological change).
110. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 54 ("The nineteenth-century molders saw
themselves as artists as well as artisans.").
11. See id. at 50-51.
112. Id. at 52.
113. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE
HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES 16-17 (1979) (discussing craft
workers' resistance to attempts to limit their autonomy through "daily self-assertion on the
job" rather than organized strikes); id. at 23 (describing the battle between stove companies
and the molders' union); id. at 26 ("Most important of all, new methods of industrial
management undermined the very foundation of craftsmen's functional autonomy.").
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[T]he Wheeling nail manufacturers rented out nail-making machines on
their premises and paid nailers by the piece; otherwise, they left many of
the nailers' working methods in the hands of the nailers themselves.
Many Wheeling nailers chose not to wet down their cutting machines,
which would have reduced the volume of dust to which they were
exposed, because dry nail cutting went faster and paid better-at least
over the short term.
In the case of the mould-makers, pneumatic tools for cleaning cast items
also raised efficiency, as did the addition of power tools to the finishing
stages of polishing and grinding." 5  The biggest change was the
introduction of moulding machines that replaced the skilled mould-
makers. 116 These innovations also created greater silica exposure, since the
power and pneumatic tools both created more dust and blew more dust into
the air. 117 The increased production raised exposures, as did the expansion
of the industry triggered by the falling prices of iron products due to higher
labor productivity.
In this environment, it is not surprising that occupational disease issues
became an important bargaining tool for unions. 11 8 The same changes that
threatened union members' positions within firms threatened the health of
their members. Employees also resisted safety measures at times, not
accepting the new equipment and methods either because they did not
believe them safer or because the changes reduced income as well as
increasing safety. 19 Opposing technological change is difficult without a
non-Luddite rationale, and health issues provided unions with the means to
seek to control the impact of technology in the workplace. Similarly, as the
number of small foundries grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
114. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 26 (footnotes omitted).
115. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 52 (noting, however, the resulting
increase in the amount of dangerous dust particles these new machines threw into the air).
116. See id. at 56 (explaining the link between the mechanization of the molding process
and the declining autonomy of skilled molders).
117. Id.at62.
118. See id. at 60 (outlining the union's argument that it should not have to bear the
financial burden of poor worker health due to mechanization); id. at 63 (noting union
arguments against allowing mechanized processes); id. at 73 ("Labor and management
defined silicosis in terms increasingly removed from the discourse of public health and
medicine."); DERICKSON, supra note 80, at 162 (describing the major role played by mining
unions in silicosis issues). Interestingly, the unions used the health issue in part to eliminate
competition from women, by arguing that female workers should be excluded from jobs
with dust exposures to protect their health. For example, "[a]t its annual convention in
1912, the [mould-makers] union resolved 'to use every effort to bring about the elimination'
of the employment of women in foundries because 'twentieth century civilization is not in
favor of the dragging down of American womanhood so that the foundrymen can increase
their profits."' ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 61 (quoting NEW YORK STATE, 3
SECOND REP. OF THE FACTORY INVESTIGATIONS COMMISSION 813 (1913)).
119. See WITT, supra note 49, at 32 (explaining employee resistance to the
implementation of safety measures).
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centuries, 12 unions must also have seen the health issue as a means of
limiting this competition to the larger, unionized shops since the smaller
shops generally could not afford to follow the safety standards set by the
larger firms. 121  The craft-basis of early twentieth-century American
unionism limited its effectiveness by fragmenting workers in each shop.1
22
The early twentieth century also saw the passage of state laws protecting
the health of employees and the creation of agencies that investigated
factory conditions and occupational health issues, part of the Progressive
Era tendency toward expert agencies. The organization of the American
Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) in 1906 created a lobbying
group seeking labor legislation and supporting its demands through
conferences, investigations, and reports. 123  It held its first national
conference on industrial disease in 1910.124 The organization also
sponsored publication of papers on the topic. As a result, after the
publication of papers from the second AALL conference, American
publications exceeded those of the former leaders-the British and the
Germans.1 25  The AALL made occupational diseases one of its top
priorities. 126 The policy entrepreneurs of the AALL, who included Richard
Ely and John Commons, sought to define a "scientific" path to legislation
that would improve human welfare. 127 In doing so, they helped create a
"more coherent field of study" dealing with occupational disease.' 28
Undoubtedly motivated by concern for the general welfare, these experts
also "aimed to secure a place for their professions" in public policy. 129
Popular demand for action grew, in part, from media accounts of
workplace hazards. Magazine and book publishers printed regular
accounts of workplace disease and injury because such stories sold
magazines. 30  State factory inspectors grew in number nationwide, from
fewer than 300 in 1907 to 425 in 1911.131 In the process, they helped
120. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 64.
121. Id. at 64-65.
122. See ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS 32 (2d ed. 1994)(discussing the physical breakups of shops as workers were summoned to various unions).
123. CORN, supra note 98, at 5.
124. Id. at 5-6.
125. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 61.
126. Id. at 50.
127. See id. at 52 (describing Ely's assertion that the organization would use "scientific
study" to convince lawmakers to better protect employees).
128. Id. at 53.
129. Id. at 60.
130. David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, The Early Movement for Occupational Safety
and Health, 1900-1917, in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY
OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 467, 469 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers
eds., 3d ed. rev. 1997) ("The publishers of these magazines and books were not printing this
material as a public service. Rather, they recognized that it could sell magazines ... .
131. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 72.
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create a constituency for legislation. 132  Organizations representing a
variety of interest groups sprang up in the 1910s. 133 By 1914, 33 states had
created factory inspection bureaus, 134 15 states had passed legislation
requiring reporting of occupational diseases by all physicians, 135 and 25
had passed workers' compensation statutes. 136 World War I's demands on
the economy and labor stimulated even greater interest in industrial
hygiene. 137
While these first agencies' capabilities were rudimentary,138 reflecting
the scientific standards of the time, their creation meant that a state
bureaucracy now invested in documenting occupational diseases. Not
surprisingly, these new agencies quickly expanded: New York went from
one to four doctors between 1922 and 1924; Connecticut formed a
"Division of Occupational Diseases" in 1928 and had "both a physician and
an 'industrial hygienist' on its staff by 1930." 13' The federal government
also funded studies aimed at occupational disease. 14  Workers'
compensation statutes spurred companies to hire plant physicians-a
Public Health Service study in 1919 found "118 out of the 170 plants
questioned paid a physician for services, either part-time or full-time."
' 4 1
This interest by governments spurred further market responses: The first
American textbooks on occupational medicine appeared in 1914,142 and
132. Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 130, at 478 ("For almost a decade, exposes of
inhumane working conditions and demands for reform were regular features in newspapers
and magazines across the country.").
133. See CORN, supra note 98, at 6-7 (naming several such organizations, including the
National Council for Industrial Safety (1913), the Industrial Hygiene Section of the
American Public Health Association (1914), the Conference Board of Physicians in Industry
(1915), and the American Association of Industrial Physicians and Surgeons (1916)). The
physicians group's membership soared from 125 in 1916 to 600 by the end of World War I.
SELLERS, supra note 45, at 145.
134. Sellers, supra note 47, at 236.
135. Id. at 237.
136. Id. at 238; see also CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 38 ("In 1915 the first workmen's
compensation laws provided implicit, though not explicit, coverage for silicosis.").
137. CORN, supra note 98, at 8; see also SELLERS, supra note 45, at 145-46 (discussing
the interest in medicine spurred by labor shortages).
138. Sellers, supra note 47, at 236 (reviewing the enforcement powers of state agencies
following the war).
139. Id. at 253.
140. See id. at 239 (discussing the Bureau of Labor's support of investigations into the
phosphorus match and lead industries in the early twentieth century); CHERNIACK, supra
note 71, at 38 ("By 1914 the Federal Bureau of Mines had begun to recommend yearly
physical examinations for workers exposed to dusts containing silica.").
141. Sellers, supra note 47, at 246.
142. Id. at 240. No mention of occupational factors that might lead to fibroid phthisis, a
silicosis predecessor, appeared in a widely used medical textbook in the 1880s, for example.
Cf SELLERS, supra note 45, at 31-33 (recounting the history of early medical textbooks on
occupational diseases).
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Harvard appointed the first full-time professor of industrial medicine in
1919.143 The initial state response mimicked the private sector response:
investing in creating knowledge.
3. Workers' Compensation
As a result of the increase in workplace hazards brought about by
industrialization, a broad coalition developed in favor of legislation to
address the problems it posed for employers, employees, and insurance
companies. 144 Employees wanted compensation; employers and insurance
companies wanted limited liability; social reformers wanted more state
intervention in the workplace. Moreover, reformers often believed
regulatory solutions to be inadequate, turning to the financial incentives
offered by the insurance approach.1 45 The primary result in the United
States was the development of the workers' compensation system for
industrial accidents (although initially not for workplace diseases), a
compromise that limited employers' liability and increased employees'
certainty of recovery. 146 Other new initiatives included the establishment
and expansion of state labor agencies, the creation of the federal
Department of Labor, and the passage of various acts regulating working
conditions in specific industries. 1
47
The first wave of workers' compensation statutes, however, did not
address diseases. Why not? Several factors contributed to the initial focus
on injuries rather than disease, a relatively crude version of the
categorization problem. First, workers' compensation, so commonplace
today, was a radical innovation at the time.148  Second, mass industrial
143. Sellers, supra note 47, at 247.
144. See Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 130, at 478 ("The movement to control
workplace hazards was widespread, encompassing a variety of different groups.").
145. WITT, supra note 49, at 100-01 (emphasizing the failures of regulatory approaches
and the increasing momentum for a focus on insurance as a way to ensure worker safety).
146. See BARTH, supra note 23, at 61 ("The essential quid pro quo of [workers'
compensation].., involved the abrogation of the injured employees' right to pursue a
common-law action against their employer. In return they received an assurance of a
speedy and certain award in amounts specified by law."); CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-
ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 216-20 (2d ed. 1916) (discussing explicitly the quid pro quo in a
report for the Russell Sage Foundation and helping build public support for workers'
compensation systems). Public interest regulation theorists suggest that workers'
compensation legislation developed out of state legislatures' concern for employees, "many
of whom were recent immigrants or former slaves and hardly in a position to strike hard
bargains with the industrial tycoons of the day." MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at
17. Left unspecified, however, is how these powerless employees convinced the members
of legislatures to defy the industrial tycoons and pass legislation against the tycoons'
interests. The public choice account is superior, in our view, because it explains the rise of
the legislation without resort to episodic defiance by legislatures of powerful interests that
are otherwise believed to control events.
147. Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 130, at 479.
148. See generally John M. Kleeberg, From Strict Liability to Workers' Compensation:
The Prussian Railroad Law, the German Liability Act, and the Introduction of Bismarck's
ADMINSTRA TIVE LA W REVIEW
disease, as opposed to isolated incidents, was still relatively unrecognized.
The long latency periods (as much as twenty years for silicosis)1 49 and
relatively primitive understanding of medicine made diagnosis of non-acute
conditions challenging.15 0 The industrial changes that increased exposure
combined with the latency period to make the real boom in disease
recognizable only after state legislatures had passed the first wave of
workers' compensation statutes. 151 One key result of the introduction of
workers' compensation insurance, however, was that a lawyer named
Crystal Eastman began to gather statistics on the causes of injuries. 1 2 A
benefit of workers' compensation acts was that they "moved analysis of
work accidents from the close specificity of individualized inquiries into
particular accident cases to a higher plane of statistical generality."'
153
Insurers sought to introduce preventative measures to lower risks. 54  It
worked: "From 1907 to 1920, work-fatality rates per manhour in American
industry dropped by two-thirds; nonfatal work-injury rates and lost
workdays per manhour ... appear to have declined by half."
55
Interest in such issues remained at the state level in part because the
federal government had not yet become large enough to make a difference.
"State and local government expenditures were about five times larger than
the federal budget in 1929"-federal expenditures represented a mere three
percent of gross national product that year.' 
56
The 1920s were a time of economic growth and advancement for
employees. Industrialization brought new material wealth:
Throughout the late 1920s surveys of consumer habits marveled at the
wide range of purchases made by working-class people, many of them
involving durable goods such as radios, washing machines, and even
Accident Insurance in Germany, 1838-1884, 36. N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53 (2003)(describing innovations in creating workers' compensation).
149. See BARTH, supra note 23, at 67 (noting that the latency period for silicosis is
between four and twenty years).
150. See id. at 63 (discussing problems that long latency periods pose for workers'
compensation generally).
151. The new legislation, which began with New York's adoption of a workers'
compensation statute in 1910 and reached fruition in 1963 with the adoption of a statute by
every industrialized state, thus preceded widespread silicosis. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX
K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 2.07-.08 (2003) (describing the
development of workers' compensation acts in the United States).
152. See WITT, supra note 49, at 126-27 (touting her efforts and her influence on the
introduction of statistical science to workers' compensation statutes).
153. Id. at 142.
154. See id. at 145 (addressing the impact on the introduction of preventive measures by
making employers responsible for injuries).
155. Id. at 187.
156. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 55 (1999). At the end of the twentieth century, state and local
expenditures were about the same size as federal expenditures, which now totaled more than
20% of the Gross National Product. Id.
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automobiles... . All experts agreed that by the end of the 1920s, the
nation's working people had greater access to health care, recreational
and cultural facilities, public services, and education than ever before. 1
57
Prices for consumer goods were falling rapidly, putting them within the
reach of an ever-widening proportion of the country's population. 158 Labor
peace largely prevailed, with strike activity reaching historic lows.' 59
"Welfare capitalism" meant that employers had taken the initiative in
addressing a wide range of issues for employees, defusing employee
interest in initiating workplace reforms. 16  Not everything was perfect;
unemployment remained a concern for many, reaching eight percent in
mid- 1929.161 Nonetheless, the success of so many during the 1920s
resulted in little demand for tackling hard to understand problems like
silicosis. Unions, the one interest group that might have spurred public
interest, were preoccupied with declining membership--a sympathetic
observer says the American Federation of Labor (AFL) "languished in
torpor and apathy throughout the 1920s"1 62 -and losing ground because it
had not yet cracked the mass production industries.1 63 Most importantly
for explaining the lack of state interest in issues like silicosis, the AFL
unions, under Samuel Gompers' philosophy of "voluntarism," largely
shunned involvement with the government.64 To the extent that the pre-
1930s responses to silicosis (and industrial diseases generally) seems
inadequate in retrospect, the inadequacy was a failure of both the market
and the state, for neither anticipated the full impact of silicosis. From the
vantage point of today, this may seem surprising, but the long latency
period and lack of understanding of the disease explains why neither state
nor market responded more quickly.
157. ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 5-6; see also KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 22 ("[I]n the
pulsing industrial cities, virtually all Americans dramatically improved their standards of
living over the course of the post-World War I decade.").
158. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 21 ("A car that cost the average worker the equivalent
of nearly two years' wages before the First World War could be purchased for about three
months' earnings by the late 1920s.").
159. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 6 (celebrating the rising prosperity that had brought
an end to the cycle of unrest and violence).
160. See KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 27 (describing the death of the organized labor
movement at the hands of increased efforts by employers to offer more attractive benefits);
MONTGOMERY, supra note 113, at 33 (stressing the goals of personnel managers to "pacify"
the concerns of the workers to ensure greater productivity).
161. ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 7.
162. Id. at 23.
163. Id.
164. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 25; see also ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM:
NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 202 (1995) (noting the American Federation
of Labor (AFL) became disenchanted in part because of a "historic reluctance to rely on
government assistance (a reluctance born of the conviction that once labor became
dependent on the state it could be-and would be-oppressed by the state)").
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4. The Silicosis Crisis of the 1930s
Because most of the first wave of workers' compensation legislation had
either explicitly excluded or not explicitly included industrial disease, 165
workers who became ill as a result of dust exposure sought relief in the
courts. Where some industrial disease coverage was provided, legislatures
adopted it as "a conservative alternative to plans for state-sponsored health
insurance." 66 Lawsuits over silicosis from workplace exposures began to
proliferate in the 1930s. 16 7  Thousands of such suits created a liability
crisis 168 and made silicosis "an issue of national import."' 169  Insurers
reported that they faced "'the most serious claim problem ever
encountered"' as a result of silicosis suits. 170 More than a billion dollars of
silicosis suits were pending in 1934,171 the equivalent of over $14 billion
today. One important reason these suits increased dramatically in the
1930s was that silica suits offered a means to survive the Depression,
converting the tort system into a rudimentary social welfare system, 17 2 and
"as workers won their suits, it emboldened more of the unemployed and
their lawyers." 1
73
A variety of factors might explain the explosion of silicosis litigation in
the 1930s. One is undoubtedly that silicosis's long lead time meant that
incidence of the disease lagged the introduction of dust-producing
165. See BARTH, supra note 23, at 92-93 (analyzing a brief history of workmen's
compensation laws that did not include occupational disease).
166. SELLERS, SUpra note 45, at 146.
167. GEORGE G. DAVIS ET AL., THE PNEUMONOKONIOSES (SILICOSIS): BIBLIOGRAPHY AND
LAWS 7 (1935) (noting the increase in litigation over silica in the 1930s). Manufacturers in
New York in 1925 supported a bill to stop the "hundreds" of common law suits over
silicosis because "hundreds of thousands of dollars" had already been spent by then in
settlements. Id. at 50.
168. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 3 (stating that in 1933 "newspapers,
magazines, and professional journals were filled with stories about the threat of a new
scourge-silicosis-that was crippling workers in a wide variety of industries"). For
example, in New York State in 1934, there were $50 million in damages claimed in silicosis
suits, prompting efforts to bring the condition into the workers' compensation system.
DAVIS, supra note 167, at 30; see also ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 91-96
(describing the crisis in New York). In Massachusetts, the costs of covering silicosis claims
required $2 per $100 of payroll fee on top of the $2.70 per $100 occupational disease rate
for foundries, almost doubling the cost of the insurance. DAVIS, supra note 167, at 5 1.
169. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 4.
170. Id. at 79 (quoting from a 1930-era insurance company's twenty-fifth annual report
to its policyholders about the seriousness of silicosis claims).
171. DAVIS, supra note 167, at 75.
172. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 78-79 (describing the negative impact
of the suits on industry itself and even workers as a group); BARTH, supra note 23, at 4
(noting, among factors increasing silicosis claims, "an apparent effort to find some source of
income by the unemployed, a number of whom had had the disease for some time but
continued to work until economic conditions caused them to be laid off").
173. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 81.
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equipment in various industries.' 74  Both researchers and the public
understood silicosis less well than many other industrial diseases, as
"researchers had great difficulty devising experiments or other kinds of
investigations that persuasively established the chain of events between
contact with silica dust and actual symptoms.' ' 175 Another important factor,
however, is that the Great Depression created economic conditions that led
"workers to use the issue of industrial illness as a means of achieving social
welfare objectives."' 176 Lawsuits filed by "workers in the dusty trades"'
177
"brought 'silicosis within the range of practical politics.""' 178 Faced with an
"actuarial potential for disaster,"' 179 employers and political leaders
experienced enormous pressure to find a solution. Yet another reason is the
federal funding that flowed from the new Social Security Act to state
boards of health to establish industrial hygiene divisions,' 80 agencies that
then assembled information on the state of occupational diseases in various
industries. Finally, the Gauley Bridge disaster (discussed in more detail
below), 18 1 in which hundreds of men lost their lives to acute silicosis,
spurred congressional hearings and litigation in 1935-1936.
Many of these suits, of course, involved genuinely injured individuals
who had suffered real damages and who properly sought compensation
through the tort system. Others, however, did not. Accurate diagnosis was
difficult, yet some experts felt that too many doctors were willing to
174. Rosner and Markowitz's study links the rise of silicosis to a combination of factors.
First, they note that from the late 1800s until the early 1900s, medical understanding of
dust-related diseases focused on tuberculosis. See id. at 15-21 (describing the early struggle
of the scientific community to come to an understanding about the origins of the disease).
Early in the twentieth century, evidence began to emerge, first in Britain and later in the
United States, that cast doubt on the bacteriological model, but the medical consensus on the
bacteriological model remained. See id. at 21-22 (explaining the slow move toward a
broader understanding of the disease).
175. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 204.
176. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 5; see id. at 76 (stating that, during the
Depression, "[a]s workers were thrown out of work and families forced to support the
disabled on meager or no income, the arguments about responsibility for industrial disease
and disability took on a new urgency and meaning").
177. Id. at 77.
178. Id. at 78 (quoting James D. Hackett, Silicosis, 11 N.Y. DEP'T OF LAB. INDUS. BULL.
475 (Dec. 1932)).
179. Id. at 87.
180. CHARLES LEVENSTErN & GREGORY F. DELAURIER, THE COTTON DUST PAPERS:
SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE "DISCOVERY" OF BYssiNosIs IN THE U.S. 43 (2002).
Interestingly, these state agencies sought expanded funding during the war years on the
grounds that war production required more attention to employee health efforts. Id. at 45-
46. This source of funding shifted the location of state industrial disease control from state
labor departments to state health departments. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at
126; see also Interview with Leonard J. Goldwater, in CORN, supra note 98, at 147 (adding
that state programs were made possible by Social Security money).
181. For a discussion of the Gauley Bridge disaster, see infra notes 198-202 and
accompanying text.
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support doubtful claims based on unskilled readings of radiographs.18 2
Silicosis suits brought with them bitter disputes over alleged fraudulent
claims such as those detailed in articles like The Dust Hazard Racket18 3 and
those evidenced by fights between insurance companies and their insured
over coverage. 184 As one observer in the 1930s complained,
Missouri is a paradise for this type of racketeering. Under its law 9
jurors out of 12 may decide a case. Though the laws against barratry and
champerty are still in existence they are apparently forgotten. Plaintiffs'
attorneys have employed runners, or solicitors to comb the state, paying
particular attention to the unemployed. As much as $25 a case is paid to
solicitors for every signed contract brought in. Cases are taken on a 50
per cent contingent basis and notices under the attorney's lien law are
promptly served on the employer. At first the solicitors confined
themselves to cases where some disability existed. More lately
solicitation has been carried on among workers still engaged in active
work, who have no more outward appearance of disability than the dust
on their clothes and some outward appearance of age. 185
This scenario presented a crisis when people without injuries took
advantage of some states' looser standards to bring fraudulent claims.
Eventually the "crisis" abated with the shifting of silicosis suits to the
workers' compensation system beginning in the mid-1930s. 186  What
brought about the change? In some states, court rulings added silicosis or
other industrial diseases to workers' compensation. In California, for
example, a ruling by the state supreme court that the limitation period for
occupational disease claims would be based on when the disease was
discoverable, not when the exposure occurred,18 7 led insurers to seek
substantial rate increases (from $11 for every $100 of payroll to $22.25 for
every $100 of payroll in the case of underground gold mines, for
example) 88 and prompted legislative action. The wave of suits, partially
182. See SELLERS, supra note 45, at 204 (addressing the dangers associated with the
combination of the X ray's limited diagnostic usefulness with doctors' limited X-ray reading
skills).
183. DAVIS, supra note 167, at 52.
184. See, e.g., Frederick Snow Kellog, Silicosis Claims-A New Problem in the
Insurance Field, N.J. L.J., 1935, at 1; ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 70
(explaining that the foundry industry was "under pressure from the insurance industry,
which was threatening to withdraw its liability coverage").
185. DAVIS, supra note 167, at 33; see also id. at 73 (noting that "[a]n epidemic of suits
aggregating $974,000 against one company alone, have been filed in Missouri" for work-
related silicosis claims).
186. See LABOR LAW INFO. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL-DISEASE
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1936, at 1-3 (1938) (describing the initiation of
occupational disease coverage for "dust diseases").
187. See Marsh v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 18 P.2d 933, 938 (Cal. 1933)
(basing the date of the injury on the date it becomes discoverable through "the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence").
188. See Silicosis, TIME, Jan. 6, 1936, at 58 (discussing the Marsh case); see also The
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spurred by the Depression, got employers' attention, and their liability
insurance companies were presumably anxious to add the workers'
compensation insurers to the defense team. ' 9 Life insurance companies
were worried that they had covered people now likely to die far earlier than
the companies had predicted. Covering industrial diseases fell within the
interest of a wide range of groups, including both employees and
employers. 190 The growing experience with accident coverage through
workers' compensation insurance inspired confidence that the system could
absorb disease claims. And, finally, the results of the increased exposures
to dust and other workplace disease agents was now producing enough
injured employees to attract attention. In particular, the Gauley Bridge
disaster put a spotlight on silicosis.
5. The New Deal
The initial wave of New Deal labor legislation did not address
occupational disease issues. Preoccupied with attempts to deal with the
staggering economic crisis of the Great Depression, and without the
guidance of a coherent theory on how to do so, the Roosevelt
Administration embarked on a raft of economic reform measures. One of
the most far reaching was the National Industrial Recovery Act and the
agency it created, the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the
essence of which was hostility to the idea of competition. 191 Led by Hugh
Johnson, who envisioned the agency as "a giant organ through which he
could play on the economy of the country,"' 92 the NRA quickly
"mushroomed into a bureaucratic colossus" with a staff of 4,500 overseeing
"more than seven hundred [industry] codes, many of which overlapped,
sometimes inconsistently."' 93 These codes cartelized "huge sectors of
American industry."' 194 Trade associations and large producers dominated
the NRA codes.195 Despite the varied efforts and alphabet soup of agencies
Silicosis Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at 22 ("Few liability companies will assume a
silicosis risk at any but a prohibitive premium.").
189. A representative of the Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, for example,
reported that silicosis costs "threaten[] the ruin of many American industries." The Silicosis
Menace, LITERARY DIG., Dec. 15, 1934, at 15.
190. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Committees for Prevention of Silicosis in Industry, 42
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1545, 1546 (1936) (quoting Labor Secretary Francis Perkins on the
interests of all sectors in resolving liability crisis and explaining the great interest of many
industrial and legal groups in how to handle the silicosis problem).
191. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 179.
192. Id. at 177 (quoting Arthur Schlesinger). Kennedy notes that Johnson's comments
were sometimes hard to interpret. For example, upon being appointed, he announced that,
"It will be red fire at first and dead cats afterward." Id.
193. Id. at 185; see BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 39 (summarizing complaints about
National Recovery Administration (NRA) codes).
194. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 184.
195. Id. at 184.
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and statutes, the New Deal was sputtering by 1935. Unemployment
remained at twenty percent, and opposition on both the right and the left
began to grow.1 96 1935 saw the launch of the "Second New Deal," a new
wave of proposed regulatory statutes including "the Emergency Relief
Appropriation Act, the Banking Act, the Wagner National Labor Relations
Act, the Public Utility Holding Companies Act, the Social Security Act,
and the Wealth Tax Act," which were, in part, designed to head off the
threats from populists Father Charles Coughlin and Senator Huey Long. 1
97
One key event spurring the expansion of the workers' compensation
system to cover industrial disease was a particularly horrific series of 500
deaths (out of 2,000 employees) from acute silicosis during the 1929 tunnel
project in Gauley Bridge, West Virginia. Another 1,500 were eventually
disabled from chronic silicosis.1 98  The tunnel route, unfortunately, ran
through a vein of almost pure quartz, producing extremely high
exposures. 199 The story broke nationally in 1936.200 As one account noted,
196. Id. at 218-19.
197. Id. at 242.
198. Balaan & Banks, supra note 71, at 435. Civil suits by the workers were largely
settled out of court. See also Silicosis: Tunneling Through an Atmosphere of Deadly Dust,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1936, at 33, 34 (discussing generally the case and resulting
settlements).
199. See Balaan & Banks, supra note 71, at 435; PRIMER, supra note 9, at 25 (describing
the composition of silicic rock as more than two-thirds quartz). Cherniack provides the
most thorough account. He notes that estimates of the silica content showed it was at least
90%. CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 41. Chemiack also suggests that the death toll may
have been as high as 764. Id. at 104.
200. The story of Gauley Bridge came to light when a "young New York playwright"
was traveling through West Virginia and gave a miner a ride. Village of Living Dead,
LITERARY DIG., Jan. 25, 1936, at 6. Learning of the "village of the living dead," where
many still-living tunnel workers with silicosis resided, the playwright wrote "a grim short of
a miner slowly suffocating" from silicosis for New Masses, a radical paper. Id. A labor
paper, People's Press, then picked up the story and published a non-fiction account. Id.
U.S. Representative Vito Marcantonio (R-N.Y.), a man "[d]ark-haired, outspoken, simple in
dress, . . . [who] has already impressed his colleagues with his earnestness," then launched a
congressional investigation. Id. Marcantonio, later termed "the most electorally successful
radical politician in America," in his first term in Congress proposed "'reopening and
operating shut-down factories by and for the benefit of the unemployed producing for use
instead of profit."' Vito Marcantonio: His Life and Milieu, http://users.rcn.com/
redpost/life.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). The most comprehensive biography of
Marcantonio described him as "frequently the sole spokesman in Congress for America's
radical left" from 1936 to 1950. ALAN SCHAFFER, VITO MARCANTONIO, RADICAL IN
CONGRESS 1 (1966). Marcantonio read the story in People's Press, which spurred the
hearings. Silicosis, supra note 198, at 33. Marcantonio later called the Rinehart & Dennis
Co., which constructed the tunnel, "worse than Dillinger and Al Capone." U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Silicosis Deaths Assailed in the House, Committees for Prevention of Silicosis in
Industry, 42 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1545, 1546 (1936). In an interesting side note, one of the
witnesses was a scientist from the NYU Medical School who was recruited to testify in
response to a request from Marcantonio. The scientist's main motive in testifying was "a
girlfriend in Washington" whom he thought would be impressed by his "being a big shot
and testifying before a congressional committee." When he produced lung specimens to
show the committee, "they emptied the room." Interview with Leonard J. Goldwater, in
CORN, supra note 98, at 142.
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"'Popular interest in silicosis, stimulating social and legislative activities
and affecting judicial decisions, was notably accentuated by the newspaper
notoriety of the Gauley Bridge episode."' 20 1 Indeed, some federal officials
felt that the Gauley Bridge disaster advanced occupational disease
legislation "almost a decade. 2 °2
Congressional hearings were held in 1936,203 and the federal Department
of Labor convened national conferences on the topic to encourage
legislation in the states, beginning just three weeks after the congressional
hearings concluded. 204 By creating a national debate over the subject of
silicosis, and bringing together both labor and industry representatives in a
forum, the government attempted to make it possible for the parties to
bargain their way to a mutually advantageous solution, 20 5 in keeping with
the Administration's corporatist approach to labor issues.20 6  The
combination of the threat of silica suits against employers, ambiguity in
many states' workers compensation laws on occupational disease
coverage, 207 causation issues for plaintiffs, 20 8 and unions' interests in using
the issue to expand their role in the workplace 20 9 made gains from
201. CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 109 (quoting WILLIAM G. COLE & LEWIS G. COLE,
PNUEMOCONIOSIS (SILICOSIs): THE STORY OF DusTY LUNGS 3 (1940)).
202. Carlton Skinner, Silicosis Deaths to Hasten Legislation Controlling Occupational
Diseases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 1936, at 4.
203. Investigation Relating to Health Conditions of Workers Employed in the
Construction and Maintenance of Public Utilities Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th
Cong. (1936).
204. See LABOR LAW INFO. SERV., supra note 186, at 5 (describing the national
conferences); CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 109 (noting that the conferences began less than
three months after the congressional subcommittee issued its report); U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Committees for Prevention of Silicosis in Industry, 42 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1545, 1545-46
(June 1936) (describing the content of the debate within the conferences).
205. The Roosevelt Administration sought to encourage a compromise, as it had through
its other attempts at using boards to negotiate between labor and management. ROSNER
& MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 218. A federal solution could not be imposed, as the
Roosevelt Administration had previously attempted on other issues, because the Supreme
Court had recently struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional.
Id. at 102. As an example of the bargaining made possible, the silicosis conferences
produced a call for uniform state legislation on the problem "[b]ecause of competition
between the same or similar industries in various States." U.S. Dep't of Labor, Program for
Prevention and Compensation of Silicosis, 44 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 909, 913 (1937).
206. See BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 35 (discussing the corporatist ideology of many
New Deal reformers); id. at 40 (discussing Roosevelt's attempts to sponsor cooperative
business-labor partnerships in 1938).
207. See LABOR LAW INFO. SERV., supra note 186, at 4 (describing the debate over
whether state statutes covering "injuries" rather than "accidents" included occupational
disease coverage); see also ROSNER & MARKOwITrz, supra note 79, at 86 (noting the
problems with the compensation system for silicosis-related diseases when experts
disagreed on diagnoses, the course of the disease, and other key issues). The bargaining was
particularly explicit in New York, where the first attempt at a legislative solution threatened
to bankrupt the insurance industry. See id. at 94-95 (noting the inadequacies of later
compromises).
208. See id. at 86 (noting that silicosis "was extremely difficult to diagnose").
209. See id. at 7 ("[S]ome of the new industrial unions added safety and health issues to
more traditional demands for shorter hours and better wages."); Sellers, supra note 47, at
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cooperation possible: Employers could eliminate the threat of civil suits,
and unions could expand their influence over the workplace 210 through a
211
new federal agency. Indeed, "[i]n the midst of the Depression, silicosis
was frequently framed as a labor and management problem, not solely as a
health issue. ' 212  Unions in the mid-1930s were on the upswing; after
dramatic declines to fewer than three million members over the 1920s and
early 1930s, union membership reached nine million in 1939.213 However,
the disputes between the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) divided the unions and weakened their political clout. 214 Economic
conditions were also turning against the unions. In 1937 the recovery
collapsed, and the "Roosevelt Recession" began, ending the active phase of
the New Deal.21 5
Employers, however, resisted the quasi-Faustian bargain; the main
impact of the federally sponsored conferences was to spur the opposing
sides to organize nationally to battle for control of the workplace. 216 Faced
with the threat of moves to create another of the New Deal "alphabet"
agencies (the leading congressional figure in the Gauley Bridge hearings
237 (adding that unions in the first part of the twentieth century created their own medical
clinics for workers); MONTGOMERY, supra note 113, at 163 (explaining that unions used
health and safety issues as bases for "quickie" strikes during periods of relatively high labor
demand in 1936 and 1937). The United Mine Workers, for example, fought long and hard
for the inclusion of safety provisions in union contracts and finally gained their inclusion in
the Appalachian Wage Agreement of 1941. Charles Anthony Morton, The United Mine
Workers and the Establishment of Coal Mine Safety Regulations 82-83 (1954) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Ohio State Univ.) (on file with the Ohio State University Library).
210. The primary issue for unions in the 1930s was gaining control over the workplace.
See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 28 ("Workers in the 1930s resolved to limit managerial
authority and to safeguard their standards and status with clear contractual safeguards.").
211. As Rosner and Markowitz note,
It became clear that it was in the interest of a broad range of groups to try to defuse
the social crisis surrounding silicosis. The insurance industry took the lead, but
state government, labor unions, and the professional community all saw the social
crisis of silicosis suits as a threat. It was necessary to remove the disease from the
political arena and return it to the stewardship of the professionals.
ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 82.
212. Id. at 107. According to an interview with Warren A. Cook, unions at this time
generally did not have industrial hygienists on staff. CORN, supra note 98, at 135.
213. ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 26; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 201 ("The rise
of the American labor movement had been one of the most striking social developments of
the 1930s.").
214. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 45, 55 (describing the conflict between the AFL and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) as they competed over membership); KENNEDY,
supra note 156, at 301-03. Brinkley notes that Roosevelt vacillated over appropriate
policies at this point. See BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 86-87 (illustrating some of the
criticism of the President over his lack of concrete planning). Within the Administration,
the period was referred to as the "struggle for a program." Id. at 97.
215. BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 3, 23.
216. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 133 ("The National Silicosis
Conference had not resolved the silicosis issue. Rather, it had spurred the contending
groups to organize nationally.").
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advocated federal solutions), 2 7 employers opted for the devil they knew-
workers' compensation. The change was evident, in the sense that "[b]y
the end of 1937, forty-six states had enacted laws covering workers
afflicted with silicosis. '21 8 By way of comparison, only 15 states covered
some or all occupational diseases at the start of 1936.219
Workers' compensation was not the only area in which state
involvement in industrial disease expanded during the 1930s. The
Roosevelt Administration offered states financial incentives to expand their
involvement: 19 states established industrial hygiene departments by 1936
in response to a federal initiative that made Social Security funds available
for such departments through the Public Health Service; only seven had
had such programs before 1935, and those were "of a limited nature.',
220
Federal spending on industrial hygiene rose quickly, from $100,000 in
1936 to almost $750,000 in 1938.221 State budgets rose to $589,000 in
1938, with 161 employees across 26 states 2 2  Importantly for future
activity, the Temporary Conference of Official Industrial Hygienists
organized in 1936 and would soon become the influential National
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (NCGIH), and in 1946,
the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH),
which continues today.223
6. Explaining the 'Moderate' Outcome
One important reason industry was able to head off regulation was that
employers organized quickly in response to the federal interest in Gauley
Bridge.224 Employers saw union efforts to control the workplace as a
217. See Skinner, supra note 202, at 4 (addressing Rep. Marcantonio's call for federally
imposed safety standards). The threat was probably seen as significant. Roosevelt's
rhetoric had taken a hard turn left in 1935, and "he now brandished the mailed fist of open
political warfare" at business. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 278. Because the main threat
to Roosevelt lay to the left in 1935, his shift leftward was aimed at Father Charles Coughlin
and Gerald L.K. Smith, the successor to the assassinated Huey Long's political program. Id.
at 283. Roosevelt may not have meant it, as Kennedy concludes, but his rhetoric was
undoubtedly alarming at the time. See id. at 284-85 (noting that Roosevelt "substituted
insultfor injury").
218. CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 110; see also ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79,
at 92 (noting that New York employers introduced a bill making silicosis coverable under
the workers' compensation system).
219. Skinner, supra note 202, at 4.
220. See CORN, supra note 98, at 10-11 (covering the growth of state industrial hygiene
units); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Third National Conference on Labor Legislation, 1936, 43
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1438, 1442 (1936) (tracking the formulation of these units within the
individual state health departments).
221. CORN, supra note 98, at 11.
222. See id. at 12-13 (providing state by state figures in table form).
223. See id. at 15 (recounting the history of this important organization). The permanent
organization organized in 1938. LiORA SALTER, MANDATED SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND THE
SCIENTISTS IN THE MAKING OF STANDARDS 37 (1988).
224. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 106 (describing the initial meeting of
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serious threat to the productivity gains of the first part of the twentieth
century.25 The opening years of the New Deal had made clear the stakes
and the Roosevelt Administration's likely approach to labor issues.226 The
Air Hygiene Foundation was quickly established to serve as a
clearinghouse and establish voluntary standards.227 It conducted "nearly
all" silicosis research after its establishment.228 And despite employers'
fears of New Deal legislation, given Roosevelt's status as a "diffident
champion of labor, and especially of organized labor unions, 229 the
Administration did not strongly resist employer efforts to head off stronger
reform efforts.
To the extent that they sought to use the Gauley Bridge incident to create
federal authority over occupational health, the unions overreached.23° And
organizing, not occupational health, was the top union priority in 1936 and
1937.231 The unions were also resisting provisions of industrial disease
legislation that might lead to afflicted employees losing their jobs.232
the industry coalition the day before congressional hearings on Gauley Bridge began).
225. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 28 (describing industry's steadfast resistance to
unionism).
226. For example, the Roosevelt Administration had convened a series of conferences of
state labor department representatives and union leaders beginning in 1934 to push states to
develop a model labor code. Louis Stark, 44 States Prepare Model Labor Code, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1934, at 20. These conferences pushed "for the leveling upwards" of labor
legislation across states. President Promises Continued Uplift of Labor Standards, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 10, 1936, at 8. The first conference's industrial health committee adopted a
report advocating industrial disease coverage, periodic factory inspections, NRA-style
industrial codes at the state level, ventilation standards, and a host of other measures. See
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Washington Conference on Labor Legislation, February 1934, 38
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 779, 780-81 (1934) (listing the various implementations recommended
by the committee). A second conference held in 1935 reached similar conclusions. See
U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Conference on Labor Legislation, Asheville, NC., October 4-
5, 1935, 41 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1247, 1250-53 (1935) (describing the additional
recommendations of the second conference). The third conference initially adopted a call
for a constitutional amendment authorizing federal legislation on minimum wages and
"other social legislation," although the latter phrase was later deleted at the request of
Secretary of Labor Perkins, who argued that it was too broad. See Labor for Change in
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1936, at 2 (describing the amendment and Perkins'
influence on its final language).
227. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 108 (noting the instant legitimacy
enjoyed by the Air Hygiene Foundation).
228. Id. at 129.
229. See KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 297 (suggesting that Roosevelt "was more
interested in giving workers purchasing power than in granting them political power").
230. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 129-30 (describing the call of the
unions for federal regulation of the workplace rather than the adoption of voluntary
standards).
231. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 289.
232. See, e.g., The Silicosis Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1936, at 22 (noting that, in crafting
a New York state bill on silicosis, "[l]abor successfully opposed physical examination [of
workers at risk] and this through fear of losing the right to earn a living. Apparently the risk
of death was not heeded"); Silicosis Problem in State at 'Crisis', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1936,
at 9 (quoting an AFL spokesman that the need for X-ray examination was unquestioned
"[w]here silicosis exists" but that employees should not be discharged or assigned to lower
paying jobs if they were discovered to have silicosis).
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Although labor interests succeeded in getting legislation introduced in
Congress to implement their approach in the late 1930s, 2 33 by that time a
conservative coalition had emerged in Congress with the strength to block
the legislation,234 and the White House did not push the legislation
through.235 Moreover, the Supreme Court had not yet "switched" to
allowing the Roosevelt reforms, 2 36 and Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins
was worried over the Court's possible attitude toward labor legislation
generally.23 7
Another reason why more radical solutions were not adopted was that
many viewed the problem as largely solved. Perkins,238 for example, told
the second national conference on silicosis that "its present hazards [can
be] reduced to a minimum and the disease itself finally eradicated, ' 239 and
employer representatives confidently asserted that ventilation equipment's
development had reached the point that "'the existence of a dust hazard is
already on its way out.' ' 240  Moreover, experts thought that only two
percent of the workforce was at risk and only half of that number was at
serious risk.241
The problem of "dust rackets" grew out of the lagging medical
technology for determining causation. Dust-related diseases, and
occupational diseases generally, were hard to diagnose definitively.
242
Without the diagnostic tools to attribute illness to exposure, the tort system
risked both under- and over-inclusiveness. Where rigorous causation
standards applied, even plaintiffs genuinely injured by an occupational
exposure were unlikely to prevail. When the plaintiffs' bar gained relaxed
233. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 131 (listing the bill for "prevention of
industrial conditions hazardous to the health of employees" introduced by Senator James E.
Murray as evidence of this success).
234. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 339.
235. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 133 (noting the Administration's
preoccupation with the coming war). Attention also shifted to international efforts, with the
International Labor Office convening a conference on the topic in 1938. Silicosis Parley
Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1938, at 3.
236. KENNEDY, supra note 156, at 335 (describing the Supreme Court's reversal on the
constitutionality of the New Deal legislation in 1937).
237. Id. at 265.
238. Perkins combined
the commonsense practicality of her New England forebears, the sometimes
patronizing compassion of the social worker milieu in which she had been steeped
at Jane Addams's Hull House as a young woman, and a large fund of political
know-how compiled in her career as a labor lobbyist and industrial commissioner
in New York.
Id. at 259. She believed that government could do better for workers than either employers
or the workers themselves. Id. at 260.
239. Bars to Silicosis Cited by Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1937, at 23.
240. Silicosis Problem in State at 'Crisis', supra note 232.
241. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Program for Prevention and Compensation of Silicosis, 44
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 909, 909 (1937).
242. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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proof and pleading standards, de facto, if not de jure, fraudulent claims
could prevail as well as legitimate ones. Of particular relevance for our
discussion is the institutional response to the silica litigation: Life
insurance companies took an interest in the question because it affected
their payments on policies. 243 The insurance companies also developed the
data that unseated the bacteriological theory. 2" Significantly, only a few
decades earlier an actuary who addressed the 1893 World's Fair "Auxiliary
Congress" "wistfully concluded [that], most 'hazards of occupations' were
'unknown and almost incalculable.' '' 241 In a short time, motivated by the
desire to increase profits by accurately classifying risks, the insurance
industry helped create a revolution in knowledge about industrial disease.
Attempts to resolve the failure of the tort system by including silicosis as
a compensable occupational disease under state workers' compensation
statutes brought financial stresses and demands for fiscal reforms to those
systems.2 46 Causation issues plagued both common law and workers'
compensation solutions, as silicosis and tuberculosis often went hand in
hand.247 Moreover, susceptibility to silicosis is related in part to
characteristics of the exposed individual, including both voluntary-for
example smoking-and involuntary-for example genetic-
characteristics, 248 creating additional problems for both tort and insurance
solutions. Such transfers failed to resolve the fundamental problem of
determining who had a covered disease and simply shifted the problem
from the tort system to the insurance system.
243. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 24 (describing how statisticians at
Metropolitan Life and Prudential handled 80% of the $3 billion market for "industrial
insurance" policies sold to workers); id. at 75 (quoting Anthony Lanza's 1939 account that
"[o]ut of a clear sky and with dramatic suddenness, the insurance companies were faced
with a situation that was in many respects terrifying").
244. See id. at 25-26 (explaining that the work of Frederick Hoffman, a Prudential
analyst, "was critical to the unmasking of silicosis as a distinct condition in the United
States").
245. SELLERS, supra note 45, at 20 (quoting actuary William Standen). The insurance
companies did not develop accurate information immediately. See id. at 29 (discussing the
development of insurance companies' customer screening practices).
246. See DAVIS, supra note 167, at 30 (describing the fiscal crisis in New York); id. at 52
(describing the fiscal crisis in Massachusetts).
247. Vermont granite workers, an occupational group whose high silicosis rates spurred
much of the modem research on the disease, primarily died of tuberculosis after contracting
silicosis. Graham, supra note 5, at 200; see also DERICKSON, supra note 80, at 52 ("[T]he
most important source of misunderstanding [in the early twentieth century] was the
pervasive failure to differentiate silicosis from tuberculosis.").
248. Absher, supra note 13, at 663 ("[C]onfounding factors include genetics, smoking
habits, and underlying diseases such as tuberculosis and rheumatoid arthritis."); Craighead,
supra note 15, at 401 ("Clearance of particulate matter from the lower respiratory tract is
more complex and is influenced by numerous variables, only a few of which can be
satisfactorily defined quantitatively. Not the least of these factors is the variability between
individuals, the effects of aging, and cigarette smoke."); Wang & Banks, supra note 10, at
70 ("In the general population, cigarette smoking accounts for the overwhelming proportion
of patients with severe airways obstruction.").
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To summarize, by 1940 the legal treatment of silica dust had undergone
several key changes. Although the medical community had long
recognized that breathing dust was unhealthy, it was not until
industrialization greatly increased dust exposures (and other hazards) that
American jurisdictions adopted regulatory measures aimed at workplace
hazards generally or silica dust in particular. The increased injury rates of
the new mechanized factories, mines, and other workplaces helped produce
a broad coalition that demanded legislation to spread the costs. In a
compromise between labor and industrial interests, both sides accepted
workers' compensation systems to spread the costs of accidents.
Eventually, the increase in industrial diseases, especially silicosis, led to
their inclusion in the system as well. This latter development did not occur
until the financial pressure of silicosis lawsuits produced a new broad
coalition in favor of action. In essence, industrial interests found workers'
compensation coverage less of a threat than the numerous suits brought by
alleged silicosis victims and the possibility of federal intervention.
The institutional response to silica dust during the first part of the
twentieth century is thus understandable in the interest group framework.
Mechanization led to a greater demand among those injured. Institutional
entrepreneurs responded to this demand by innovating (the workers'
compensation system coverage of accidents, the 1930s silicosis lawsuits,
and the extension of workers' compensation to cover silicosis and other
industrial diseases). Further, the interplay of interest groups produced
compromises as well as new institutions.
The categorization problem arose in the context of these debates.
Silicosis and other industrial diseases were covered by the new institutions;
tuberculosis and other "social" diseases were not. This was not a foregone
conclusion; labor and left-wing interests campaigned early for a
comprehensive approach to public health rather than a workplace-specific
approach.2 49  The outcome of the debate, however, introduced a legal
distinction between the two types of disease.
Implementing the distinction proved difficult. Diagnosis was-and
remains-a challenge; early twentieth-century medicine was not up to the
task of definitively determining whether a particular individual was sick
because of occupational exposures or because of other factors. As a result,
distinctions that later came to be seen as arbitrary were introduced, such as
the requirement that radiographic evidence be used to diagnose lung
conditions rather than loss of capacity. 25° By awarding benefits for a
249. See Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 130, at 475-77.
250. See Daniel M. Fox & Judith F. Stone, Black Lung: Miners' Militancy and Medical
Uncertainty, 1968-1972, in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA, supra note 130, at 32, 39
(describing the controversy in the 1960s over this requirement for diagnosing black lung).
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subset of employees with reduced lung capacity, the institutions that grew
out of the 1930s created incentives both for employees to be diagnosed
with silicosis and other covered diseases rather than other conditions and
for employers to seek different diagnoses for claimants in order to
eliminate the need to pay compensation. This line of division became
politically determined because the categorization issue could not be settled
objectively.
C. World War H to OSHA
During the war, labor became, "in effect, a ward of the state." '251 The
Roosevelt Administration protected unions from decertification but
demanded and received a "no strike" pledge and wage restraint in return.252
Labor demands after the end of the war centered on wages. 25 3 The passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 made union organizing more difficult.
25 4
After the war, "national labor leaders in both [the AFL and the CIO] came
to see the labor movement's political goals as broadly conceived support
for lower- and middle-class Americans. 255  Politically, the union
movement "align[ed] itself squarely with the larger liberal agenda of
countercyclical public spending and generous programs of social
protection. 256 This more general focus to labor activism meant attention
shifted away from workplace issues like industrial diseases. As in the
1920s, the expanding economy during the 1950s and early 1960s brought
prosperity that dulled the union movement's appetite for institutional
reform.257 Moreover, the post-war industrial relations system centralized
wage and benefit issues, but left "matters related to work rules, discipline,
job assignment, and grievances" to local unions to resolve. 258
The most important changes in workplace health thus came from the
private sector. Industry turned to the industrial hygienists' trade
organization for standards. The ACGIH, which had expanded its
membership criteria to offset the decline in government activity after the
war,259 began to receive requests from firms for standards governing
251. BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 212.
252. Id. at209-11.
253. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 104 ("[F]or most workers, the relatively
straightforward question of wages remained the first priority.").
254. See id. at 110 (stating that the Taft-Hartley Act created allegedly "endless
bureaucratization of labor relations").
255. Id. at 120.
256. BRINKLEY, supra note 164, at 223.
257. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 137 (suggesting that economic expansion and
stability crippled the labor movement).
258. Id. at 154.
259. See CoRN, supra note 98, at 29 (allowing full and equal membership to professional
government employees).
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workplace exposure. 26°  The organization formed the Committee on
Industrial Hygiene Codes, and it created a table of "maximum allowable
concentrations" (MACs) as a first step toward a comprehensive industrial
hygiene code in 1946.261 A separate Technical Standards Committee also
considered the issues and took over the project. 262 The organization also
took advantage of increased interest in the subject during the war "to
organize and develop industrial hygiene agencies where they had not
previously existed. By the end of the war a network of units had been
established in nearly every state and many large industrial cities."
263
ACGIH then published its maximum allowable concentrations as
"Threshold Limit Values" (TLVs). 264 The organization insisted that the
TLVs were merely guides and not "fine lines between safe and dangerous
concentrations. '" 265 Despite regular repetition of such warnings, however,
many states used TLVs as legal limits in state-level workplace regulatory
26626
schemes, and they continue in widespread use around the world.2 67 The
TLVs offered firms a focal point around which to structure their workplace
safety campaigns, without requiring the firms to invest individually in the
research necessary to set them. And firms could point to their compliance
with "industry standards" if questions were raised about particular
substances. The range of substances to which employees were exposed
grew with the post-war explosion in the chemical industry, but there was no
increase in dust exposures comparable to that introduced by the industrial
revolution.
The one industry in which dust exposures increased dramatically was
coal mining, which the United Mine Workers encouraged to move toward
greater mechanization, 268 and the industry became virtually completely
260. See id. at 32-33 (noting debates over ACGIH's role in setting industry standards).
261. See id. at 33-34 (providing the committee's objectives). Three values for silica
were established: five million particles per cubic foot of air (mppcf) for "Silica-High (above
50% free SiO 2)," 20 mppcf for "Silica-Medium (5-50% free SiO 2)," and 50 mppcf for
"Silica-Low (below 5%)." Id. at 40.
262. Id. at 35.
263. Id. at 43.
264. ACGIH replaced the term Maximum Allowable Concentrations (MACs) with the
term Threshold Limit Value (TLV) because of terminology concerns. See SALTER, supra
note 223, at 57 (providing new terminology because of "inappropriate connotations").
"Threshold Limit Value" and "TLV" are both copyrighted terms. See id. at 36.
265. See CORN, supra note 98, at 60 (quoting the Committee on Threshold Limits).
266. Id. at 61-62.
267. See SALTER, supra note 223, at 43-44 (describing ACGIH's activities today); see
also Health and Safety Homepages, Occupational Exposure Limits: Summary of
Information from EU Member States and Other Sources, http://
www.healthandsafety.co.uk/OELs Summary of information.html#us (last visited Mar. 28,
2006) (noting nations that selected exposure standards values based on ACHIH's standards).
268. William N. Denman, The Black Lung Movement: A Study in Contemporary
Agitation 8-9 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University) (noting that the
miners union supported mechanization and quoting a Fortune magazine article labeling
John L. Lewis "the best salesman the machinery industry ever had").
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mechanized after the war.269 In this one industry, we do find persistent
efforts to create regulatory measures. Congress introduced a series of bills
during the 1950s proposing federal investigations of mine safety issues
generally; some of these singled out silicosis for special mention, and
others did not.270  The International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter
Workers, working with Montana Democratic Congressman Lee Metcalf,
was a major force behind these bills. 271 In 1958, Congress appropriated
$128,000 in funding for a Public Health Service study,272 and in 1961,
Congress authorized a federal study of health and safety hazards in mines
(excluding coal mines) and quarries.273
As with silicosis, lung injuries from coal dust (referred to as black lung)
were well-known but were not yet the focus of government action.274 The
problem of black lung came to the forefront at the same time as the
Johnson Administration began a push for general occupational safety and
health legislation.275 Ralph Nader, for example, began a public campaign
in 1968 to spur federal action on black lung with an article in The New
269. Id. at 6 ("[T]he almost complete mechanization of coal mining in America,
particularly since the end of the Second World War produced significantly greater amounts
of coal dust in the mines.").
270. See, e.g., H.R. 2622, 84th Cong. (1955) (providing for silicosis compensation); S.
2299, 84th Cong. (1955) (requiring study of silicosis); S. 3097, 84th Cong. (1955)
(mandating investigation of health conditions in mines); S. 764, 85th Cong. (1957)
(providing compensation for silicosis); H.R. 1240, 85th Cong. (1957) (authorizing federal
mine and quarry inspections); H.R. 4111, 85th Cong. (1957) (requiring federal mine and
quarry inspections); H.R. 9483, 85th Cong. (1957) (authorizing federal mine and quarry
inspections); S. 828, 85th Cong. (1957) (authorizing federal mine and quarry inspections);
H.R. 3394, 85th Cong. (1957) (mandating investigation of health conditions in mines and
quarries); S. 403, 86th Cong. (1959) (providing for federal silicosis compensation); S. 811,
86th Cong. (1959) (providing federal mine and quarry inspections); H.R. 3741, 86th Cong.
(1959) (authorizing federal mine and quarry inspections); H.R. 3760, 86th Cong. (1959)
(authorizing federal mine and quarry inspections); H.R. 6295, 86th Cong. (1959)
(authorizing federal mine and quarry inspections).
271. See ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 200-01 (detailing the steps in building
a nationwide campaign regarding rock miners' health).
272. See id. at 206.
273. See Pub. L. No. 87-300, 75 Stat. 649 (1961) (granting investigative authority).
274. DENMAN, supra note 268, at 24.
275. Id. at 26-27. Testimony at the 1968 hearings on the Johnson Administration's
OSHA proposal often included mention of silicosis and mine dust issues. See, e.g.,
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968: Hearings on S. 2864 Before the S. Subcomm.
on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 59-60 (1968) [hereinafter
1968 OSHA Hearings] (statement of David S. Black, Undersecretary of the Interior) (noting
that ACGIH will be adopting a mine dust standard and recounting the Department of
Interior's activities on dust issues); id. at 64 (statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of
Labor) (listing dust issues in mining as in need of address); id at 229 (statement of Sen.
Jennings Randolph) (calling for improvements to keep pace with problems); id. at 245
(statement of William Naumann, Associated General Contractors of America) (discussing
silicosis exposure from rock work); id. at 272 (statement of Paul Hafer, National
Association of Manufacturers) (characterizing coal miners' dust diseases as "the greatest
single group of occupational diseases in the United States in terms of disability and
compensation costs").
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Republic and a public letter to Interior Secretary Stewart Udall.2 76 Coupled
with a heavily publicized West Virginia coal mine explosion later that
year, 77 Nader's campaign pushed black lung to the forefront of public
awareness. The mine disaster "badly tarnished" the industry and made it
more willing to accept regulation.2 78  The following year the new Nixon
Administration introduced a federal mine safety bill, which at least some
observers termed stricter than the Johnson Administration's efforts.
279
Many coal companies, which oil companies recently acquired, accepted
regulation to help head off strikes.28 °
Despite the increased activity of the ACGIH, from World War II until
the creation of OSHA in 1970, there was little federal or state action on
silicosis or related diseases. Indeed, after the war, government funding for
industrial hygiene fell,281  and the profession declined despite the
appearance of new technologies that posed new dangers in the
workplace.282
Nevertheless, the ACGIH was active. Between 1961 and 1970, it issued
220 TLVs, bringing the total to 500.283 ACGIH, and the TLV committees
within ACGIH,8 4 had considerable autonomy. The organization rejected
the consensus approach of the American Standards Association because its
members asserted that experts should set the health standards without
interference from outsiders and that ACGIH members' governmental
employment freed them from conflicts of interest. 285 But, public choice
theory raises the question, what were ACGIH's and others' interests in the
regulatory adoption of the TLVs?
First, the organization delivered professional status to its members,
allowing them to both improve their status within firms and bureaucracies
276. Denman, supra note 268, at 27-28.
277. Id. at 51.
278. Id. at 175.
279. Id. at 141.
280. Id. at 177. A last minute veto threat by the Nixon White House on fiscal grounds
prompted a wildcat strike in Charleston, West Virginia and brought a quick signature from
Nixon. Id. at 185.
281. See CORN, supra note 98, at 51 (noting that state industrial hygiene programs
declined through the 1950s); id. at 195-96 (describing the impact of declining post-war
federal funds on state programs in an interview with Charles D. Yaffee, who stated, "when
the war ended, a depression set-in in industrial hygiene. A number of programs folded for
lack of funds").
282. See id. at 29 (noting new industrial developments).
283. See SALTER, supra note 223, at 39 (citing 1931 through 1968 as ACGIH's most
active period).
284. See id. at 44 (noting that TLV committee membership has been stable).
Specifically, from 1961 to 1983, only 57 different people served on the committee. Id.
TLV committee membership is controlled by the chair, and substances are selected
generally based on industry requests. Id. at 47.
285. See id. at 38 (discussing ACGIH's belief that manufacturing and health standards
should be set differently).
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and to raise the profession as a whole. 286 The ACGIH's role in setting
standards adopted by state governments, and eventually the federal
government, enhanced that status. Second, the adoptions gave the
organization influence: Firms followed its recommendations, and
government agencies adopted its TLVs. Strong evidence that the
organization derived some benefit from their use can be found in the fact
that the organization and its members tolerated such uses over long periods,
uses that directly contradicted the stated purposes of the TLVs.
28 7
The ACGIH also played an important role for large firms, which, in turn,
assumed key roles in creating and determining the TLVs. As one study
noted, "It is easy to document the influence of industry, and of industry
286. See id. at 60 (explaining that, in order to effectively control industry practices,
ACGIH, not a professional association per se, needs the participation of those in the
industry). There is little evidence of direct personal benefit to any members of the
organization or the committees-committee members were paid only their travel expenses.
Id. at 44, 47.
287. TLVs for about 400 substances were incorporated into OSHA consensus standards
via their earlier use under the Walsh-Healey Act standards, although some were "based on
inadequate documentation." See CORN, supra note 98, at 91 (describing OSHA's
congressional authority to bypass rulemaking procedures and establish "start-up" standards).
ACGIH did not attempt to stop OSHA's inappropriate use of the TLVs. See id. at 92
(clarifying that the TLVs were not meant to be standards). According to Corn, "ACGIH
seemed to have mixed emotions about use of the TLVs. They wanted to contribute to the
new federal effort to bring about a healthy and safe workplace, and they were proud of the
TLVs. Very little discussion can be found about this issue." Id. In the one discussion
recorded in the minutes, ACGIH seems to have been resigned to OSHA's inappropriate use
of the TLVs. See id. (elaborating that, although the ACGIH was displeased with the Labor
Department for misusing the TLVs, it felt that if the Labor Department was going to use
TLVs for that purpose it might as well use ACGIH's TLVs). The board responded to a
question from the floor by saying: "There is nothing in my opinion, that ACGIH can do to
prevent or stop anyone, any state or federal agency, from using our ACGIH TLVs in
standards." Id. at 92-93. One participant recalled that, despite the language in the TLV
publications warning against treating them as standards, the group "was rather tickled with
themselves that the TLVs were being used that way." Interview with Leonard J. Goldwater,
in id. at 145. Goldwater also noted that the ACGIH "took no measures, whatsoever, to
disassociate themselves from [OSHA's use of the TLVs] after it was made, after these
things were adopted." Id. at 144. ACGIH standards were technically "not consensus
standards, but the legislation establishing OSHA required that only consensus standards be
adopted." SALTER, supra note 223, at 42. As one informant [to the study] suggested,
Section 5(a) of the OSHAct mandates the Secretary of Labor to adopt, without
dealing with title 5 of the Administrative Procedures Act [sic], as soon as
practicable, any of the consensus standards already established in federal
regulations ... Some argue that the Secretary had discussions (before adopting the
standards). Others argue that the adoption was automatic because the big
employers were already using these standards.
Id. In addition, "There was some discussion in ACGIH about whether to adopt a consensus
method, but ACGIH did not do so." Id. As one person described the situation,
Stokinger saw the legislation (OSHAct) required consensus standards from that
point on (for the purpose of their being adopted as OSHA regulations). So he
looked around and appointed industry and union representatives on the TLV
committee for the first time. I don't think this is appreciated. Stokinger was wrong,
but he thought he could make the TLV committee (into) a consensus body if there
were industry and union representatives.
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consultants in ACGIH, ' 2 s s especially since unions generally did not
participate in the TLV process 28 9 and the ACGIH developed TLVs largely
in response to industry requests. 290 Large firms thus obtained standardized
TLVs around which state regulations, and eventually federal regulations,
coalesced, helping prevent inconsistent standards. The process gave the
firms influence over both the substances included and the levels set-
influence they would find much harder to exercise over government
regulatory bodies. ACGIH thus played a larger part than the Baptists (to
large firms' "Bootleggers") in a "Bootleggers and Baptists" regulatory
coalition.2 9 ' It was a priestly caste in a theocracy.
Moreover, the eventual expansion of the federal role in occupational
health and safety was foreseeable long before 1970.292 The role of the
ACGIH TLVs was also foreseeable. One ACGIH member and government
agency employee described the use of TLVs by OSHA to a researcher as
follows:
I don't think it was accidental. There had been several attempts over the
preceding years to promulgate an OSHAct... and it was just a question
of time as to when there would be a national occupational health and
safety program. The language of the OSHAct specifically provided for
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate as interim or start-up standards,
national consensus standards, that had already been promulgated under
certain Acts including the Walsh-Healy Act. Now the people in the
Bureau of Labor Standards who were responsible for promulgating those
standards were the same people who were going to be responsible under
OSHA for setting the interim standards. Many of these people were
288. SALTER, supra note 223, at 59. ACGIH and its members, however, deny that they
are biased toward industry. Id. (explaining that many ACGIH members view the
organization as an "industry watchdog").
289. Id. at 46 (referring to the labor industry as a "reluctant participant" in the ACGIH).
Unions refused to participate in ACGIH, believing the organization was "industry
dominated." MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 124.
290. See SALTER, supra note 223, at 47-48 (describing generally the informal process by
which the ACGIH sets priorities and develops standards).
291. The Bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation suggests that two different
groups often work together to achieve political goals. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and
Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, AEI J. Gov'T & Soc'Y 13 (May/June
1983), available at http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/560.pdf. Like the bootleggers in
the early twentieth-century South, who benefited from laws that banned the sale of liquor on
Sundays, special interests need to justify their efforts to obtain special favors with public
interest stories. The Baptists, who supported the Sunday ban on moral grounds, provided
that public interest support. While the Baptists vocally endorsed the ban on Sunday sales,
the bootleggers worked behind the scenes and quietly rewarded the politicians with a
portion of their Sunday liquor sale profits. Id.
292. See CORN, supra note 98, at 90 (explaining that ACGIH has unsurprisingly
endorsed the OSH Act).
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ACGIH members but that doesn't make it an ACGIH decision. These
people knew what was coming down the road and that they would have a
job to do. If you had that responsibility, what would you use? 293
Another factor in the expanding federal role may have been the Nixon
Administration's distrust of bureaucrats relative to private enterprise.
Nixon supported initiatives like environmental legislation, at least in part,
for political advantage, but he also wanted to keep these initiatives
carefully constrained to avoid incurring economic penalties or alienating
his business supporters. 294 Adopting the consensus standards, already in
use at many large businesses, both satisfied his political need to appear to
be doing something and minimized the economic effects and potential
decline in support from business. The expansion of ACGIH's TLVs during
the 1960s, and their "inappropriate" use in state, and eventually federal,
regulations, thus served the interests of the members, the organization, the
large firms, and politicians.
Several factors explain the disappearance of silicosis and industrial
hygiene generally from the legislative agenda until the late 1960s. First,
the improvements in ventilation and other safety measures had greatly
reduced dust exposures, especially outside mining. Follow-up studies on
Vermont granite cutters in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, concluded
that improved ventilation had solved the silicosis problem there.295 The
optimism expressed at the silicosis conference seemed to have been borne
out. 296 Second, although some mining unions continued to push for federal
studies and silicosis benefits, many unions lost interest in the issue because
297of their success at winning health benefits from employers. The 1950s
brought a "period when the issue of work and health became synonymous
with health insurance packages and third-party coverage for the American
work force. Unions bargained for financial support of welfare funds and
Blue Cross or private health insurance coverage rather than for prevention
of disease at the workplace.,, 298 Third, there were no Gauley Bridge-like
293. SALTER, supra note 223, at 42.
294. See JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY,
1961-1974, at 402 (1991) (detailing Nixon's environmental initiatives as a reaction to his
main political opponent's position).
295. ROSNER&MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 210.
296. See, e.g., 1968 OSHA Hearings, supra note 275, at 59-60 (statement of David S.
Black, Undersecretary of the Interior). Mr. Black testified that the department's programs
had had "a marked effect over the last 30 years in steadily decreasing the number of cases of
silicosis." Id. "Even silicosis, formerly a matter of major concern, has to a large extent
been controlled" and that social security disability figures for silicosis claims reflect
"exposures that occurred many years ago, particularly in coal mining, rather than current
conditions." Id. at 461 (statement of Andrew Kalmykow, Counsel, Am. Ins. Ass'n).
297. See CORN, supra note 98, at 65 (noting that unions lagged behind management and
government in industrial hygiene issues).
298. ROSNER & MARKOWITZ, supra note 79, at 212.
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figures to focus public attention on the issue. 2 99 The anti-communism of
the 1950s and the growth of the civil rights movement in the 1960s focused
public attention elsewhere. 300  Due to a lack of scientific breakthrough,
vigorous efforts by interest groups, or a salient public event, little changed
in regulation. When action did come with the 1970 passage of the OSH
Act, it came as part of the contest between the Nixon Administration and
the Democratic Party for blue collar voters. 30 1  Nixon had an "acute
political sensitivity" and followed virtually every policy discussion with "a
presidential expatiation which be[gan]: 'Now let me talk about the politics
of this thing; how it will turn out in October and November; how it will
translate into votes."' 30 2 Labor votes were central to Nixon's plan, even if
he could not completely win over its leadership.30 3 Charles Colson, a key
299. BARTH, supra note 23, at 5-6 (discussing the importance of disasters that gain
public notice in spurring change in workplace regulation).
300. See CORN, supra note 98, at 44 ("Americans in the 1950s were not very interested
in occupational health. Other public health problems, for example, delivery of health care,
and political issues dominated their thinking.").
301. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 34 (denouncing the compromise that the
final version of the OSH Act struck between Republicans and Democrats, namely that while
OSHA would have the authority to set the standards, another agency, the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, would be the adjudicatory body to determine
whether the Act had been violated). Nixon sought an electoral realignment. See ROBERT
MASON, RICHARD NIXON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW MAJORITY 3 (2004) (describing Nixon's
immediate goal of securing a large majority for re-election in 1972). Nixon had beaten
Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968 by only 500,000 votes out of 72 million votes cast, an election
in which unions had worked vigorously for Humphrey. See ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 182-
83 (marking the 1968 presidential election as "the end of the New Deal dispensation").
Nixon was aware after the 1968 election that he "had not yet won over any majority" and
that "he owed his election to the votes of a minority rallied in opposition to the mistakes of
the Democrats rather than in support of his promise." MASON, supra note 301, at 37. The
closeness of the election undoubtedly had turned in part on active union support for
Humphrey. The AFL-CIO "financed a strong operation to turn the labor vote from Wallace
back to the Democrats." BLUM, supra note 294, at 314. Although Zieger terms Nixon "one
of labor's chief nemeses, dating from his red-baiting campaigns for the U.S. Congress and
Senate in 1946 and 1950," he also notes that Nixon had "cultivated some elements of the
labor movement-hard core conservative construction unions, for example, and a huge
Teamsters' union by now almost completely isolated from and disdainful of the AFL-CIO."
ZIEGER, supra note 122, at 191. The 1968 election results demonstrated two key facts.
First, "[t]he Johnson coalition of 1964 splintered in 1968," with George Wallace's third-
party candidacy pulling significant blue collar support in North central states (Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois). BLUM, supra note 294, at 316. Looking to 1972, Nixon
could thus hope to improve his margins among these voters. Second, Nixon had to find new
support to win reelection. See MASON, supra note 301, at 6 (detailing Nixon's efforts to find
this new support through refusing to oppose the notion of governmental activism, which was
popular at the time, and through leaving intact a majority of the programs created by
Democrats between the 1930s and the 1960s). There was no guarantee that the crisis within
the Democratic Party, which played to Nixon's advantage in 1968, would continue into the
1970s. See id. at 36 (referring to Nixon's reliance on the crisis within the Democratic Party
as a "fragile basis for political success").
302. MASON, supra note 301, at 42 (quoting Elizabeth Drew).
303. See id. at 72, 97-98 (noting how central the labor vote had been to the Democrats
and how Nixon urged his staff to publicize his Administration as "pro-workingman"). A
memo by Pat Buchanan analyzing political strategy noted that the target constituency in
1970 would be "law and order Democrats, conservatives on the 'Social Issue,' but
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political advisor, told Nixon in 1970 that they "need[ed] to identify with
labor on a major substantive issue other than national security, '304 and
OSHA provided such an issue. Nixon's view of the conservativism of the
voters he sought to woo included recognition that these voters opposed
social engineering, not government programs they thought benefited
them. 305 The strategy paid off in the 1970 mid-term elections, with large
gains in areas that had supported Wallace in 1968.306 Senate committee
hearings in 1968 and 1970 were critical in both getting issues before the
public and building support for the OSH Act. 30 7 The creation of OSHA
and NIOSH in 1970 is thus consistent with the interest group perspective.
D. Regulation Under OSHA
The passage of the OSH Act dramatically changed the institutional
environment, creating new incentives and interest groups and altering
existing ones.
1. OSHA and Incentives
There are three key features to the regulatory regime created by the OSH
Act. First, the statute separated standard-setting and enforcement from the
development of technical knowledge about workplace hazards, locating the
former in OSHA and the latter in NIOSH.30 8 This separation of standard-
'progressive' on domestic issues." Id. at 84. In pursuit of labor, Nixon "enthusiastically
cultivated" union leaders, hosting a "high-profile" Labor Day dinner for union leaders in
1970. See id. at 97 (recounting Nixon's attempts at attracting the labor vote at a time when
labor was becoming increasingly dissociated from the Democrat Party). Nixon did persuade
AFL-CIO head George Meany to remain neutral in 1972. See id. at 173.
304. Id. at 97. The White House "avoided active conflict with unions on [economic
issues] wherever possible." Id. at 134.
305. See id. at 49 (discussing how Nixon could reach the conservative "emerging
majority"). When Nixon arrived in the White House it was "a time when mainstream
political debate remained dominated by activist and not conservative proposals .... As
Leonard Garment would note in 1971, in spite of their 'conservative philosophy,'
Americans wanted 'liberal' benefits-complete health care, more social security, etc." Id. at
56.
306. See id. at 67 (observing that these gains were due largely to the Republicans'
emphasis on the needs of the "silent majority"). It also paid off in 1972, with Nixon
winning 57% of union household voters. See id. at 189 (noting that Nixon's efforts to
generate support resulted in him receiving the greatest plurality in American history in the
1972 election).
307. See CoRN, supra note 98, at 86 (asserting that, although the causal relationship
between occupational disease and certain industries had been established, the available
knowledge to remedy this problem had not been applied to preventing the problem).
308. Under the OSH Act, when NIOSH recommends that OSHA promulgate a health
standard, the Secretary of Labor
must, within 60 days after receipt thereof, refer such recommendation to an
advisory committee pursuant to this paragraph, or publish such as a proposed rule
pursuant to paragraph (2), or publish in the Federal Register his determination not
to do so, and his reasons therefor. The Secretary shall be required to request the
recommendations of an advisory committee appointed under section 812(c) of this
title if the rule to be promulgated is, in the discretion of the Secretary which shall
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setting and enforcement from research "has its roots in the history of earlier
occupational safety and health activities and conflicts between the
Department of Labor and the Public Health Service. 30 9 The ACGIH had
to be careful in disputes over agency location in setting up OSHA because
it had members in both public health and labor agencies.31 ° Protecting the
interests of existing bureaucracies thus explains the split between OSHA
and NIOSH, a split that may have hindered OSHA's ability to set
standards. 311
Second, the statute required the agencies to act quickly to create a base
of federal standards. 312  OSHA had only two years to convert existing
consensus standards into legally binding ones unless the agency found that
doing so would not improve safety and health.31 3 This provision led to
OSHA's wholesale adoption of things like the ACGIH TLVs as standards.
Shortly after Congress established OSHA in 1971, the agency issued more
than 4,000 general industry standards, based on national consensus
standards of the American National Standards Institute and the National
Fire Protection Association, as well as existing federal maritime safety
standards.31 4 In just four months, OSHA took more than 400 pages of
standards from a variety of prior programs and voluntary organizations and
converted them into regulations. 31 5  This change had the effect of
converting a set of largely discretionary industry guidelines into mandatory
workplace design standards 316 and, as noted below, changed the role of
other agents in the market for health and safety.
3 17
be final, new in effect or application and has significant economic impact.
30 U.S.C. § 81 l(a)(1) (2000).
309. CORN, supra note 98, at 88 n.*.
310. Interview with Charles D. Yaffe, in id. at 203-04 (inferring that the ACGIH did not
take an official position on a federal OSH Act).
311. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 16, at 56-60 (criticizing the lack of cooperation in
1970s).
312. This was supplemented by a general duty provision. The OSH Act established a
general duty on the part of employers to "furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; and [to] comply with occupational
safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(2)
(2000).
313. See McGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 36 (explaining that Congress, wanting
OSHA to immediately begin providing safer and healthier American workplaces, made a
one-time exception allowing OSHA to promulgate already established national consensus
standards and federal standards under the Walsh-Healey Act); see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)
(2000) (outlining the procedure by which the Secretary would promulgate occupational
safety or health standards).
314. See VIscusI ET AL., supra note 52, at 775 (construing the nature of OSHA
standards).
315. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 37 (describing OSHA's rush to
promulgate the standards that Congress had mandated).
316. See VISCUS1 ET AL., supra note 52, at 775 (criticizing OSHA's "technology-based"
approach to regulation).
317. See discussion infra Section II.D.2 (examining the emergence of OSHA employees
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Some have criticized OSHA for not attempting to "sort through the
existing standards to weed out those that were obviously silly and
outdated. ' ' 318  Salter's study and Corn's institutional biography both
suggest, however, that because ACGIH members in their capacity as
bureaucrats were involved in the process the explanation may not lie in a
lack of knowledge about whether particular provisions were "silly or
outdated" but rather in a wholesale acceptance of a broader role for TLVs
than had ever been officially acknowledged as a goal by ACGIH.
Reinforcing this interpretation is the recollection of an ACGIH member,
who described the situation to Professor Salter as follows:
At the time of OSHA's creation, there was a lot of soul searching at
ACGIH. We wondered whether we should just fold up our tent and go
home. There was a lot of encouragement in that direction coming from
NIOSH. NIOSH felt that now it had legal responsibility for establishing
criteria for standards, that ACGIH's TLV committee had done its job
well, but that now we were in a new era and NIOSH superseded us.
There were a lot of people at NIOSH who felt that way and weren't
afraid to express it to the TLV committee and ACGIH itself. I was on the
Board of Directors, but I think even more discussion was taking place in
the TLV committees. It ended up with a wait and see attitude for a
couple of years. By the mid-i 970s, there was a realization that the new
system was not going to be responsive to current problems.
319
Converting the TLVs into standards served the interests of the ACGIH by
giving it a rationale for continuing its work and served the interests of
OSHA in getting regulations on the book quickly.
Moreover, OSHA standards did not come into existence in a vacuum.
Before OSHA, there were state and local regulatory efforts as well as
voluntary standards like the ACGIH TLVs. Large firms operating across
jurisdictions benefited from nationalizing regulations, getting rid of
conflicting local standards, and shifting the regulatory focus to Washington
where they could afford to maintain lobbyists and lawyers. Indeed, the
threat of conflicting state and local regulation remains a potent one. When
the new Reagan Administration stopped work on a Carter Administration
proposal for "right to know" rules, for example, unions began lobbying for
state and local versions.320 Worried about a patchwork of inconsistent
rules, industries then sought federal rules that would preempt local
standards. 321 Adopting the ACGIH TLVs, with which they were already
as an interest group).
318. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 37.
319. SALTER, supra note 223, at 41.
320. See McGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 81 (affirming the unions' mistrust of
the Regan OSHA's ability to promulgate an acceptable standard).
321. See id. (stating that OSHA, in an effort to appeal to the chemical and manufacturing
industries, began drafting a uniform set of regulatory standards).
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familiar, gave larger firms an advantage and forced their smaller
competitors to incur additional costs.
Third, after the initial wave of standards copied from elsewhere, OSHA
had to use its rulemaking powers to adopt new standards or modify existing
ones. The "adversary-like process" of standard-setting gives those
involved an incentive to produce all available evidence in support of a
desired outcome. 322 "It is precisely this process that confirms the degree of
uncertainty regarding the question of what is a 'safe' level of exposure' 323
in the context of hazardous substances. Unlike the relatively informal
development of ACGIH TLVs, the process of OSHA standard-setting
produced more vigorous participation by unions, which had largely ignored
the ACGIH process, and by OSHA employees, a new interest group
established by the creation of the agency. The subsequent history of OSHA
and its workplace health standards is thus consistent with the interest group
analysis.
2. OSHA and Interest Groups
Industrial hygienists as a group were the first major beneficiaries of the
creation of OSHA and NIOSH. Passage of the OSH Act "created an
intense interest in setting standards, ' 324 "[j]ust as state and local industrial
hygiene programs reached a low point and the profession seemed to be
splintering, the federal government broadened its role in occupational
safety and health. ' 325 The creation of NIOSH and OSHA led to "an
enormous growth of professionals" in industrial hygiene: ACGIH
membership boomed, and for the first time, a majority of ACGIH
employees came from federal agencies.326 Membership soared from
approximately 1,000 in 1968, to over 1,500 in 1973, to almost 2,500 in
1983.327 An organization that began in 1938 primarily consisting of 76
employees, almost all state and local agency employees, grew to 3,720
members, with a substantial federal contingent, by 1988.328
Creating OSHA brought an additional interest group into existence:
OSHA's employees. OSHA's initial loose organizational structure gave
the staff a great deal of autonomy, if not an overabundance of resources.
329
322. BARTH, supra note 23, at 77 (acknowledging the interest in standard-setting that the
passage of the 1970 OSH Act generated).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. CORN, supra note 98, at 86.
326. Id. at 89.
327. Id. at xi.
328. Id. at x.
329. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 63-64. McGarity and Shapiro
describe the first decade as follows:
In its early years [until 1981], OSHA had in fact been a very loosely run
organization. Rulemaking initiatives were generated internally in an ad hoc fashion.
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As a result, when the Reagan Administration attempted to implement
(de)regulatory agendas that were not those of the agency staff by exercising
greater White House control (via the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)) over the agency, the agency staff found itself frustrated and turned
to allies on Capitol Hill. For example, at congressional hearings in 1988,
OSHA staff testified about the frustration of working on standards that
were ultimately rejected by the agency or when they felt professional
pressures as a result of agency positions. Working at the agency was, as
one scientist put it, "extremely frustrating, and you ask yourself the
question why are you doing this." 330 As McGarity and Shapiro conclude
from their analysis of OSHA in the 1980s,
Like any professional, an OSHA health scientist would like to believe
that he or she is accomplishing something. But it is very hard to feel a
sense of accomplishment when a regulation for which you are
responsible sits on the desk of an upper-level manager or an OMB desk
officer for years.331
Additional evidence of OSHA staff acting as an interest group comes from
its practice in the 1970s of funding activist groups "that sought to educate
workers about actions they could take in public forums to bring about safer
workplaces," 332 funding which created a demand for OSHA's services.
(This funding stopped under President Reagan.) 333
Not only was OSHA's staff now an interest group, but outside interest
groups now had a potential ally. Unions in particular found OSHA-
except during the Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations-to be
a useful ally in some situations. For example, unions opposed Reagan
Administration efforts to achieve voluntary compliance rather than to use
large fines to motivate employers: "Workers preferred OSHA to be the
'tough cop' rather than a 'helpful consultant.'
3 34
The heads of the Health and Safety Directorates had traditionally controlled
standard-setting within their functional bailiwicks, with sporadic input from the
assistant secretary. Loose internal work groups were assembled to draft rulemaking
documents with substantial technical help from outside consultants. It was not
uncommon for the head of a directorate to work directly on the rule, even to the
point of typing the final version of the rule at 4 a.m. on the morning it was due. The
entire agency tended to gear up for a single rulemaking effort, putting aside most
other initiatives until they assumed front burner status.
Id.
330. Id. at 133 (quoting Dr. Peter Infante, who discussed difficulties with OSHA
administrators).
331. Id. at 134.
332. Id. at 79.
333. See id. (explaining the history of the program).
334. Id. at 143. Consider also the example of the "lockout" rule-the rule that specified
procedures under which equipment is locked to prevent injury from accidental restarts
during servicing-that McGarity and Shapiro use to illustrate the delays in OSHA's
accomplishing even relatively straightforward rulemaking. Id. at 112-14. OSHA
promulgated consensus standards in 1971, but these "were not uniform in their coverage and
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The creation of OSHA dramatically changed the environment under
which standards were created. As one observer noted,
A rule of thumb would suffice in the 1950s; it could easily be dislodged
by industry and other criticism in the 1970s [under OSHA]. The
expectations of the scientific basis for standards had increased
considerably in the interim. More important, the relationship of industry
to the standards themselves was changed by the introduction of
regulatory standards and litigation arising from them. 335
In short, "[o]nce a coherent (albeit not necessarily adequate) body of
regulatory standards existed, as they did after 1970, the environment for
standard-setting changed. ACGIH, other standard-setting bodies and
regulatory agencies were in competition.
336
OSHA also changed the standards environment by allowing those
dissatisfied with the results to seek relief from the courts and political
process. This affected how OSHA created standards. Professors McGarity
and Shapiro, for example, concluded that judicial review was "a primary
cause" of OSHA's slowness in issuing standards: "The impact of having to
dot every i and cross every t for fear of a judicial remand has had a
dramatic effect on OSHA."33 7 The history of OSHA's efforts to regulate
"ergonomics" injuries illustrates the impact of the political process. OSHA
issued its first directive on the subject of ergonomics in 1986338 and began
contained significant inconsistencies between industries and between different types of
equipment in the same industry." Id. at 112. The United Auto Workers repeatedly petitioned
OSHA for a revised, more uniform rule, but internal debates within OSHA and between
OSHA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) delayed a final rule until 1988,
more than ten years after OSHA's initial publication of a notice in the Federal Register that
it was considering revising the consensus standard. Id. at 112-13. Unions did not like the
final rule, primarily because it did not "incorporate the principle of 'one person, one lock,
one key,' under which the worker servicing the machine must personally lock the machine's
switch in the off position before beginning the maintenance work and must personally
remove the lock on the way out." Id. at 113. Unions also wanted a broader rule, applicable
to more industries, and "employee participation in the formulation of lockout/tagout
procedures and training programs." Id. The unions' interest in these three areas is
straightforward. Both the "one person, one lock, one key" principle and the greater
employee participation in creating training programs increased employee control over work
procedures, enhancing union control when collective bargaining agreements existed.
Expanding the application of a single rule across more industries, rather than taking
OSHA's preferred industry-by-industry approach, favored unions, whose national office
could analyze the single rule, at the expense of industries that might benefit from the case-
by-case approach. As this example suggests, OSHA became a political prize, since it could
be used to assist or hinder union efforts in the workplace.
335. SALTER, supra note 223, at 63-64.
336. Id. at 64.
337. McGARITv & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 258.
338. See OSHA Instruction CPL 2.78, Feb. 9, 1987 Directorate of Technical Support,
reprinted in OSHA Notice CPL 2, May 12, 1986, available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/
oshaweb/owadisp.show document?ptable=DIRECTIVES&pid=1655 (stating that the
directive "provided direction and established goals for use by OSHA personnel in the
development of an ergonomics program for technical assistance as well as broad guidelines
to be followed while conducting ergonomically related enforcement activities at the
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the rulemaking process to draft an ergonomics standard in 1992. The final
Ergonomics Program Standard was not issued until November 4, 2000.339
Despite years of development, the standard was still controversial, and
Congress passed a Joint Resolution, signed by President George W. Bush,
repealing it on March 20, 2001.340 Concurrent with the rule development
process, OSHA was bringing enforcement actions against employers under
the "general duty" clause of the OSH Act, which imposes a general
obligation on employers to protect workers from "recognized hazards" in
the workplace. Yet, in the three cases OSHA litigated to judgment, it was
unable to convince the courts that (1) a recognized hazard existed,
(2) workplace activity caused the injuries, or (3) OSHA offered solutions to
the hazard.
3 41
3. The Silica Standards
How did silica fare under the new regime? OSHA's regulation of silica
began with OSHA's adoption of the ACGIH consensus standard in 1970,
which set maximum exposure levels at 0.10 mg/m3.342 Unfortunately that
standard was obsolete by the time it was adopted. In 1968, there was a
major change in how individuals estimated quartz exposures based on dust
samples. This change led to the adoption of arbitrary conversion factors to
account for differences between the old and new measurement standards. 343
Also in 1970, the newly created NIOSH began a study of lower levels to
understand the impact of this methodological change. The study concluded
that there was a significant loss of lung function and perhaps radiographic
changes at the current dust levels. This finding led NIOSH in 1974 to
recommend a change to an exposure level of 0.05 mg/m3. Because the
epidemiological studies on which NIOSH relied were "called into question
because of technical and procedural problems," the recommended exposure
limit has not been accepted by the Department of Labor.344
workplace").
339. See id. (ordering implementation of new standard).
340. See Press Release, Statement by the President (Mar. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010321.html (explaining that he
signed the legislation because he believed regulation was too burdensome on business).
341. See Eugene Scalia, OSHA 's Ergonomics Litigation Record: Three Strikes and It's
Out, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, available at http://www.cato.org/ pub_display.php?
pub id=1229 (detailing the history of the litigation and the attempt to impose ergonomics
standards).
342. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000(c) (1971) (delineating a new standard).
343. See Graham, supra note 5, at 201 (detailing a new method of measuring quartz
exposures that, for the first time, took into account the particle size and percentage of quartz
in the fraction of dust, but noting that the measurement required a mathematical
conversion).
344. Id. at 201; see NIOSH HAZARD REVIEW, supra note 31, at 3 (explaining that, in the
continued effort to protect workers from exposure, the exposure limit should be lowered to
0.05 mg/m3).
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In the 1980s, new studies found crystalline silica to be a potential
carcinogen, triggering OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard (HCS or
HazCom standards). 345 Under the HCS, OSHA-regulated businesses using
materials with 0.1 percent or more crystalline silica must follow federal
guidelines on hazard communications and worker training.346  HCS
coverage did not immediately trigger new exposure regulations, but it did
get the attention of the mining industry (which involves a great deal of
silica exposure), mining regulators, and state legislatures.3 47  The Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) issued its own HazCom
standards in 2002.348 OSHA has issued several interpretive letters
clarifying the standard with respect to silica and denying petitions for
exclusions of certain silica applications from the HCS requirements. 3
In the private sector, both the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) and the Building Construction Trades Department of the
AFL-CIO have also developed recommended practices for protecting
workers who may be exposed to quartz dust.35°
345. See PRIMER, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining the evolution of the regulation of silica).
346. See id. at 12 (noting that a lot of sampling is required to prove the concentration is
under the threshold in order to get out of OSHA's Hazard Communication standards).
According to OSHA regulations, these "comprehensive hazard communication
programs ... are to include container labeling and other forms of warning, material safety
data sheets and employee training." OSHA Hazard Communication Standards (HCS or
HazCom standards), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/
oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p table=STANDARDS&pid = 10099.
347. See PRIMER, supra note 9, at 12, 16 (noting how awareness of the problem led to
changes).
348. See Hazard Communication, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,314, 42,323 (June 21, 2002) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 42, 46, 47, 48, 56, 57, 77) The Hazard Communication stressed
the potential for exposure to substances in the determination of covered hazards:
Almost all miners are exposed to crystalline silica, but the potential for illness is
related to their exposure to the respirable fraction of dust. For example, suppose
your miners work on a concrete floor and there is silica in the concrete. If no
cutting, grinding, or other activities occur on the floor that would release the
respirable fraction, the potential for exposure to respirable crystalline silica is
remote, and the miners are not potentially exposed to a hazard. If you must remove
the floor through grinding, cutting, or crushing, the potential for exposure is
foreseeable and the concrete would become a hazardous chemical subject to
HazCom. Base your decision to include a chemical in your HazCom program on its
hazards and the potential for miner exposure.
Id.
349. See Letter from John Pendergrast, Assistant Secretary of Labor, to Theodore L.
Garrett (Sept. 20, 1988), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show
document?p~table=lNTERPRETATIONS&pid=19704 (stating that OSHA denied the
petition filed on behalf of the National Stone Association because it ruled that
"[i]nformation regarding the evidence of carcinogenicity must be included on required
labels and material safety data sheets for crystalline silica, and for products containing
crystalline silica, where employee exposure to the crystalline silica may occur").
350. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SPRING 2005 UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS, available at http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/ua/Spring2005/agenda/
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (DOL).html; ASTM INT'L, ASTM El132-99A, STANDARD
PRACTICE FOR HEALTH REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO
RESPIRABLE CRYSTALLINE SILICA (Aug. 10, 1999).
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Recently, OSHA has moved the regulation of crystalline silica to the top
of its regulatory agenda. It is one of four "high priority regulations" listed
in the December 2004 Regulatory Plan.351 In October 2003, OSHA
provided for review by a Small Business Advocacy Review panel a draft
rule to address exposure to crystalline silica. 352 The draft included three
alternative "permissible exposure limits" (PELs): the current 0.10 mg/m 3,
0.075 mg/m3, or 0.050 mg/m3, all measured as an 8-hour time-weighted
average (TWA) concentration of respirable crystalline silica.353  In
December 2003, the small business panel submitted a report to OSHA,
commenting on OSHA's evaluation of the costs and risk-reduction
potential of compliance with different standards.354 OSHA plans to
complete a peer review of its health effects and risk assessment by
December 2005 and to issue a proposed regulation by April 2006. 355 The
MSHA has also listed silica on its regulatory calendar.356 Noting that "the
Secretary of Labor's Advisory Committee on the Elimination of
Pneumoconiosis Among Coal Mine Workers made several
recommendations related to reducing exposure to silica" and that "NIOSH
and ACGIH recommend a 50jLg/m 3 exposure limit for respirable crystalline
silica," MSHA states it "is considering several options to reduce miners'
exposure to crystalline silica., 357  In its Spring 2005 agenda, MSHA
proposed as its next action a "request for information" but did not establish
358
a time table for action.
351. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 2004 Regulatory Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,781, 72,781 (Dec. 13,
2004).
352. See Letter from Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, to Robert E.
Burt, Small Business Advocacy Chair, OSHA (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/osha03_1031.pdf (explaining that § 609(b) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), requires OSHA and the EPA to notify the Office of
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and respond to comments by a Small
Business Advocacy Review Panel before issuing regulations that may have a significant
impact on small entities).
353. See SBREFA PANEL, 12/03 REPORT OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCACY REVIEW
PANEL ON TuE DRAFT OSHA STANDARDS FOR SILICA (Dec. 19, 2003) (stating that the PEL is
the highest average concentration of respirable crystalline silica in the air to which an
employee may be exposed over an eight-hour workday).
354. Id.
355. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SPRING 2005 UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND
DEREGULATORY ACTIONS, ENTRY 1935, OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE To CRYSTALLINE SILICA,
available at http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/cgi-bin/ua/webfetchdoc?dataset-ua&db=agenda
Spring2005&query= and&doc id= 1935.
356. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SPRING 2005 UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND
DEREGULATORY ACTIONS, ENTRY 1921, RESPIRABLE CRYSTALLINE SILICA STANDARD,
available at http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/cgi bin/ua/webfetchdoc?dataset-ua&db=agendaSprin
g2005&query=and&docid=1921.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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4. Institutional Biases in Regulation
The measures necessary to stop silica dust from harming people are
conceptually simple359 : reduce exposure to the dust. There are four main
methods of reducing exposure to dust. First, jobs might be redesigned to
eliminate exposure to dust. For example, a silica product might be replaced
with a different substance in a grinding application. 360  This method has
limited capacity because silica is both so common and so useful.
Moreover, restructuring the workplace is exactly the situation in which
Hayekian local knowledge will be most needed-making it all but
impossible to impose through a centralized regulatory regime without
imposing unacceptable losses. Such welfare losses from a centralized
approach might be borne with respect to an infrequently used substance,
both because the range of uses might be small enough to reduce the losses'
magnitude and because the amount of use is small enough to reduce the
total loss to a bearable level. Where a substance is used as widely as silica,
however, it is not possible.
Second, engineering steps might be taken to reduce exposure. 36I For
example, dust suppression equipment might be deployed362 or increased
ventilation might reduce dust concentrations. 363 These engineering steps
are the primary approach taken by OSHA, both with respect to silica and
other hazardous air contaminants. They have the regulatory virtue of
allowing OSHA to specify a level of contamination in the air that gives the
impression of precision. 364 As noted earlier, however, OSHA's current
359. See Brian Williams et al., Occupational Health, Occupational Illness: Tuberculosis,
Silicosis and HIV on the South African Mines, in OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE, supra note
5, at 95, 100 (opining that the prevention of silicosis can be accomplished by observing dust
levels, a technical problem).
360. See Jones, supra note 5, at 221 (proposing that using less hazardous materials in
lieu of dangerous materials is a viable way of reducing exposures).
361. See id. at 221 (suggesting that ventilation, isolation, substitution, and dust
suppression by wetting are among the possibilities to reduce silica exposure).
362. See id. (indicating that applying water or other liquid is an adequate method of
controlling dust).
363. See id. (detailing the ability of local ventilation systems to trap a contaminant before
it reaches the general air flow).
364. Corn details one of the key problems with using the TLVs as standards by using the
following example: TLV standards were intended to be room air levels, but OSHA treated
them as measurements "at the nose." See Interview with Leonard J. Goldwater, in CORN,
supra note 98, at 145-46. As Columbia Medical School Professor and longtime ACGIH
member Dr. Leonard Goldwater explained in an interview, TLVs were based on room
monitoring, not personal monitoring:
Now we're doing almost entirely personal monitoring. And the values you get from
personal monitoring, as you well know, have no connection whatsoever to general
room air levels. I shouldn't say no connection, but they can be very far apart. In
fact my experience with personal monitoring is that it gives higher levels than those
in general room air. We've done some studies on this. Mercury in particular is two
or three times higher at the nose than it is 6 feet away in the general room air. Now,
as far as I'm aware, nothing has been done to point out the fact that these original
correlations no longer hold. And that what the agencies are doing now is saying
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standard (in effect since 1970) is based on outdated measurement
technology.365 Most importantly, such standards provide no incentive for
increasing knowledge about the regulated workplace hazard; indeed, they
may even discourage it by focusing attention on compliance with the
standard rather than on harm reduction. Given the costs of changing an
OSHA regulation, they certainly do not encourage investigations by private
parties into categorization issues.
Third, vulnerable employees may be removed from the workplace.366
Unions have traditionally resisted this approach,367 and OSHA has
followed their lead and generally not included such provisions in its
regulations. As medical knowledge increases, however, genetic links
between individuals and vulnerability to particular substances are likely to
emerge. 368
Finally, workers at risk of exposure could wear personal protective
equipment, but OSHA generally prefers not to use this method of
controlling occupational exposure to hazardous substances. As one
reference work on the subject firmly concluded: "Personal protective
equipment, and in the case of dust exposure, specifically respiratory
protection, should only be considered for operations where it is not possible
to control exposure by other means. They should never be considered as an
alternative to engineering controls. 3 69  Why not? Occupational disease
control specialists have three main objections: (1) the gear is not
"foolproof;" (2) it depends on workers' "voluntary compliance" with the
program for their use, and workers will not follow instructions on using
personal equipment; and (3) it requires an ongoing maintenance
that you mustn't have more than, let's say, 10 parts per million at the nose when
originally it was 10 parts per million in the general room air. You're dealing with a
totally different system. And so they're insisting on the values of personal
monitoring being the same as those of the general room air, which means that you
have to reduce them by several-fold. I wrote to Elkins and Stockinger about this at
the time I became aware of it. And Elkins said 'You're right'; he was on the
committee. And that's where that ended. Stockinger as usual giggled .... OSHA
misapplied these things from day one. As far as I'm aware, ACGIH has done
nothing to tell OSHA: "You're off-base, you don't know what you are talking
about. You're misapplying TLVs, you're misinterpreting them, you're doing
everything wrong with them." To me this has done great mischief, to put it mildly.
Id.
365. See Graham, supra note 5, at 201 (detailing a new conversion method that has
problems, for example, converting between parts per cubic foot and mg/m3).
366. See Banks, supra note 71, at 8 (advocating that, once someone has an occupational
lung disease, "the worker is best advised to leave the workplace").
367. See supra text accompanying note 232 (discussing union efforts to prevent
legislation that would result in the discharge of affected employees).
368. See Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative
Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755, 1755 (1997) (finding that, as
technology advances, the information base on connections between genetics and
susceptibility to disease has increased).
369. Jones, supra note 5, at 221.
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program. 370  The first and third of these are not serious objections-no
method of exposure control is foolproof, and all equipment requires
maintenance. 371  The problematic objection is thus that workers will not
properly use the equipment intended to protect them. This objection has a
long history.372 In essence, it amounts to a claim that workers make
inappropriate tradeoffs of immediate comfort and long-term health (by
removing uncomfortable respirators) and/or do not properly understand the
risks posed by the substances from which the respirators are intended to
protect them. 373
So long as occupational health regulations forbid reliance on respirators,
of course, the incentive to develop more effective, lower cost, and more
comfortable equipment is eliminated. We observe a quite different rate of
technical progress in other, similar areas of equipment. Scuba gear, for
example, has progressed from heavy, relatively failure-prone, surplus
370. See Philip Harber, Respirators, in ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE
1757, 1757 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed. 1998). Harber stated,
Use of respirators is not the method of choice for controlling exposures.
Respirators do not provide foolproof protection. Respirator-based protection is
completely dependent on voluntary compliance by the worker. Furthermore,
protection by respirator use requires an ongoing multifaceted program to assure
proper maintenance and utilization. The cost of the respirator itself is only a small
part of the total cost of an effective program.
Id.
371. The intent behind these objections may be to argue that respirators have a higher
failure rate than engineering controls or that respirator maintenance is more costly or
difficult than engineering control maintenance. If that were true, however, the claim would
not be stated categorically, since it would have to be evaluated on a case by case basis.
372. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 71, at 422. Rosen offered an early historical example
of the problem of worker interference with safety measures:
It has been mentioned that several authors suggested the use of respirators to
prevent the inhalation of dust. However, such devices did not come into common
use and Federath writing in 1899 offers some illuminating information on this
subject. "At the end of the seventies," he says, "I recommended the wearing of a
respirator while at work as a prophylactic measure. The miners complained,
however, that they could not work with it because it interfered with their breathing.
I then suggested to them at least to tie a piece of cloth in front of the nose and
mouth-even in this way a large quantity of dust would be prevented from entering
the lungs. I do not know whether they followed this advice-even this measure
was probably too inconvenient for them. Unfortunately most of them are very
indolent-the younger ones say 'we don't need that' and the older ones, 'that can't
help us any more."'
Id.
373. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 71, at 4. Banks illuminated upon the difficulty in
getting workers to comply with safety measures:
Conveying the public health perspective that dust-related diseases are dangerous to
a worker's respiratory health can be difficult, particularly when the period from
first exposure to the development of disease may be 20 or more years.
Furthermore, the frequently suggested solution of wearing personal respiratory
protective devices throughout the workday is an unrealistic expectation. The
increase in the work of breathing, the discomfort, the poor-fit sometimes
attributable to facial hair, and the inability to speak and adequately communicate
with one's fellow workers is almost too much too [sic] ask of any worker.
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military gear to light-weight, ergonomic, comfortable, fail-safe, consumer-
friendly gear. As a result, scuba gear is in widespread use in environments
where the potential for immediate injury and death from equipment failure
is more severe than that found in most workplaces. Again, we see the
influence of regulation distorting the development of new knowledge that
could provide superior protection for employees because of institutional
biases.
E. Explaining Regulations
There are a number of reasons why regulating silica ought to be a
reasonably easy matter. A hazardous substance, visible to the naked eye,
with a documented history of causing occupational disease problems
should be a straight-forward case for regulators. Indeed, some optimistic
sources have even suggested that silicosis can be prevented entirely by
proper regulation.37 4  When the IARC identified silica as a "probable
human carcinogen," regulating it should have been straightforward-
standards needed to be tightened in light of the newly recognized risk.
What to do to prevent silica exposure also ought to be clear. The general
principle in occupational disease prevention is to prevent exposure. 375
Preventing dust exposure is neither difficult nor novel; prevention requires
a combination of ventilation and dust reduction or removal.376
Unfortunately, regulating silica is not straightforward.377 Relatively
obvious problems include the presence of other minerals in dusts, which
make interpreting data about exposures more difficult.378 Equipment and
techniques may not be competent to undertake the task of measuring at
374. See, e.g., Balaan & Banks, supra note 71, at 446. Balaan and Banks displayed their
optimism in addressing the problem posed by silica:
Silicosis is preventable. The extent to which this can be realized depends on
education of employers and employees, strict enforcement of industrial hygiene
practices, and vigilance for circumstances where unacceptable exposures to
respirable silica may happen. Further research on the mechanism of lung injury in
silicosis and its modulation by pharmacologic agents will contribute to our
therapeutic armamentarium for this disease.
Id.; see also Gary R. Epler, Clinical Overview of Occupational Lung Disease, 30 THE
RADIOLOGICAL CLINICS OF N. AM.: OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 1121, 1127 (1992)
(maintaining that "[v]igorous adherence to dust control regulations and dust count
monitoring can eliminate this disorder [chronic silicosis]").
375. See Banks, supra note 71, at 7 ("Primary prevention, the backbone of prevention of
all workplace disease, is best achieved by eliminating exposures.").
376. See Hoffman, supra note 71, at 536 (considering the dust safety techniques known
in the early 1900s); CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 38 (highlighting that "[t]he efficacy of
preventative measures had also been documented" by 1915).
377. See Frank J. Hearl, Identification, Monitoring and Control of Dust Exposures, in
OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE, supra note 5, at 35, 35 ("The recognition, evaluation and
control of dust exposures in occupational environments can be complex.").
378. See PRIMER, supra note 9, at 16-17 (discussing the various issues inherent in
diagnosing silica-related health troubles).
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levels required by regulations. 379  Health and exposure records are
incomplete, causing difficulties in linking individuals' conditions with
workplace exposures and thereby complicating efforts at setting exposure
levels. 38 0 There are also more complex problems related to the particular
form of silica dust to which individuals are exposed.38 '
Moreover, there are serious problems in identifying the cause of lung
damage from silica exposure. The successful effort to reduce exposures
itself complicates attempts to identify the remaining harms by eliminating
the most obvious evidence of exposure and making the health effects
harder to spot. 382 Indeed, even with asbestos, where lung damage was (at
379. See id. at 16 ("Under certain conditions, current techniques and equipment can't
distinguish very well between its physical states at the low concentration level specified by
HCS.").
380. See Graham, supra note 5, at 200. Graham commented on the added complications
caused by incomplete data:
Setting [occupational exposure] guidelines is hardly a simple task, depending as
they do on animal toxicology as well as epidemiological studies, either prospective
or retrospective, of exposed occupational cohorts. Often, past exposures are
uncertain because of fragmentary data and constantly changing work environments.
Clinical data such as chest X-rays may never have been taken systematically and
maintained. Predicting a safe exposure for a working lifetime involves the
conundrum of protecting workers but not establishing standards which unfairly
burden the industry, although the necessary tendency is clearly to err on the side of
worker health.
Id.
381. See, e.g., Hearl, supra note 377, at 35 (citation omitted). Hearl noted that the age of
the dust further complicates the issue:
Some studies show that freshly generated dust containing crystalline silica will
exhibit increased toxicity in lung cells compared with aged dust, due to the recent
creation and presence of surface free radicals. Therefore, specific knowledge about
the process that generated the dust and the interactions of the aerosol with the
environment provide important information.
Id. Hearl continued by explaining,
Dust measurement and dust hazard evaluation is complex because of the need to
characterize properties beyond the intensity of exposure, i.e. the dust concentration.
It may be necessary to describe the exposure in terms of the particle size
distribution, and the often inhomogeneous chemical or morphological properties of
the dust. For fibrous materials such as asbestos, particle shape may have a
profound impact on the toxicity of the material. Several descriptors of the particles
may be used to characterize the concentration including: the mass of the particles,
the mass of one chemical species in the particles, the active surface area, the
number of particles, or the crystalline properties of the particles.
Id.
382. See Graham, supra note 5, at 192-93. Graham discussed that success in eliminating
high silica exposure has made it more difficult to find other damaging exposure to silica:
As dust levels have fallen as a result of environmental controls and governmental
standards, the health effects have become more subtle: radiographic changes may
be so slight that interpreting a film as "abnormal" or "normal" may be difficult and
subject to disagreement, even by expert readers. Likewise, when conglomerate
silicosis was often the outcome of extremely high dust exposures, pulmonary
function changes were certain and inevitable. Now, however, whether quartz
exposure has any effect in the absence of radiographic changes is very much in
doubt.
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least theoretically) more readily identifiable, there have been serious
problems linking harm to the inhaled dust. For example, as part of the
Manville Trust's distribution of funds to asbestos claimants, the Trust
implemented an audit program. Using only personnel selected in
consultation with the plaintiffs' bar, none of whom had ever testified on
behalf of a defendant in an asbestos case, and a liberal rule for inclusion of
claims,383 the audit nonetheless discovered that approximately half of the
claimants' radiographs had no indication of "even low-level, sub-diagnostic
X-ray evidence of interstitial fibrosis. 384
Because of the difficulties in developing adequate exposure and health
records, data availability often drives regulations. In the case of silica, for
example, the two primary sets of health data come from a series of studies
of Vermont granite workers 385 and white South African gold miners. 3
86
Indeed, the history of medical knowledge about silicosis comes primarily
from studies of individuals who had extraordinarily high levels of
exposure, such as Nevada mill workers, Vermont granite cutters, and the
workers at the Gauley Bridge, West Virginia tunnel incident. 387
The highest quality medical evidence, therefore, comes from extremely
limited sources. Given the variability in types of silica, we therefore
confront the problem of how to account for this limitation. Consider, for
example, the Vermont granite cutters. The Vermont studies came about
because of an increase in silica-dust-related tuberculosis in Vermont after
the introduction in 1900 of pneumatic chisels and surfacing machines. 38
8
The high degree of variance in exposure across job categories enabled
383. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION:
AN INTERIM REPORT 20 (RAND Institute for Justice ed., 2002) (citation omitted) (finding
that independent readers "reviewed the X-Rays submitted by a random sample of
claimants .... A claim was downgraded only if both [readers] independently determined
that they saw no indication of even low-level, sub-diagnostic X-Ray evidence of interstitial
fibrosis"); see also Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation:
The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 33, 128-37 (2003)
(describing Trust experience in detail).
384. CARROLL, supra note 383, at 20 (citation omitted).
385. See Graham, supra note 5, at 200 ("[T]he Vermont granite industry ultimately
provided the most complete epidemiologic data on the health effects of quartz through a
series of landmark investigations."); Wang & Banks, supra note 10, at 70 ("Exposure and
lung function data from [Vermont granite workers studied serially from 1979 to 1987] has
formed the backbone for the silica standard in the US.").
386. See Wang & Banks, supra note 10, at 70 ("The evidence for airways obstruction, as
it relates to silica, is found primarily in epidemiologic studies of South African gold
miners.").
387. See CHERNIACK, supra note 71, at 38-39 (discussing the development of knowledge
and citing such incidents).
388. See Graham, supra note 5, at 200 (exploring the origins of the Vermont studies on
silica); see also Interview with Leonard J. Goldwater, in PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF
WORKERS: THE AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS, 1938-
1988, at 143 (1989) (highlighting the fact that granite workers "did not have much trouble
[with silicosis] in Vermont until they started using pneumatic tools. When it was all
handwork they had no problems").
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creation of a dose-response relationship for granite dust. 389 The state then
conducted follow-up studies through 1965, which "determined that no
cases of silicosis had appeared in workers first employed after 1938. "39o
There are not only the usual dose-response questions about extrapolating
from high-exposure studies to low exposures, but the granite workers were
exposed to silica of particular types, which may or may not be
representative of silica found elsewhere. 39' To use the language of our
earlier hypothetical, we thus do not know whether the Vermont studies
concerned a-kryptonite or 0-kryptonite. Moreover, the Vermont granite
cutters were exposed to freshly cut silica, and some silica exposures today
are to aged silica. Again, turning to our earlier hypothetical's language, we
must decide if the distinction between a-kryptonite and a'-kryptonite is
relevant as well.
But, these are not merely hypothetical discussions. Scientists working
for the Sorptive Minerals Institute have obtained samples of the ore used in
the study of South African miners and examined the form of silica
present.392 They determined that there is a difference between it and the
aged silica present in many absorbent products manufactured with mined
silica and related minerals. What are regulators to make of such evidence?
If the South African studies are the basis for a new regulatory effort, are
firms using non-comparable forms of silica to be exempted from the new
regulation? Or must they undertake the far more complex and likely
impossible task of proving that the distinction renders their materials
'safe"?
In addition to the chemical, biological, mineral, or other characterization
of the regulated substance, technological change also plays a critical role in
regulation by providing more sophisticated measurement techniques. Our
ability to measure dust levels today, for example, is far more sophisticated
than even thirty years ago. Further, our ability to diagnose health effects
has taken a major step forward with the development of CT scan
technology, which reveal even smaller impacts on lungs, raising important
questions about a number of aspects of regulation:
The large increase in sensitivity afforded by CT scans raises the question
of whether tiny opacities, hitherto not discernible on plain chest
radiographs, will become the standard for making the diagnosis of work-
related lung disease. The implications are manifold, including the
389. See Graham, supra note 5, at 200 (documenting the variables allowing for a dose-
response relationship for workers exposed to granite dust).
390. Id. (citations omitted).
391. Since the form of silica was not known to be important at the time of the studies, the
reports of the studies do not include sufficient information to characterize the material as
fully as is currently possible.
392. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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question of whether future radiographic surveys of industries should
include CT, whether the more sensitive detection of abnormalities will
be important in litigation or disability evaluations, and whether
arguments can be made that at least part of the responsibility for these
changes rests with the general exposure to environmental particles, and
is not therefore strictly related to employment.
393
The future development of institutions dealing with occupational hazards
such as silica exposure need to take into account these uncertainties and
technologies. These developments will increase both the fineness with
which we can distinguish one form of a potentially harmful substance from
another and advance the point at which we can identify small changes in
human health from exposures. It is also virtually certain that these
advances will occur faster than we can link the distinctions to the health
effects, increasing the problem of categorization for future regulators.
Because individuals staff OSHA, its regulations reflect their motives and
self-interest. Being self-interested does not mean that bureaucrats do not
have altruistic goals; rather, it means that even public-spirited OSHA staff
are motivated by a desire to maximize what they think is the public good.
This innate bias may not always coincide with others' views of the public
good. In addition, they may have other motives:
Bureaucrats normally have several private motives. One is, of course,
simply not to work too hard.... Another is to expand the size of one's
own department and in the process of so doing, being willing to go along
with the expansion of all the rest. A third is to improve the "perks" that
accompany the particular position .... 394
In general, bureaucrats have incentives to call for additional regulations and
spending in support of the interests that justify their programs'
existences.
OSHA has had less success at expanding its authority and resources
compared to many other regulatory agencies. Although staffing and
spending to develop, administer, and enforce OSHA regulations have
generally been increasing in real terms since Congress established the
agency in 1970,396 OSHA's growth has been less rapid than the growth of
other agencies, particularly the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
393. Graham, supra note 5, at 205.
394. Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMIcs 1043 (1998).
395. See BRYCE WILKINSON, CONSTRAINING GOVERNMENT REGULATION 123-24 (N.Z.
Bus. Roundtable ed., 2001), available at http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/publications/
publications-2001/constraininggovt.pdf (discussing the diverse benefits accruing to
government officials from increased regulation).
396. See SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, MODERATING REGULATORY GROWTH:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 5 (2006), available
at http://www.mercatus.org/ (analyzing trends in federal regulatory agencies' budgets).
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and, more recently, the Department of Homeland Security.3 97 OSHA also
lags behind other agencies in regulatory volume: OSHA generally issues
far fewer regulations than does the EPA. In 2004, for example, OSHA
issued (in proposed or final form) nine regulations, only one of which was
considered economically significant,3 98 compared to the EPA's 65
proposed or final regulations, 11 of which were economically
significant.399 In the first four years of the Bush Administration, OSHA
issued three final economically significant regulations. Similarly, during
the previous eight years of the Clinton Administration, OSHA issued only
400
seven economically significant rules-less than one per year.
Despite its relative inactivity, OSHA promulgates regulations that are
costly for the economy. According to recent estimates, OSH Act
regulations constitute nearly one-half of the total direct cost of workplace
regulations-around $41 billion per year in 2000.41 MSHA regulations
cost another $7.4 billion.40 2 It is unclear whether these costs produce
commensurate benefits. Econometric studies have generally failed to find
evidence that OSHA regulations have had a significant impact on job
safety.4 °3
What explains OSHA's relative lack of success at gaining resources and
authority? Three important factors stand out. First, the primary outside
interest group behind OSHA regulation is organized labor. Unions
generally support OSHA regulations for three reasons: (1) the regulations
raise costs for both union and non-union employers, evening the playing
field; (2) the regulations give unions a tool to use in negotiations (OSHA
complaints by union members can reduce productivity); and (3) the
regulations, through their participation in the regulatory process, give
organized employees a comparatively greater voice in workplace
organization than unorganized employees, thus providing a benefit to
397. Id. at 15.
398. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 639 (1993) (announcing that "economically
significant" generally refers to regulations that are expected to have an impact of $100
million per year or more).
399. Data on regulations reviewed under Executive Order 12,866 are available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport.
400. See id.
401. See Joseph M. Johnson, A Review and Synthesis of the Cost of Workplace
Regulations, in CROSS-BORDER HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT IsSUES 433,
454-55 (Andrew P. Morriss & Samuel Estreicher eds., 2005). Johnson estimates that the
cost of workplace regulation totaled $91 billion in 2000. Id. Figures are in year 2000
dollars. See Harvey S. James, Jr., Estimating OSHA Compliance Costs, 31 POL'Y SCd. 321
(1998) (analyzing and approximating OSHA compliance costs).
402. See Johnson, supra note 401, at 454-55.
403. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 52 (summarizing the econometric studies that
examine the impact of OSHA). Most of the studies Viscusi used focus on accident rates,
rather than diseases, however. For example, death rate trends for job-related accidents did
not change after the enactment of the OSH Act.
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employees who join unions. 404 Others interested in expanding state power
also find the issue attractive.40 5 Since 1970, union political power has
declined, as union membership has fallen from 24 percent of the private
labor force in 1973 to less than eight percent in 2004.406 Moreover, since
1970, Republicans, generally unsympathetic to unions, have controlled the
executive branch for 24 of the past 36 years. Even the 12 years of
Democratic control came under Presidents Carter and Clinton, both of
whom may be described as less than sympathetic to unions and arose from
the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party. OSHA thus has
lacked an effective outside ally in seeking to expand its authority and
resources.
Second, OSHA lacks the political capital of other regulatory agencies.
Early missteps, particularly connected to its transformation of voluntary
consensus standards into mandatory regulatory standards, gave the agency
a bad reputation both on Capitol Hill and among the public. The lack of
highly publicized events that spur public demand for regulation also
hampers the agency's quest for additional resources and authority.
Compare OSHA's record to the creation of state and federal programs for
black lung, a disease among coal miners similar to silicosis. Like silicosis,
diagnosis of black lung was highly controversial. Miners pointed to the
high levels of dust visible in mines; mine owners and many medical
professionals insisted on objectively verifiable diagnoses, such as
407 'tec
radiographic evidence. Not until the combination of several unrelated
historical events-industry conditions that weakened the union Welfare
and Retirement Fund's finances, the rise of a dissident United Mine
Workers group that seized on the black lung issue as a vehicle for
challenging the established union leadership, and a disastrous mine
explosion attributed to high dust levels-however, did a coalition capable
404. See Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 130, at 467 (discussing the history of
workplace health and safety measures and union organizing as well as quoting an early
twentieth-century analyst that the campaign for workplace health and safety was "part and
parcel of the movement for labor legislation"); id. at 477 (describing the role of unions and
noting that the New York bakers' union in 1909 had a strike in which "the union identified
unsanitary workshops and the spread of disease with nonunion bakeries").
405. See id. at 479 ("[I]ndustrial accidents and diseases proved to be an attractive issue
[at the start of the twentieth century] for progressives interested in expanding the role of the
state.").
406. See Unionstats.com, http://www.unionstats.com (last visited May 6, 2006); Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2004, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
union2_01272005.pdf; see also Orly Lobel, Beyond Experimentation: Governing
Occupational Safety in the United States 5 (University of San Diego Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 07-32, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-874837 ("OSHA practices and
the limits of its reach no doubt epitomize the relative power of business interests and the
political weakness of labor interests in the United States.").
407. See Fox & Stone, supra note 250, at 33-34 (commenting that these owners and
physicians were more concerned with political complacency than with the limits of medical
knowledge).
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of obtaining regulatory action coalesce.40 8  The result was both state and
federal legislation. As two prominent commentators have noted, "What
appeared to be radical demands of a vocal minority [of miners] became
Federal policy because members of Congress coalesced around their
interest in reelection and their need to ally with colleagues. 40 9
Third, OSHA regulations greatly affect the industries it regulates. The
threat of OSHA regulation spurs these firms to organize collective
resistance to OSHA activity. As a result, OSHA is a relatively weak
institutional actor compared to other federal regulatory agencies. OSHA
has been unable to expand its authority and resources as rapidly as other
agencies have been able to do, in part because it has been hampered by a
lack of political capital, opposed by highly-motivated interest groups, and
lacking in effective outside interest group allies.4 10
Silica virtually disappeared as a subject of regulatory interest in the
period between World War II and the creation of OSHA. The combination
of voluntary efforts through the ACGIH TLVs and workers' compensation
coverage "solved" the silicosis problem by creating a mechanism to
compensate those injured that, in turn, provided employers with an
incentive to improve workplace conditions (to lower premiums). The
TLVs provided a benchmark, allowing employees to compare their
employer's practices with an industry standard and facilitating market
pressures for improving health and safety. That exposures did not continue
to fall during this period may reflect the preferences of employees and
employers to maintain silica dust exposure at a level above zero because
the marginal cost of the reductions to zero were too high for either group to
accept.
This regime appears to have been successful enough that we could drop
the quotation marks from the word solved in the preceding paragraph.
Silicosis declined in the United States after World War II, as best we can
tell, and remained a problem primarily in a few high exposure industries. 4 1
The primary flaw was not employers ignoring health effects, but the flaw
rested instead with unions deciding not to engage in the ACGIH process,
which left it to the interests of large firms and bureaucrats. Union
408. See id. at 36-37 (explicating the situation in the late 1960s, including the
Farmington disaster, which prompted legislative action on the black lung problem among
miners).
409. Id. at 40.
410. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 385 (2005) (pointing to OSHA's structural and
political weaknesses).
411. See NIOSH HAZARD REVIEW, supra note 31, at 1, and tbl. 1, at 5 (showing
industries with workers potentially exposed to silica and noting that "[s]ince 1968, reported
mortality associated with silicosis has declined; however, 200 to 300 such deaths were
reported each year during the period 1992-1995").
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participation would have introduced an interest group to challenge their
data and conclusions, thus improving the ACGIH process. Unions,
however, had other fish to fry.
Knowledge of silica's health effects grew after World War II, largely
through a combination of public and private investment. NIOSH and
IARC both pulled together a great deal of research on silica, but that
research came from a mixture of private, nonprofit, and public-sector-
funded researchers. 41 2  Post-war problems with silica stem largely from
OSHA's involvement. By ossifying the ACGIH standard, OSHA
eliminated the flexibility of the ACGIH process without adding any
compensating benefits (such as more comprehensive analysis) to the near
universal acceptance of the TLV. OSHA's failure to respond to NIOSH
and IARC since NIOSH first warned of the existing standard in 1974 is a
textbook example of government failure.
The inability of regulators to keep pace with the growing knowledge of
silica exposure risks created an opportunity for the issue to be addressed
through another venue: the courts. The role of the courts and interest
groups that participate in the resulting litigation are discussed in the next
Section.
III. REGULATION BY LITIGATION
In addition to the regulatory interest groups described above, there is an
additional interest group that can play, and already has played, a major role
in regulatory debates: the plaintiffs' bar. Suits over silica-related diseases
have a long history.413 While workers' compensation covers occupational
exposure to silica, silica's use is so widespread that suits against product
manufacturers are not implausible.414 In this Section, we consider the
history of asbestos litigation as a potential model for predicting how tort
law might implicitly regulate silica.
The mass tort litigation over asbestos dates to the Fifth Circuit's 1973
decision in Borel v. Fibreboard Corp.415 In that case, the court recognized
412. Id. at 3.
413. See DAVIS, supra note 167, at 74. The author goes on to describe the major players
in silica-related suits:
Two great groups are very much interested in silicosis. One is the employers who
are conducting industries in which there is exposure to dust. The other groups
consist of the thousands of people who work in these industries. Lawyers and
legislators make up another group--one that buzzes around the other two.
Id.
414. See Brickman, supra note 383, at 46 n.29 (describing parallels between silicosis and
asbestosis and concluding that "the principal difference ensuing from identifying a fibrosis
as asbestosis, that is, caused by exposure to asbestos, rather than one of the other causes of
fibrosis, does not lie in the medical realm"). The author goes on to explain that "it is a
function of the compensation system." Id.
415. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); see also
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a products liability theory that enabled injured employees to avoid the
exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation schemes and sue
the manufacturers of asbestos products used in the workplace. 4 6 Workers'
compensation systems had trouble handling occupational disease claims for
diseases with long latency periods and whose cause lay in employees'
exposures to multiple sources of asbestos at a variety of employers over
decades.417 Thus, allowing suits against the manufacturers of the product
was an important doctrinal innovation in compensating individuals who
had suffered serious harms,4 18 such as mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer
closely linked to asbestos exposure.419  As one commentator noted,
"Modern asbestos litigation was born when courts, having lost confidence
in workers' compensation schemes, developed doctrines of products
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1343, 1385 (1995) (observing the effect the first major asbestos decision had on
subsequent litigation); FREDERICK M. BARON, HANDLING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES 2
(1981) (noting that before Borel "occupational disease law amounted to a group of cases and
articles discussing recovery under the various state workers' compensation acts").
416. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1091, 1095-96 (holding that strict liability may apply in this
case because the use of the product was "unreasonably dangerous" and that the tortfeasors
may be held jointly and severally liable for the total damages).
417. See Patrick M. Hanlon & Julie S. Lehrman, Developments in Premises Liability
Law, in ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 162 (2004) (remarking on the lack of
confidence in workers' compensation systems).
418. A classic example of this attitude toward Borel is provided by Professor Harold
Southerland's essay, Law, Literature and History:
Law is at its best, I think, when used to restrain the exertion of external power by
one person over another, at its worst when used, as it so often is, to legitimize, to
make possible, the exertion of such power. It is hard to think of a better example
than Paul Brodeur's account of the long struggle of dying plaintiffs against the
asbestos industry, in particular Ward Stephenson's Herculean labors on behalf of
Clarence Borel, which culminated in the Fifth Circuit's ground-breaking decision
in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., the case which would effectively break
the back of the asbestos industry.
Harold P. Southerland, Law, Literature, and History, 28 VT. L. REv. 1, 82 n.255 (2003)
(citation omitted). Southerland goes on to quote Paul Brodeur's account to support his
point:
a society that cannot summon up the sense to protect the lungs and the lives of its
workers cannot hope to protect the lungs and lives of its other citizens, including its
children .... The health hazard posed by... [asbestos] has called into question
the conduct of a huge cross-section of the institutions that make up the private-
enterprise system, including many of its manufacturing corporations, insurance
companies, investment houses, law firms, trade unions, and governmental
regulatory agencies, as well as many members of the medical and legal professions,
the scientific community, and Congress.
Id. at 82 (quoting PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 348-49 (1985)).
Southerland's comment, simply an illustration for an unrelated point in his essay, is
representative of the academic legal literature's view of asbestos litigation. It is difficult to
square this account with the economic devastation and fraud given in more modem accounts
of asbestos litigation. See, e.g., CARROLL, supra note 383. Brickman offers an interest-
group-based explanation for the academy's uncritical attitude toward asbestos litigation.
Brickman, supra note 383, at 166-70.
419. See Brickman, supra note 383, at 44-46 (giving a thorough summary of the
literature on asbestos and cancer).
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liability to provide tort remedies to injured workers as a substitute for
workers' compensation benefits.,
420
Asbestos litigation soon became something quite different than what the
early commentators anticipated. It is now "the longest running mass tort in
U.S. history., 42 1 Some have compared it to "a massive, unending river,,
422
or "a malignant enterprise. 423 It has spread far beyond the original suits
against the manufacturers of asbestos products to "virtually all parts of the
U.S. economy, ' ' 424 involving defendants in 75 of the 83 two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification codes.42 5 Its scale dwarfs even major regulatory
impacts, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks; former Attorney General
Griffin Bell contends that asbestos litigation's estimated costs to the
economy are greater than the estimated costs of "all Superfund cleanup
sites combined, Hurricane Andrew, or the September 11 terrorist
attacks. 426
Asbestos litigation's evolution is relevant because it illustrates how an
interest group comes into being and influences subsequent events.427
Indeed, some have argued that the asbestos bar is attempting to expand into
silica suits, and the goal of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar is "to keep the
asbestos-litigation gravy train alive. 428 The scale of asbestos litigation and
the amount of money involved has continued to grow at a pace even the
most pessimistic analysts did not anticipate. A RAND Corporation study
of the litigation in 1983 made the "shocking" prediction that the litigation
420. Hanlon & Lehrman, supra note 417, at 162.
421. CARROLL, supra note 383, at v.
422. Coffee, supra note 415, at 1384.
423. Brickman, supra note 383, at 35.
424. CARROLL, supra note 383, at 49.
425. Id. at 50.
426. Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Congress Should
Act to Resolve the National Asbestos Crisis: The Basis in Law and Public Policy for
Meaningful Progress, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 839, 861 (2003) (quoting the Honorable Griffin B.
Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts' Duty to Help Solve the
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6 BRIEFLY 4 (2002)), available at http://www.nlcpi.org/
books/pdf/Vol6Number6June2002.pdf.
427. There are numerous similarities between asbestosis and silicosis that make the
comparison particularly apt. Both diseases feature long latency periods, widespread
exposure, and well-documented harms of exposure. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 14
("That workplace exposure to asbestos can be dangerous was known well before World War
lI."). The two substances share some physical and chemical characteristics-asbestos is a
silicate. See Balaan & Banks, supra note 71, at 435 (describing the chemical composition of
silica and offering examples of types of silicates). Further, both diseases have long latency
periods. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 16 (noting that there is a 20 to 40 year latency
period for asbestos disease). Lastly, both produce a chronic disease that can be present in an
asymptomatic version as well as more serious versions. See Jones, supra note 5, at 215
("Chronic silicosis occurs 20-40 [years] after initial exposure to crystalline silica.").
428. David Hechler, Silica Plaintiffs Suffer Setbacks, 27 NAT'L L.J. 1, 18 (2005) (quoting
Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Cardozo Law
School)).
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and subsequent compensation expenses would total $1 billion through
2001, with more than 21,000 lawsuits and three major corporations in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.429 Other analysts predicted that the total costs
could ultimately reach as much as $38 billion.430
These estimates proved wildly off the mark. By 2000, more than
600,000 people had filed claims, generally against multiple defendants,43 1
over 6,000 entities had been sued,4 32 and $54 billion had been spent on
compensation and litigation costs. 433 Another measure of the unexpected
size of awards for asbestos is the rapid exhaustion of the $5 billion
Manville Trust, set up to fund payments to claimants against the Johns
Manville Company; less than two years after it was created in 1988, the
trust was effectively insolvent.434 Reasonable estimates of total costs now
range from $200 to $265 billion, an over five-fold increase in twenty
435years.
Asbestos litigation has changed markedly in character as well. The
litigation has spread from suits by plaintiffs who had contracted a rare form
of cancer closely linked to asbestos exposure against the manufacturers of
asbestos products to now "touch almost every type of economic activity in
the U.S., 436 and include plaintiffs without any symptoms. Plaintiffs with
cancer no longer bring most of the claims: 65 percent of compensation has
gone to nonmalignant claimants.43 7 The number of defendants sued by
each plaintiff soared from 20 in the 1980s to between 60 and 70 in the
1990s. 438 Asbestos litigation has grown from a problem of large asbestos
manufacturers into a problem for even firms "with as few as 20 employees
and just a few million dollars in annual revenues., 439  By the 1990s,
"nontraditional" defendants accounted for over 60 percent of asbestos
429. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983); CARROLL,
supra note 383, at 51 ("In 1982, people were shocked to learn that over 21,000 claimants
had filed claims for asbestos-related injuries and that the litigation had spread to about 300
defendants. Today, we believe that through the year 2000 over 600,000 claimants had filed
against about 6,000 defendants.").
430. See, e.g., CARROLL, supra note 383, at 6.
431. See id. at 40 (noting that the statistics given were probably underestimated).
432. Id. at 49.
433. Id. at vii.
434. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1387 (noting that bankruptcy reorganization did little
to help defendants who were targets of mass asbestos litigation).
435. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at vii. Asbestos litigation has costs well beyond the
payments by individual defendants. Estimates of job losses from the financial weakening of
the defendants range from 128,000 to 423,000 and $10-78 billion in lost investment capital.
Id. at 73-74.
436. Id. at vii; see also id. at 68 (noting the change in the type of defendants due to
bankruptcies of traditional defendants).
437. Id. at vii.
438. Id. at 41.
439. Id. at 49.
ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
expenditures. 44 Some of these developments may have been the result of a
court-imposed expansion of insurance policies to provide unlimited
coverage for asbestos claims, which had the effect of making "allies" of the
plaintiffs' bar and the asbestos defendants: To avoid bankruptcy, asbestos
defendants agreed to mass settlements and default judgments and then
made insurance claims, without subjecting the claims to a great deal of
scrutiny, resulting in some meritless claims.44 '
Relatively few asbestos cases actually went to trial.442 In the 1980s and
1990s, the litigation "matured" into quasi-administrative proceedings that
handled claims in bulk. 443  As one observer has described the flood of
litigation,
The leading asbestos manufacturers had been sued in tens of thousands
or hundreds of thousands of cases and had evolved strategies for
managing the litigation. A large fraction of the cases were being filed by
a small number of plaintiff law firms. Over time, the litigation became
more and more concentrated in a small number of firms. By 1992, ten
firms represented half the annual filings against the defendants who
provided data to us. By 1995, ten firms (many, but not all, of the same
firms that had been in the 1992 'top ten') represented three-quarters of
the annual filings against these defendants, which had themselves grown
by a third. The leading firms had standing settlement agreements with
the major defendants. Virtually all the cases settled. 444
This process generated enormous gains for the law firms involved: The
Dallas law firm Baron & Budd had reportedly grossed more than $800
million from asbestos cases by 1998. 4 45 Transactions costs have consumed
more than half of the spending on asbestos claims, with the majority going
to plaintiffs' law firms.446 In a sign of their power, the share of spending
440. Id. at 50.
441. See Brickman, supra note 383, at 55-56 (noting that meritless claims were often
accommodated by "en masse" settlements and default judgments).
442. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 56 (demonstrating that, from 1993 to 2001, only
527 cases out of 1,598 resulted in trial verdicts).
443. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1356 ("Mass tort actions matured in the 1980s.").
444. CARROLL, supra note 383, at 30.
445. See Christine Biederman et al., Toxic Justice, DALLAS OBSERVER, Aug. 13, 1998,
available at http://www.daltasobserver.com/issues/1998-08-13/news/feature_ l.html.
446. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at vii. Other scholars have commentated on the
motivation of the bar and the disproportionate amount of revenue attorneys generated
through the settlement process. As one scholar wrote,
The obstacle that plaintiff lawyers faced in the mid 1980s is that while they had
crafted the proverbial sorcerer's stone that could turn base metal into gold, they
could not yet conjure up enough claimants to take full advantage of the unique
opportunities that beckoned. The need for masses of claimants that would enable
attorneys to fully exploit the multi-billion dollar asset pools was met by the
initiation of attorney-sponsored asbestos screenings in the mid-1980s.
Brickman, supra note 383, at 63; see also Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the
Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1726 (2002) ("The transaction costs associated
with this massive transfer of wealth from stockholders to plaintiffs are outrageous. Lawyers
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going to plaintiffs' firms held steady, while defense firms' share fell over
time (with the savings going to the plaintiffs).447  In the case of the
Manville Trust, in which the claims "were paid out under a bankruptcy plan
which was largely designed by plaintiff lawyers," plaintiffs' claims
"generated approximately $250 million in fees at an effective hourly rate of
$5,000 per hour for largely administrative claiming. 44 8
The process created a powerful economic interest: the asbestos
plaintiffs' bar. 449 Ralph Nader, lauding their efforts, noted, "Personal
injury lawyers must know that they could soon be defeated as a group
precisely because of the corporate reaction to their judicial successes as
individuals. Defeated, that is, unless they organize as a group to preserve
and expand the emerging legal order regarding the area of toxic
tragedies. 4 50  These firms, which invested considerable sums in
developing expertise in asbestos-related matters, will naturally seek to
increase the return on their investment by expanding the range of claims,
claimants, and defendants. 451 This dynamic can be seen in the expansion
receive a grossly disproportionate share of the total amount of monies spent in the litigation
process.").
447. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 60-61 (noting that over time the plaintiffs' share of
recovery grew from 37 to 43 cents on the dollar, with the plaintiffs' bar getting the same
percent of recovery while defense costs fell).
448. Brickman, supra note 383, at 138.
449. The plaintiffs' bar is an organized lobbying group. The Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (ATLA), the major national plaintiffs' bar organization, has
contributed almost $11 million to political campaigns (over 90% to Democratic candidates)
over the 2000-2004 election cycles. See Center for Responsive Politics, Donor Profiles,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID=D000000065 (last visited
May 6, 2006) (outlining ATLA's political contributions). ATLA's donations "routinely
rank[ ] among the top five PACs in federal campaign contributions." See CENTER FOR
LEGAL POLICY, TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT OF THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA
2003, at 20 (2003), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/triallawyersinc.pdf
(discussing PAC contributions and where among PACs ATLA ranks). Two major asbestos
law firms, Baron & Budd and the Law Offices of Peter Angelos, themselves contributed
more than $3 million. See id. (outlining the large asbestos firms and their contributions to
various political candidates); see also Daniel LeDuc & Michael E. Ruane, Orioles Owner
Masters Political Clout, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1999, at Cl. LeDuc and Ruane report that
[o]ver the years, Angelos has used his amassed power to change laws that have
benefited his law practice and helped ensure that his cases come out on top. At his
request, more judges have been named to hear asbestos cases in Baltimore, and
significant alterations in state law have made it easier to sue asbestos makers and
tobacco companies.
Id. Asbestos defendants (at least the solvent ones) also organized. See PUBLIC CITIZEN,
FEDERAL ASBESTOS LEGISLATION: THE WINNERS ARE .. . (2005), available at http://
www.citizen.org/documents/master%20report.pdf (describing lobbying campaigns by
defendants).
450. See Ralph Nader, Forward to BARON, supra note 415, at xi.
451. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1360 ("Plaintiffs' firms specializing in the field also
have a special incentive to search for claimants in order to realize continuing returns from
their investment in human capital. The asbestos litigation illustrates this tendency.");
Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar Crisis, 30
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 384 (1993). Edley and Weiler argued that
[l]awyers then cast the litigation net further to find corporate pockets deep enough
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of claims to include non-malignancy and asymptomatic claims,45 2 the
aggressive search for claimants,4 53 and the extraordinary expansion of
defendants in asbestos litigation.454
Viewing the history of asbestos litigation in retrospect, it becomes clear
that the plaintiffs' bar had an incentive to invest in developing evidence
455
to satisfy the vast numbers of pending and future tort claims. Judicial legerdemain
helped fill that gap with doctrinal innovations that imposed liability on firms (or
their insurers) whose "misdeed," for example, was buying asbestos-related
companies in the 1960s and early 1970s-after the human tragedy but before the
litigation disaster.
Id.; see also CARROLL, supra note 383, at 47-48 (discussing how there have recently been
claims from "people who were exposed to asbestos while working at job sites where
asbestos was present in the atmosphere but not to the degree typical of the traditional
industries"). Carroll cites, as an example, the "large numbers of claims have recently been
brought by workers in the textile industry. Textile workers sometimes work with machines
run by motors with gaskets that contain asbestos or in facilities ventilated by ducts lined
with asbestos." Id.; see also Richard C. Field & Ronald F. Frank, Indemnity, Contribution,
and Third Party Practice in Occupational Disease Litigation, in OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
LITIGATION 89, 91 (Sheila L. Bimbaum & Jerold Oshinsky eds., 1983) ("Plaintiffs bringing
civil actions for occupational injury will consider suing a number of entities which may be
alleged to have contributed to the harm."). Among those the plaintiff may choose to sue
include "the employer, the owner and/or lessor of the premises, the general contractor, the
manufacturer of a machine or other product involved in the injury, and other parties in the
product's distributional chain." Id.
452. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 45 ("Claims for nonmalignant injuries grew
sharply through the last half of the decade. Almost all the growth in the asbestos caseload
can be attributed to the growth in the number of these claims, which include claims from
people with little or no current functional impairment."); see Brickman, supra note 383, at
59-62 (describing the rise of unimpaired claimant claims and concluding that "[t]he weight
of the evidence.. . [demonstrates] that asbestosis as diagnosed by attorney-sponsored
asbestos screenings exists primarily if not exclusively as a function of the compensation
system").
453. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1359 ("[D]uring the 1980s ... asbestos plaintiffs'
attorneys arranged with labor unions for portable x-ray trucks to screen union workers for
telltale lung scars suggesting asbestos."); see also Brickman, supra note 383, at 59
("Plaintiff lawyers are able to maintain a near inexhaustible supply of such claimants by use
of attorney-sponsored mass screenings to identify thousands who are then diagnosed by the
processes used in the screenings, to have asbestos-related lung conditions."); id. at 62-103
(describing screenings in detail); Biederman, supra note 445, at *4-9 (describing mass
screenings and lax controls on identification of harm).
454. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 49 ("Because most of the traditional defendants
are in bankruptcy and are not making payments any more, the litigation has moved on to a
wide variety of new defendants. The number of defendants typically named in claims is
growing as well."); see also id. at 31 (discussing how, in the 1990s, plaintiffs' firms sought
new defendants and more money from types of defendants which they had previously
treated as peripheral); Biederman, supra note 445, at *3 ("Thanks to the bankrupting of the
biggest asbestos companies, the targets of [the asbestos bar's] lawsuits are a host of smaller
manufacturers-among them brake manufacturers, turbine manufacturers, paint
manufacturers, even the makers of the first generation of respiratory equipment intended to
protect workers from asbestos.").
455. A classic example is the investment by the asbestos plaintiffs' bar in locating 1930s
Johns-Manville General Counsel Vandiver Brown, who had retired to Scotland. Manville
resisted the "introduction of damaging correspondence between Brown and Sumner
Simpson, President of Raybestos Manhattan, as trial evidence by arguing that Brown was
dead and therefore his signature could not be authenticated. However, this tactic proved
futile after plaintiff's lawyers found Brown alive and well in Scotland." See Barbara Pfeffer
Billauer, How To Survive Workplace Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
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and legal theories,456 since both could be used in multiple cases. They had
the incentive to search for the most favorable jurisdictions for asbestos
suits 457 and for jurisdictions with rules that eased procedural problems458 -
exactly what we have observed. During the 1990s, asbestos cases migrated
to Mississippi, New York, West Virginia, Ohio, and Texas from California,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, where the majority of claims had
been filed in the 1970s and early 1980s. The latter group of states' market
share fell from 60 percent of all cases in the period between 1970 and 1987,
to seven percent between 1998 and 2000, while the former group's market
share rose from nine percent to 66 percent during the same periods.459
The sheer volume of asbestos litigation gives the plaintiffs' bar several
significant advantages. First, by overwhelming the courts, plaintiffs'
attorneys are freed from the close supervision of their fees and settlement
practices, which are normally available to courts to control potentially
abusive practices. 460 As Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner noted, the
volume "exert[ed] a well-nigh irresistible pressure to bend the normal
AND HEALTH 687, 691 n.t (Lawrence Slote ed., 1987).
456. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1360 (discussing how the advice for potential
defendants echoes this point and noting that liability theories "continue to grow in the hands
of creative plaintiffs' lawyers"); see also Billauer, supra note 455, at 687.
457. See BARON, supra note 415, at 37 ("Forum shopping, however, takes on added
significance in an occupational disease case because of the substantial variation in the law,
from state to state ....").
458. For example, Mississippi allowed the joinder of out-of-state plaintiffs to cases filed
by in-state plaintiffs, allowing firms to bring claims in the Mississippi courts for non-
Mississippi residents. CARROLL, supra note 383, at 34. Similarly, Texas passed a statute
that gave asbestos cases special access to the Texas courts during the 1990s, a statute drafted
in part by one of the leading asbestos lawyers. Biederman, supra note 445, at 7. A 1998
news report on the statute identified the problem:
This small exception quickly became a gaping hole. Between 1990 and 1992, after
the Texas Supreme Court made it more difficult to get rid of nonresidents' suits,
the number of nonresidents filing asbestos lawsuits in Texas grew rapidly,
according to numbers compiled by the Texas Civil Justice League. There were 580
claims filed by nonresidents in 1990, and 3,121 in 1992. After the 1993 bill, the
numbers multiplied even more rapidly. Between 1993 and the end of 1995, more
than 35,000 nonresidents filed asbestos-related claims in Texas, as lawyers in states
with shorter limitations' statutes than Texas referred their cases here. Though the
loophole was closed last year, there are nearly 42,000 asbestos claims filed in
Texas by out-of-state plaintiffs awaiting resolution.
Id. (discussing the loophole and asbestos lawsuit filings in detail); see also Dow Chem. Co.
v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990); Act of February 23, 1993, S.B. 2, § 1, 73d
Legis. 1st R.S. (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.051 (1993)). California
had a special statute of limitations for asbestos claims that tolled the running of the
limitations period until the plaintiffs ability to work at his or her ordinary occupation is
impaired. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 340.2(a) (2006) (creating a limitations period that
does not begin until impairment occurs); CARROLL, supra note 383, at 24 (recognizing
California's "relaxed" limitations program).
459. See CARROLL, supra note 383, at 32 (providing a chart listing the change in
litigation share).
460. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1350 (discussing the impact on courts of "docket
inundation").
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rules. 461  Second, the volume creates a demand by the courts for
innovative means of processing cases to reduce costs. The lower "price" of
litigation, in turn, attracts additional cases.462 Third, the defense bar is
unable to adopt vigorous defense strategies because it is overwhelmed.
Fourth, the small number of major asbestos firms on the plaintiffs' side of
the litigation have acquired an enormous amount of resources, which can
be deployed to influence courts and legislators to protect the gravy train.463
Fifth, because of the massive numbers and indefinite nature of many of the
claims, individual plaintiffs have little control over their attorneys.4
Finally, "[i]n practice ... mass tort litigation is reduced to battles between
repeat players who have litigated and negotiated settlements in similar
cases many times in the past., 465  Converting the process into a repeat
player game weakened the check on plaintiffs' counsel provided by the
466
adversarial system.
461. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003) (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)) ("The elephantine mass of asbestos cases lodged in state
and federal courts, we again recognize defies customary judicial administration and calls for
national legislation."); Field & Frank, supra note 451, at 127 ("The pressure of immensely
overcrowded dockets has encouraged legislatures to adopt a posture towards settling multi-
defendant cases that appears to deprive defendants of the fair exercise of their right to a
trial.").
462. See Schwartz, supra note 426, at 867 (quoting Francis McGovern of Duke Law
School, who stated, "If you build a superhighway, there will be a traffic jam" on reducing
transaction costs of filing); see also CARROLL, supra note 383, at 26 (stating how "reduce[d]
per-case transaction costs made filing small claims financially viable for more people,
thereby encouraging mass filings").
463. See Hechler, supra note 428, at 18 (quoting Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA
Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of
Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School)).
464. See Coffee, supra note 415, at 1346 (discussing how individual plaintiffs have little
control over attorneys in mass tort cases, particularly when claims concern potential future
medical problems rather than immediate concerns).
465. Id. at 1365. See generally Biederman, supra note 445 (holding out Baron & Budd
as the epitomy of the repeat player). Biederman quotes a defense attorney, who claims,
'My client is a very small player,' explains one defense lawyer, who asked that his name
not be used because, as he puts it, 'when you irritate [Baron & Budd], they have a tendency
to retaliate."' Id.
466. The RAND study of asbestos litigation found that the pooling of claims helped
induce defendants to settle even weak claims:
By the mid-i 980s, however, plaintiff law firms in areas of heavy asbestos exposure
(such as jurisdictions with shipyards or petrochemical facilities) had learned that
they could succeed against asbestos defendants by filing large numbers of claims,
grouping them together and negotiating with defendants on behalf of the entire
group. Often defendants would agree to settle all of the claims that were so
grouped, including those claims that were questionable, to reduce their overall
costs of litigation. By agreeing to pay questionable smaller-value claims in
exchange for also settling stronger and larger-value claims, defendants could also
contain their financial risk. Some plaintiffs might receive lower values for claims
that were settled as part of a group. But litigating claims en masse lowered the cost
and risk per claim for plaintiff law firms.
CARROLL, supra note 383, at 23; see also Coffee, supra note 415, at 1373-76 (discussing
"new" collusion between parties' attorneys in mass tort litigation made possible by repeat
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The asbestos bar turned to silica cases, using some of the same
techniques.46 7 Perhaps because they learned from the asbestos experience,
silica defendants have proven more resistant.468  In early 2005, the
asbestos-like approach of several prominent plaintiffs' firms ran into
trouble in a multi-district litigation proceeding in front of a medically
sophisticated federal district court judge, Judge Janis Graham Jack.469
In the course of resolving pre-trial motions, Judge Jack uncovered a
pattern of improper diagnoses of silicosis based on inadequate medical
evidence. Among the problems were multiple plaintiffs diagnosed with
both silicosis and asbestosis (sometimes by the same physician, in different
cases), 470  rapid diagnosis (measured in minutes) and radiograph
readings, 471 failure to follow the doctor's own procedures as documented in
academic writings authored by the doctor,472 and improper financial
incentives (doctors and screening companies paid only for positive
diagnoses).47 3  Moreover, as Judge Jack noted, the pattern of silicosis
player aspects).
467. See Hechler, supra note 428, at 18 (finding that the silica plaintiffs' bar was using
the "[slame methodology, same screening companies, same B-readers," according to a
defense attorney). One problem was that many silica plaintiffs were discovered to have
been previously diagnosed with asbestosis by the same screening companies and doctors.
Id. Approximately half of the 10,000 plaintiffs in the Texas MDL proceeding, for example,
had prior asbestos claims. Id.
468. In response to discovering possible fraud, the defense firms in the Houston MDL
proceeding filed a motion seeking $1.1 million in sanctions from the plaintiffs' lawyers, and
some speculate that some defendants who previously paid claims based on diagnoses that
are now suspect will seek to reopen the issue. See id.
469. Judge Janis Graham Jack has received training as a nurse. Id.
470. See In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 607-09 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
The court noted that the rate of reversal of diagnosis of one of the plaintiffs screening
doctors "can only be explained as a product of bias-that is, of Dr. Harron finding evidence
of the disease he was currently being paid to find." Id. at 638. The two diseases produce
different patterns on radiographs. As the court noted, citing testimony from Senate
hearings, "[b]ecause asbestosis and silicosis have such different appearances on an x-ray, in
a clinical setting, 'confusion between silicosis and asbestosis does not occur."' Id. at 595.
471. See id. at 612 (noting that one diagnosing doctor spent less than four minutes per
case on average). A more objective expert estimated that "the entire process of determining
whether an individual has silicosis takes between 60-90 minutes." Id. at 594.
472. See id. at 615-16. Another physician testified that one diagnosing doctor's
procedures "came nowhere near meeting what his own methodology was that he spelled out.
And I have both the Third and Fourth Edition of his textbooks. And in no way does it relate
to that methodology." Id. at 616, 639. The doctor's opinion was excluded because "the
result driven methodology.., is rife with error and speculation." Id.
473. See id. at 601 ("Because of this fee structure, Mr. Mason [owner of the screening
company] testified that the emphasis was on attracting as many people as possible to the
screenings and creating as many positive diagnoses as possible; as he stated, '[f]rom a
business standpoint of mine, you had to do large numbers."'); see also Press Release, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Doctors Refuse to Testify at Silicosis Hearing;
Others Recount Diagnoses 'Manufactured for Money,' available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/03092006_1810.htm (recounting the March 8, 2006
testimony of Heath Mason, co-owner of N&M, Inc., before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee that ".... in the case of the Campbell Cherry law firm of Houston, his
company was only paid for positive diagnoses"), available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/03092006_1810.htm; Lester Brickman, Comments
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claims in the 11 1 cases with more than 10,000 individual plaintiffs474
before her was anomalous when population and regional variations in silica
exposure were considered.475 Moreover, the astonishing rate of silicosis in
Mississippi represented by these cases attracted no press or regulatory
attention.476 The court concluded that
the clear motivation for [plaintiffs attorney, the O'Quinn firm's] micro-
management of the diagnostic process was to inflate the number of
Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the Defendants and the
judicial system. This is apparently done in hopes of extracting mass
nuisance-value settlements because the Defendants and the judicial
system are financially incapable of examining the merits of each
individual claim in the usual manner.
The Court finds that filing and then persisting in the prosecution of
silicosis claims while recklessly disregarding the fact that there is no
reliable basis for believing that every Plaintiff has silicosis constitutes an
unreasonable multiplication of the proceedings. When factoring in the
obvious motivation-overwhelming the system to prevent examination of
each individual claim and to extract mass settlements-the behavior
becomes vexatious as well.
477
Judge Jack's opinion caught the attention of members of the House Energy
and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, who sent
letters and subpoenas to physicians and medical screening companies
identified in her opinion, asking for records and information about their
roles in diagnosing patients with silicosis. 478  At a March 2005 hearing,
three doctors who were responsible for almost 2,000 diagnosed silicosis
claims invoked their constitutional right against self-incrimination and
refused to answer the Committee's questions.479
on NIOSH's Proposed 'B-Reader Code of Ethics,' (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-871965 (discussing the problems of mass screenings).
474. See In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
475. See id. at 572 ("This explosion in the number of silicosis claims in Mississippi
suggests a silicosis epidemic 20 times worse than the Hawk's Nest incident. Indeed, these
claims suggest perhaps the worst industrial disaster in recorded world history.").
476. See id. ("Mississippi's apparent silicosis epidemic has been greeted with silence by
the media, the public, Congress and the scientific communities.").
477. Id. at 676.
478. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce composed several letters in
connection to the Texas silicosis litigation requesting records and information. These letters
are dated between February 17, 2006 and March 6, 2006 and are available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/letters/letters.htm.
479. The doctors invoked their Fifth Amendment rights in response to this question
asked by Subcommittee Chairman Ed Whitfield: "Will you certify that each of these
diagnoses and all others that you made in this litigation are accurate and made pursuant to
all medical practices, standards and ethics?" Press Release, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Doctors Refuse to Testify at Silicosis Hearing; Others Recount Diagnoses
'Manufactured for Money,' available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/
News/03092006_1810.htm; see also Silicosis Clam-Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at A18.
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Although not part of the court's analysis of the validity of the expert
testimony, the court did note that
[i]f searching for an explanation in the legal field, one might focus on the
fact that most of the cases were filed just prior to the effective dates of a
series of recent legislative "tort reform" measures in Mississippi. One
might also focus on the decline in asbestosis lawsuits, leaving a network
of plaintiffs' lawyers and screening companies scouting for a new means
of support.45 0
Seeking additional information from state health officers in 13 states with
"litigation hot spots," the Congressmen expressed concern that the health
benefits of screening for silicosis are undermined
when the screening process identifies serious medical conditions but the
medical professionals involved disavow responsibility for informing the
patient of the finding, explaining its significance, and discussing follow-
up and treatment options. It is hard to imagine circumstances where
leaving such tasks to lawyers could be considered acceptable medical
practice or serving the interests of public health. The health benefit of
even a co.metent screening may well be negated by the lack of medical
follow-up.
Thus, while a common law approach to problems like silica or asbestos
exposure, when injured parties can claim compensation from responsible
parties, might appear to provide incentives for optimal efforts to reduce
exposures, the history of asbestos litigation and this initial foray into silica
litigation suggest otherwise. The court system does not appear to be the
best way to ensure that silica exposure is neither over- nor under-regulated.
480. See In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (analyzing why the
mortality rate in silicosis patients has steadily declined, yet the number of lawsuits is
significantly rising).
481. Press Release, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Committee Broadens
Silicosis Investigation, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/
02172006_ 1784print.htm; see also Letter from the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce to State Health Officials (Feb. 17, 2006), available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/Letters/02172006_1 786.htm. The letter expressed concern
about the medical procedures employed by these doctors:
Medical monitoring or surveillance-including mobile facilities-can play an
important part in protecting and promoting public health. The practices described
in the opinion of Judge Jack, however, raise concerns that the public health
purposes of these screenings are lost in a push only to identify prospective
plaintiffs for a law firm. We are particularly concerned with the apparent lack of
medical supervision and follow-through associated with the mass diagnostic
screenings described in In Re: Silica. As such, we must fully understand the facts
and legal frameworks involved in such practices.
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IV. WHAT TO DO?
If we step back and take a long view of the history of silica in the
workplace and workplace hazards more generally, we can see a pattern
emerge. Governments pay attention only when events facilitate the
formation of a coalition seeking action. At the turn of the twentieth
century, the growth of tort suits spurred both employers and employees to
seek a compromise in the form of workers' compensation legislation,
initially dealing only with accidents-the issue of greatest public appeal.
Although the same technological change that increased accident rates also
increased silica exposures, silica and dust diseases did not become an issue
until the liability crisis of the 1930s. Even accounting for the lag due to
silicosis's long latency period, the timing of that crisis appears more related
to the onset of the Depression than to any actual increase in silicosis.
Again, employers and employees compromised, extending the workers'
compensation system to cover at least some industrial diseases, including
silicosis. The issue again slipped off the regulatory radar screen, emerging
again only with the beginnings of the post-asbestos wave of silicosis suits
in this century.
The regulatory history of silica teaches three important lessons. First,
the most compelling account of the cycle of action and inaction on the part
of regulators is the one based on interest groups. Second, knowledge about
hazards is endogenous-it arises in response to outside events, regulations,
and interest groups. Accepting particular states of knowledge as definitive
is thus a mistake, as is failing to consider the incentives for knowledge
production created by regulatory measures. Third, the rise of the trial bar
as an interest group and the asbestos litigation experience means that the
problems of silica exposure and similar occupational hazards cannot simply
be left to the current legal system for resolution through individual action.
Many OSHA-reform proposals focus on unblocking OSHA's regulatory
process and speeding up the issuance of new standards. 482 Our account
suggests that regulatory speed and volume are not the only problems that
need to be addressed. A faster OSHA that did not accurately identify the
substances that cause harm would simply be imposing costs more quickly.
We suggest a three-pronged approach to silica and occupational health
issues generally. First, before issuing new regulations, OSHA should
clearly define what market failures, if any, impede efficient solutions to
address health risks. Both employers and employees have incentives to
protect health and safety in the workplace.483 The lack of information,
482. See, e.g., MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 185 ("If OSHA is to fulfill its
statutory mandate to protect workers, a way must be found to increase its regulatory
output.").
483. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48 (discussing the financial incentives to
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particularly due to the long latency period for silicosis and lung cancer,
may dampen these incentives. If the problem is a lack of information on
risks and remedies, OSHA and its research counterpart NIOSH should
focus on generating and dispersing better information. Although
occupational health is not a field in which market forces are trusted,484 the
serious problems with the current system cannot be solved without
recognition of the important role played by the Hayekian knowledge
problem.
The federal government can play two important roles in this information
market place. It can be a supplier. Through entities like NIOSH, the
government can sponsor and conduct research that will influence standards.
It can also be a consumer. Just as it did under the Walsh-Healey Act before
OSHA's creation in 1970, 485 the government can demand that its
information suppliers meet standards the government believes are effective.
Second, any regulatory action must recognize the diversity in exposure
and response across the varied workplaces. Given the varying forms of
silica to which workers may be exposed, and the problems of
characterizing those forms and their associated health risk, a uniform
national standard would unlikely be optimal in all situations. Heeding the
lessons we have learned from the history of silica in the workplace, it is
important to contrast the interest group incentives provided by a regulatory
effort aimed at developing a uniform standard with those of a policy aimed
at generating and disseminating information. The uniform standard
provides incentives to interest groups to invest resources in influencing the
standard to suit private goals (for example, gain advantage over
competitors). In contrast, a focus on information provides incentives for
interest groups to compete to develop and provide better information in
support of their views of the risks and remedies.
The "market" for standards that existed before OSHA consisted of
groups like the ACGIH, unions, trade associations, and others.4 86 NIOSH's
entry into this market changed the dynamics, primarily because of the
influence of NIOSH criteria documents in initiating OSHA standards.
Encouraging the development of competing standards for occupational
providing a healthy and safe environment to employees).
484. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 71, at 442-23 (noting that, despite "[t]he great technical
accomplishments of the engineers" in improving occupational health in mines, which led to
"the disappearance of the more extreme forms of pulmonary disease towards the end of the
century," these accomplishments were nonetheless problematic because "[tlhe motivation
underlying the development of mining engineering was fundamentally economic and
therefore only indirectly concerned with creating more healthful working conditions for the
miners").
485. See supra note 287 (discussing in detail how TLVs were incorporated into OSHA
consensus standards and how some were based on inadequate documentation).
486. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
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health would create market pressure for increasing knowledge about harms.
If a standard-setting organization could identify a distinction like the a / 03
kryptonite example discussed earlier and show that the distinction
mattered, it could issue a more effective and less costly standard.
Competitive standards have operated successfully in a number of areas,
including organic food certification and kosher labeling,487 and have
successfully improved quality in a number of areas.488
In contrast to flexible standards that respond to different information, a
uniform standard proves hard to adjust as new information becomes
available, as is evidenced by the current OSHA exposure limit of 0.10
mg/m3.489 Knowledge is dynamic, and uniform standards necessarily lock
in expectations based on the level of knowledge available at a given time.
In particular, regulations that specify which remedies are acceptable or
unacceptable discourage innovation into better solutions.49 °
Finally, the tort system needs to be controlled. Judge Jack's efforts are a
good start, but adequate legal process must depend on more than the
fortunate accident of the judge in charge of mass tort litigation having a
medical background. We do not pretend to know the answers to the many
questions raised by tort reform, from federalism to fee-shifting, but we
contend that the asbestos experience makes clear the inadequacy of modem
tort law to the task of providing appropriate incentives for industrial health.
Defining what to regulate is critical to avoiding both over- and under-
regulation. If the history of silica in the workplace teaches anything, it is
that our knowledge of even obvious hazards is highly dependent on
medical knowledge, available technology, and a host of other factors.
Increasing that knowledge depends on the incentives for knowledge
creation. Unfortunately, locking current knowledge into a regulation does
487. See John Blundell & Colin Robinson, REGULATION WITHOUT THE STATE... THE
DEBATE CONTINUES 18-29 (2000) (discussing the standards and certification programs set
by non-governmental bodies). The authors note that Underwriters Laboratory, for example,
faces competition from 12 other certification organizations and thus has strong incentives to
maintain the quality and reliability of its testing methods and standards.
488. Probably the most well-known private standards are set by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), which describes itself as "a global network that
identifies what International Standards are required by business, government and society,
develops them in partnership with the sectors that will put them to use, adopts them by
transparent procedures based on national input and delivers them to be implemented
worldwide." See ISO, ISO IN BRIEF: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR A SUSTAINABLE
WORLD (2005), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/
isoinbrief 2005-en.pdf. ISO 9000 sets standards for product quality, and ISO 14000 sets
standards for protecting environmental quality. Together, these two generic standards are
implemented by 760,900 organizations in 154 countries. See ISO, ISO 9000 and ISO
14000-In Brief, http://www.iso.org/en/iso9000-14000/understand/inbrief.html.
489. See supra note 337.
490. See supra text accompanying notes 364-69.
[58:2
2006] SILICA & THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY CATEGORIZATION 357
not provide adequate incentives for improving understanding of workplace
hazards. Market-based methods create superior incentives to develop
knowledge about what is regulated, a powerful tool for improving the
quality of regulatory efforts.
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